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California Land Use Practice

Be ready to advise your clients with confidence and get cutting-edge analysis on all major topics in the complex world of California land use practice.

Be ready to advise your clients with confidence and get cutting-edge analysis on all major topics in the complex world of California land use practice.

  • Sustainability and climate change regulations
  • Affordable housing and density bonuses
  • Adopting and amending general plans and specific plans
  • Takings, exactions, and vested rights
  • Environmental regulation (CEQA) in summary
  • Zoning, variances, and conditional use permits
  • Subdivision Map Act in summary
  • Aesthetic regulation and design review
  • Litigating land use decisions
  • Compliance with wetlands and endangered species laws
OnLAW RE94590

Web access for one user.

 

$ 520.00
Print RE33590

2 looseleaf volumes, updated 10/19

 

 

$ 520.00

Be ready to advise your clients with confidence and get cutting-edge analysis on all major topics in the complex world of California land use practice.

  • Sustainability and climate change regulations
  • Affordable housing and density bonuses
  • Adopting and amending general plans and specific plans
  • Takings, exactions, and vested rights
  • Environmental regulation (CEQA) in summary
  • Zoning, variances, and conditional use permits
  • Subdivision Map Act in summary
  • Aesthetic regulation and design review
  • Litigating land use decisions
  • Compliance with wetlands and endangered species laws

1

Overview of Land Use Regulation

Adam U. Lindgren

  • I.  POLICE POWER: THE SOURCE OF LAND USE AUTHORITY
    • A.  Police Power
      • 1.  Sources  1.1
      • 2.  Scope  1.2
    • B.  Limits on Police Power
      • 1.  Governmental Purpose  1.3
      • 2.  Preemption of Federal and State Laws  1.4
        • a.  Federal Preemption  1.5
        • b.  State Preemption  1.6
      • 3.  First Amendment  1.7
        • a.  Speech  1.8
        • b.  Religion  1.9
      • 4.  Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments  1.10
    • C.  Other Sources of Land Use Law  1.11
    • D.  Charter Cities Compared to General Law Cities  1.11A
    • E.  State Land Use Laws Imposed on Charter Cities  1.11B
  • II.  STRUCTURAL HIERARCHY OF LAND USE LAW  1.12
    • A.  Does a Federal or State Constitutional Provision or Law Apply and Preempt Local Regulation?  1.13
    • B.  Is the Desired Land Use Consistent With the City General Plan?  1.14
    • C.  Does the General Plan Require a Specific Plan?  1.15
    • D.  Does the Project Comply With the Zoning Code?  1.16
    • E.  Does the Project Have the Desired Number and Configuration of Parcels?  1.17
    • F.  Does the Project Require Building Permits? If So, Does It Comply With Applicable Building and Development Codes?  1.18
  • III.  PLAYERS/PARTIES  1.19
    • A.  Primary Land Use Agency
      • 1.  City Council or Board of Supervisors  1.20
      • 2.  Planning Commission or Agency  1.21
        • a.  Responsibilities  1.22
        • b.  Meetings  1.23
        • c.  Appeal of Commission Decisions  1.24
      • 3.  The Land Use and Planning Staff Team; Roles  1.25
        • a.  Planning Director  1.26
        • b.  City or County Engineer  1.27
        • c.  Building Official  1.28
        • d.  Code Enforcement Officer  1.29
        • e.  City or County Clerk  1.30
        • f.  City Manager  1.31
        • g.  City Attorney  1.32
    • B.  Other Regulatory Agencies With Permit Authority  1.33
    • C.  Developers  1.34
    • D.  Interested Parties Without Regulatory Authority
      • 1.  Local Community, Labor, Business, and Environmental Groups  1.35
      • 2.  Other Public Agencies  1.36
  • IV.  COMMON STEPS IN THE LAND USE PERMITTING PROCESS  1.37
    • A.  Preliminary Preparation  1.38
    • B.  Project Design; Project Application  1.39
    • C.  Submission of Project Application  1.40
    • D.  Review of Project Application  1.41
    • E.  Administrative Appeal of Project Decision  1.42
    • F.  Judicial Appeal of Project Decision  1.43
  • V.  FINDINGS
    • A.  Generally  1.44
    • B.  Findings Defined  1.45
    • C.  Purposes of Findings  1.46
    • D.  When Findings Are Required  1.47
      • 1.  Legislative Actions  1.48
      • 2.  Adjudicative Actions
        • a.  Nature of Adjudicative Decisions  1.49
        • b.  Appeal of Adjudicative Decisions  1.50
      • 3.  Ministerial Actions  1.51
      • 4.  Statutorily Required Findings  1.52
    • E.  Legally Adequate Findings  1.53
      • 1.  Adoption of Findings of Planning Commission, Other Lower Bodies, and Staff  1.54
      • 2.  Oral Findings  1.55
      • 3.  Boilerplate, Conclusory Findings  1.56
      • 4.  Findings Unrelated or Irrelevant to Statutory Findings and Requirements  1.57
    • F.  Table: Cases on Findings  1.58

2

General and Specific Plans

Steven T. Mattas

Adam U. Lindgren

  • I.  GENERAL PLANS
    • A.  General Functions
      • 1.  Blueprint for Planning and Development  2.1
      • 2.  Establishes Land Use Patterns  2.2
      • 3.  Framework for Capital and Infrastructure Improvements  2.3
      • 4.  Foundation for Development Impact Fees  2.4
      • 5.  Provides CEQA Standards of Significance and Basis for Tiering  2.5
    • B.  Mandatory Elements  2.6
      • 1.  Land Use  2.7
        • a.  Consistency With Airport Land Use Compatibility Plan  2.8
        • b.  Consultation With School Districts  2.9
        • c.  Consultation With Native American Tribes  2.10
        • d.  Sphere of Influence  2.11
      • 2.  Circulation  2.12
      • 3.  Housing  2.13
        • a.  Required Contents  2.14
        • b.  Methods of Compliance  2.15
        • c.  Land Suitable and Available for Residential Development  2.16
        • d.  Substantial Compliance  2.17
        • e.  Reduction in Housing Opportunities  2.18
        • f.  Periodic Review  2.19
      • 4.  Conservation  2.20
      • 5.  Open Space  2.21
      • 6.  Noise  2.22
      • 7.  Safety  2.23
      • 8.  Environmental Justice  2.23A
    • C.  Permissive Elements  2.24
      • 1.  Urban Design  2.25
      • 2.  Economic Development  2.26
    • D.  Legal Adequacy
      • 1.  Completeness  2.27
      • 2.  Internal Consistency  2.28
      • 3.  Presumption of Validity of Housing Element  2.29
    • E.  Consistency of Project With General Plan  2.30
    • F.  Adoption and Amendment  2.31
      • 1.  Procedure
        • a.  Planning Agency and Legislative Body  2.32
        • b.  Other Agencies and Entities  2.33
      • 2.  Public Hearing; Notice Requirements  2.34
      • 3.  Planning Agency Recommendation  2.35
      • 4.  City Council or Board of Supervisors Consideration  2.36
      • 5.  Maximum Amendments Per Year  2.37
      • 6.  Initiation of Adoption or Amendment Process
        • a.  By Board of Supervisors or City Council  2.38
        • b.  By Planning Staff  2.39
        • c.  By Blue Ribbon Commission  2.40
        • d.  By Developer or Interest Group  2.41
      • 7.  Initiative Measure  2.42
      • 8.  Statute of Limitations; Judicial Review  2.43
    • G.  Administration  2.44
  • II.  SPECIFIC PLANS
    • A.  Overview  2.45
      • 1.  Advantages  2.46
      • 2.  Disadvantages  2.47
    • B.  Content of Specific Plans
      • 1.  Required Elements  2.48
      • 2.  Permissive Content; Organization  2.49
    • C.  Design Guidelines  2.50
    • D.  Existing Commitments and Constraints  2.51
    • E.  Zoning Standards  2.52
    • F.  Imposing Conditions of Approval  2.53
    • G.  Local Guidelines  2.54
    • H.  Consistency With General Plan  2.55
    • I.  Relation to Zoning and Other Plans  2.56
    • J.  Procedures for Adoption, Amendment, and Repeal  2.57
    • K.  Fees  2.58
    • L.  CEQA Compliance  2.59
    • M.  Streamlined Housing Development Plans  2.59A
    • N.  Referendum and Initiative; Judicial Review  2.60

3

Growth Management

Thomas Jacobson

  • I.  INTRODUCTION
    • A.  Growth Management Generally  3.1
    • B.  History  3.2
    • C.  Motivations for Growth Management  3.3
  • II.  TYPES OF GROWTH CONTROL MEASURES
    • A.  Local Implementation of Growth Measures  3.4
    • B.  Residential Growth Limitations  3.5
    • C.  Commercial and Industrial Growth Limitations  3.6
    • D.  “Anti-Sprawl” Measures  3.7
      • 1.  Urban Growth Boundaries (UGBs)  3.8
      • 2.  “Smart Growth”  3.9
    • E.  Resource-Based Growth Management  3.10
    • F.  Voter Approval Requirements  3.11
  • III.  GROWTH CONTROL: LEGAL AUTHORITY  3.12
  • IV.  GROWTH CONTROL: LEGAL LIMITATIONS  3.13
    • A.  Takings
      • 1.  Regulatory Takings  3.14
      • 2.  Applying the Takings Clause to Growth Control Measures  3.15
    • B.  Due Process Challenges  3.16
    • C.  Equal Protection Challenges  3.17
    • D.  Growth Management and State Housing Law  3.18
      • 1.  Challenges Based on Govt C §65008(b)(1)(C)  3.19
      • 2.  Challenges Based on Govt C §65913.1  3.20
      • 3.  Challenges Based on Govt C §65915  3.21
      • 4.  Challenges Based on State “Housing Element” Law  3.22
      • 5.  Factual Inquiry in Housing Law Challenges to Growth Control Measures  3.23
    • E.  Findings Required for Certain Types of Growth Management Measures  3.24
      • 1.  Government Code §65863.6  3.25
      • 2.  Government Code §65302.8  3.26
    • F.  Unique Characteristics of Growth Management Initiatives  3.27
      • 1.  Limitations on Amendment and Repeal  3.28
      • 2.  Notice and Hearing Requirements  3.29
      • 3.  CEQA Review  3.30

4

Zoning

Vivian Kahn, FAICP

Daniel A. Muller

  • I.  WHAT IS ZONING?
    • A.  Introduction  4.1
    • B.  Zoning Distinguished From Planning, Building, and Housing Codes  4.2
    • C.  Zoning Implements and Must Be Consistent With the General Plan  4.3
  • II.  ORIGINS AND HISTORY
    • A.  Early U.S. Zoning Ordinances  4.4
    • B.  Early California Ordinances  4.5
    • C.  Federal Influence  4.6
  • III.  APPROACHES TO ZONING
    • A.  Use Zoning  4.7
    • B.  Performance Zoning  4.8
    • C.  Form Zoning  4.9
    • D.  Character Zoning  4.10
    • E.  Hybrid Zoning  4.11
  • IV.  RECENT TRENDS IN ZONING APPROACHES  4.12
    • A.  New Urbanism  4.13
    • B.  Guidelines Versus Standards  4.14
    • C.  Incentive-Based Regulation  4.15
    • D.  User-Friendly Zoning Codes  4.16
  • V.  SOURCES OF ZONING AUTHORITY
    • A.  U.S. Constitution  4.17
    • B.  California Constitution  4.18
    • C.  Statutory Authorization  4.19
  • VI.  FEDERAL AND STATE LIMITATIONS ON ZONING AUTHORITY
    • A.  Federal Law  4.20
      • 1.  Federal Housing Laws  4.21
      • 2.  Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act  4.22
      • 3.  Federal Environmental Laws and Regulations  4.23
      • 4.  Sign Regulations  4.24
    • B.  State Law
      • 1.  General Plan Consistency and Local Coastal Plans  4.25
      • 2.  California Fair Employment and Housing Act  4.26
      • 3.  Accessory Dwelling Units  4.27
      • 4.  Table: California Statutes That Limit Local Zoning Authority  4.28
  • VII.  ADOPTING OR AMENDING ZONING
    • A.  Requirements to Adopt or Amend Zoning
      • 1.  Relation to Public Welfare  4.29
      • 2.  Clarity, Vagueness, and Other Constitutional Issues  4.30
    • B.  Procedural and Notice Requirements
      • 1.  Types of Zoning Amendments: Rezonings and Text Amendments  4.31
      • 2.  Procedural Requirements
        • a.  Planning Commission and Legislative Body Hearings  4.32
        • b.  Notice and Hearing Requirements  4.33
        • c.  Conduct of Hearings  4.34
        • d.  Adoption of Interim Urgency Ordinances  4.35
    • C.  Zoning Amendment Versus Other Forms of Land Use Regulation  4.36
    • D.  Planned Unit Developments: When Does a Project Require a Rezoning?  4.37
    • E.  Initiative- and Referendum-Based Zoning
      • 1.  Zoning Initiatives  4.38
      • 2.  Zoning Referendums  4.39
  • VIII.  ZONING CODE CONTENTS AND STRUCTURE
    • A.  Structure of Zoning Ordinances  4.40
    • B.  Discretion to Separate Districts and Uses  4.41
    • C.  Table: Types of Zoning Districts  4.42
    • D.  Designating Uses  4.43
    • E.  Use Provisions  4.44
      • 1.  Permitted, Conditional, and Prohibited Uses  4.45
      • 2.  Primary and Accessory Uses  4.46
    • F.  Table: Design Provisions  4.47
    • G.  Moratorium Provisions  4.48
  • IX.  INTERPRETATION OF ZONING CODE  4.49
    • A.  Rules of Statutory Construction  4.50
    • B.  Guidance From Zoning Ordinances  4.51
  • X.  SPECIFIC TYPES OF BASE ZONING DISTRICTS
    • A.  Residential  4.52
      • 1.  Home Occupation Use in Residential Zone  4.53
      • 2.  Uses Incidental to Residential Use  4.54
      • 3.  Regulating Occupancy in Residential Zones  4.55
    • B.  Commercial Zones  4.56
    • C.  Industrial Zones  4.57
    • D.  Agricultural Zones and the Williamson Act  4.58
    • E.  Open-Space Zones  4.59
      • 1.  Urban Reserves  4.60
      • 2.  Urban Growth Boundaries  4.61
      • 3.  Visual Corridors  4.62
      • 4.  Conservation Easements  4.63
    • F.  Public and Quasi-Public Zones  4.64
      • 1.  School Sites  4.65
      • 2.  Water Facilities of Other Local Agencies  4.66
    • G.  Mixed-Use Zones  4.67
    • H.  Planned Unit Development  4.68
    • I.  Smart Growth  4.69
    • J.  Transit-Oriented Development Zones  4.70
    • K.  Airport Zones  4.71
    • L.  Hazard Zones
      • 1.  Flood Zones and the Cobey-Alquist Flood Plain Management Act  4.72
      • 2.  Alquist-Priolo Fault Zones  4.73
      • 3.  Cortese Sites  4.74
    • M.  Historic District Zones  4.75
    • N.  Solar Energy Rights and Easements  4.76
  • XI.  FISCALIZATION OF LAND USE  4.77
    • A.  Brief History of Why Fiscalization of Land Use Is Occurring  4.78
    • B.  Long-Term Costs and Benefits of Residential Versus Commercial and Industrial  4.79
    • C.  Tools for Assisting With Community Development
      • 1.  Business Improvement Districts  4.80
      • 2.  Mello-Roos Districts  4.81
    • D.  Laws Regulating Sales Tax Generators  4.82
      • 1.  Formula Business and Chain Store Regulation  4.83
      • 2.  Large Format, Big Box Retail  4.84
      • 3.  Auto Sales  4.85

5

Sustainability and Climate Change Regulations

Steven T. Mattas

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  5.1
  • II.  ACHIEVING GREENHOUSE GAS REDUCTION
    • A.  California’s Global Warming Solutions Act (AB 32)  5.2
    • B.  Air Resources Board Scoping Plan  5.3
    • C.  CEQA Guidelines on Greenhouse Gas Emissions  5.4
    • D.  Transportation and Land Use Integration (SB 375)  5.5
      • 1.  Regional Transportation and Land Use Planning to Achieve Greenhouse Gas Emissions Reduction  5.6
      • 2.  CEQA Streamlining for Mixed-Use, Residential, and Transportation Priority Projects (SB 375)  5.7
      • 3.  Regional Housing Needs Allocation (RHNA)  5.8
    • E.  California’s Cap-and-Trade Program  5.8A
  • III.  GREEN BUILDING STANDARDS
    • A.  State Green Building Standards  5.9
    • B.  Energy Commission Standards  5.10
    • C.  Local Regulations May Exceed State Green Building Code Requirements  5.11
    • D.  Green Building Rating Systems  5.12
  • IV.  LOCAL GOVERNMENT SUSTAINABILITY REGULATIONS  5.13
    • A.  General Plan Updates—Sustainability Element  5.14
    • B.  Climate Action Plans  5.15
    • C.  Local Green Building Ordinances  5.16
    • D.  Methods for Public Financing of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy  5.17
    • E.  Local Solar Programs  5.18
    • F.  Laws Related to Use and Regulation of Solar Energy Systems  5.19
    • G.  Localities May Adopt Building Standards for Graywater Use in Buildings  5.20
    • H.  Regulation of Small Wind Energy Systems  5.21
    • I.  Streamlining of Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Projects  5.22

6

Housing

Steven T. Mattas

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  6.1
    • A.  Inclusionary Housing  6.2
    • B.  Residential Accessory Dwelling Units (ADUs)  6.3
    • C.  Density Bonuses for Affordable Housing, Senior, Youth, Veteran, and Homeless Person Housing, and Child Care Facilities
      • 1.  Introduction to Density Bonuses  6.4
      • 2.  Processing Density Bonus Applications; Required Notice to Applicants   6.4A
      • 3.  “Housing Developments” Defined in Context of Density Bonus  6.5
      • 4.  Density Bonus Standards  6.6
        • a.  Lower-Income Housing Density Bonus  6.7
        • b.  Very Low-Income Housing Density Bonus  6.8
        • c.  Moderate-Income Housing Density Bonus for Common Interest Units  6.9
        • d.  Density Bonuses for Senior Housing, Student Housing, and Housing for Transitional Youths, Disabled Veterans, and Homeless Persons  6.10
        • e.  Child Care Facilities  6.11
        • f.  Donation of Land by Developer  6.12
      • 5.  Restrictive Covenant Required to Receive Bonus  6.13
      • 6.  Regulatory and Financial Concessions and Incentives  6.14
      • 7.  Parking Requirements for Density Bonus Units  6.15
    • D.  Required Findings for Denial of or Conditions on an Emergency Shelter or Affordable Housing and Other Housing Projects  6.16
    • E.  Prohibition of Discrimination Related to Residential Development  6.16A
    • F.  Expedited Affordable Housing Approval Processes   6.16B
  • II.  RESIDENTIAL CARE HOMES  6.17
    • A.  Residential Care for Six or Fewer Persons  6.18
    • B.  Residential Care and the Fair Housing Act  6.19
  • III.  MOBILE HOME PARKS  6.20

7

Conditions of Land Use and Development Approval; Variances; Conditional Use Permits; and Planned Unit Developments

Jeri L. Burge

  • I.  CHAPTER OVERVIEW  7.1
  • II.  CONDITIONS OF LAND USE AND DEVELOPMENT APPROVAL
    • A.  Wide Range of Requirements  7.2
    • B.  Conditions of Approval May Include, But Are Not Limited to, Exactions  7.3
    • C.  General Process for Creating Conditions of Approval  7.4
    • D.  Findings Related to Conditions of Approval  7.5
    • E.  Purpose of Conditions  7.6
    • F.  Sources of Authority to Impose Conditions of Approval  7.7
      • 1.  Police Power  7.8
      • 2.  Public Infrastructure Statutes  7.9
        • a.  School Impact Fees  7.10
        • b.  Parks and Recreational Facilities: The Quimby Act  7.11
        • c.  Subdivision Map Act Conditions  7.12
        • d.  Mitigation Fee Act Conditions  7.13
        • e.  California Environmental Quality Act  7.14
        • f.  Assessment Districts  7.15
      • 3.  General and Specific Plans, and Subdivision and Zoning Ordinances  7.16
    • G.  General Principles and Limitations Common to Land Use Conditions  7.17
    • H.  Compliance With Lawfully Imposed Conditions of Approval Is Required  7.18
  • III.  VARIANCES AND CONDITIONAL USE PERMITS
    • A.  Overview of Variances and Use Permits  7.19
    • B.  Variances
      • 1.  Authorization and Purpose  7.20
      • 2.  Requirements for Granting a Variance; “Hardship”  7.21
      • 3.  Procedures Required for Consideration of Variance  7.22
      • 4.  Imposing Conditions on Variances  7.23
      • 5.  Findings Required for Variances
        • a.  Statutory Requirements  7.24
        • b.  Table: Examples of Case Findings  7.25
        • c.  Documenting the Findings; Adequacy  7.26
      • 6.  Standard of Review for Challenges to Variances  7.27
    • C.  Conditional Use Permits (CUPs)
      • 1.  Authorization and Purpose  7.28
      • 2.  Requirements for Consideration of a CUP  7.29
      • 3.  Procedure for Consideration of a CUP
        • a.  Generally  7.30
        • b.  When First Amendment Protections Are Implicated  7.31
      • 4.  Procedure for Imposing Conditions as Part of the Consideration of a CUP  7.32
      • 5.  Findings Required for Issuance of a CUP  7.33
      • 6.  Effectiveness of CUPs; Termination  7.34
      • 7.  Revocation  7.35
        • a.  Authorization  7.36
        • b.  Procedure  7.37
        • c.  Findings  7.38
        • d.  Standard of Review  7.39
  • IV.  PLANNED UNIT DEVELOPMENTS (PUDS)
    • A.  Definition and Purpose  7.40
    • B.  Establishment and Validity of a PUD  7.41
  • V.  CONTESTING CONDITIONS OF DEVELOPMENT APPROVAL  7.42
    • A.  Challenging Variances, CUPs, and PUDs by Writ of Mandate
      • 1.  Evidentiary Standard  7.43
      • 2.  Statute of Limitations  7.44
      • 3.  Mediation  7.45
    • B.  Challenging Fees, Dedication Requirements, and Other Exactions Imposed as Development Conditions  7.46

8

Nonconforming Uses

Mary Jo Lanzafame

  • I.  NATURE OF NONCONFORMING USE
    • A.  Background  8.1
    • B.  Definition of Nonconforming Use  8.2
    • C.  Nonconforming Use as a Vested Right  8.3
    • D.  Types of Nonconformities
      • 1.  Nonconforming Uses in the Zoning Context  8.4
      • 2.  Nonconforming Uses in the Nonzoning Context  8.5
    • E.  Nonconforming Use Distinguished From Variance and Conditional Use Permit  8.6
  • II.  CONTINUATION OF NONCONFORMING USES
    • A.  Ordinances Allowing for Continuation of Nonconforming Use  8.7
    • B.  Lawful Existence of Use Before Enactment of Precluding Ordinance; Burden of Proof  8.8
    • C.  Policy Reasons for Continuing Nonconformity  8.9
  • III.  ACTIVITY AFFECTING RIGHT TO CONTINUE NONCONFORMING USE
    • A.  Prohibiting Expansion of Nonconforming Use  8.10
    • B.  Extension, Increase, or Enlargement of Nonconforming Use
      • 1.  General Rule  8.11
      • 2.  Diminishing Asset Doctrine Exception: Hansen Decision  8.12
      • 3.  Enlargement of Use Within a Building  8.13
      • 4.  Expansion of Land Use Throughout Parcel  8.14
    • C.  Effect of Similarity and Intensity of Changed Use  8.15
    • D.  Repairs or Alterations  8.16
  • IV.  TERMINATION OF NONCONFORMING USES
    • A.  Evolution of Perspectives
      • 1.  Historical Perspective  8.17
      • 2.  Termination by Zoning Ordinance  8.18
      • 3.  Emerging Perspective  8.19
    • B.  Methods of Terminating Nonconforming Uses
      • 1.  Conversion to a Less Intense Nonconforming Use  8.20
      • 2.  Rebuilding After Damage or Destruction  8.21
      • 3.  No Reuse After Abandonment  8.22
      • 4.  Termination by Amortization  8.23
        • a.  Amortization of Buildings and Structures  8.24
        • b.  Amortization of Nonconforming Land Uses  8.25
      • 5.  Immediate Termination on Nuisance Theory  8.26

9

Subdivision Map Act

Adam U. Lindgren

Sue A. Gallagher

  • I.  OVERVIEW OF THE MAP ACT  9.1
    • A.  Scope  9.2
    • B.  Purpose  9.3
    • C.  Local Agency Authority and Map Act Preemption  9.4
      • 1.  Principles of Preemption  9.5
      • 2.  Application of Preemption
        • a.  Cases Favoring Preemption  9.6
        • b.  Cases Finding No Preemption  9.7
    • D.  Relation to Other State Laws  9.8
      • 1.  Subdivided Lands Act  9.9
      • 2.  Land Surveyors’ Act  9.10
      • 3.  Other Land Use Regulations  9.11
  • II.  WHAT IS A SUBDIVISION AND WHEN IS A MAP REQUIRED  9.12
    • A.  Elements of a Subdivision
      • 1.  A “Division” of Land  9.13
      • 2.  For Purposes of Sale, Lease, or Finance  9.14
      • 3.  “Any Unit or Units of Land”  9.15
      • 4.  “By a Subdivider”  9.16
    • B.  Specific Transactions  9.17
      • 1.  Deed of Trust or Other Financing Instrument  9.18
      • 2.  Divisions of Airspace (Condominiums, Community Apartments, Stock Cooperatives)  9.19
      • 3.  Gifts and Devises  9.20
      • 4.  Life Estates  9.21
      • 5.  Tax Foreclosure Sales  9.22
      • 6.  Environmental Subdivisions  9.23
  • III.  EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS  9.24
    • A.  Leases Excluded From Map Act  9.25
      • 1.  Financing and Lease of Apartment, Office, and Mobilehome Space  9.26
      • 2.  Financing and Lease of New Commercial Buildings  9.27
      • 3.  Financing and Lease of Existing Commercial Buildings  9.28
      • 4.  Mineral, Oil, and Gas Leases  9.29
      • 5.  Agricultural Leases  9.30
      • 6.  Leases for Agricultural Labor Housing  9.30A
      • 7.  Wind-Powered and Solar Electrical Generators  9.31
      • 8.  Biogas Projects  9.31A
      • 9.  Cellular Transmission Facilities  9.32
    • B.  Lot-Line Adjustments  9.33
      • 1.  Four or Fewer Parcels  9.34
      • 2.  Adjoining Parcels  9.35
      • 3.  No Additional Parcels Created  9.36
      • 4.  Local Agency Approval  9.37
      • 5.  Recordation of Deed  9.38
    • C.  Condominium Conversions  9.39
      • 1.  Conversion of Community Apartment Project  9.40
      • 2.  Conversion of a Stock Cooperative  9.41
    • D.  Accessory Dwelling Units  9.42
    • E.  Miscellaneous Exemptions
      • 1.  Cemeteries  9.43
      • 2.  State Lands Commission; Tidelands  9.44
      • 3.  Separate Assessments  9.45
      • 4.  Small Removable Commercial Buildings  9.46
      • 5.  Short-Term Lease of Railroad Right-of-Way  9.47
  • IV.  RECOMBINING PARCELS: MERGER, REVERSION, RESUBDIVISION, AND EXCLUSION  9.48
    • A.  Voluntary Merger  9.49
    • B.  Reversion to Acreage  9.50
    • C.  Resubdivision  9.51
    • D.  Involuntary Merger  9.52
      • 1.  Eligibility for Involuntary Merger  9.53
      • 2.  Procedure for Involuntary Merger  9.54
        • a.  Notice of Intention to Determine Status  9.55
        • b.  Hearing  9.56
        • c.  Determination  9.57
      • 3.  Unmerger  9.58
      • 4.  Exclusive Means for Involuntary Merger  9.59
    • E.  Exclusions From Map Itself  9.60
  • V.  DETERMINING WHICH TYPE OF MAP IS REQUIRED
    • A.  Tentative and Final Maps
      • 1.  Two-Step Process for Larger Subdivisions  9.61
      • 2.  General Rule: Subdivisions Creating Five or More Parcels or Units Require Tentative and Final Map  9.62
      • 3.  Exceptions to General Rule Requiring Tentative and Final Map  9.63
      • 4.  Counting Parcels
        • a.  Remainder Parcels  9.64
        • b.  Conveyances to Public Entities and Public Utilities  9.65
        • c.  Successive Divisions by Same Subdivider  9.66
      • 5.  Vesting Tentative Maps  9.67
    • B.  Parcel Maps
      • 1.  General Rule: Subdivisions of Four or Fewer Parcels Require a Parcel Map  9.68
      • 2.  Exceptions to Rule Requiring Parcel Map  9.69
      • 3.  Local Agency May Also Require a Tentative Map  9.70
  • VI.  PROCESSING TENTATIVE MAPS AND PARCEL MAPS
    • A.  Processing Tentative Maps  9.71
      • 1.  Who Processes Tentative Maps  9.72
      • 2.  Filing Tentative Maps  9.73
      • 3.  Review by Other Agencies  9.74
      • 4.  Local Agencies Apply Laws in Effect When Map Application Deemed Complete  9.75
      • 5.  Role of Findings in Approval or Denial of Map  9.76
      • 6.  Grounds for Denial of Tentative Map  9.77
    • B.  Processing Parcel Maps  9.78
    • C.  Processing Vesting Tentative Maps
      • 1.  Vested Rights  9.79
      • 2.  Procedures Established by Local Law  9.80
      • 3.  Information Required  9.81
      • 4.  Maps Not in Compliance With Zoning Ordinances  9.82
  • VII.  CONDITIONS FOR MAP APPROVAL
    • A.  Basis for Imposition of Conditions: Police Power and Map Act  9.83
    • B.  Practical Considerations in Addressing Conditions  9.84
    • C.  General Conditions Authorized by the Map Act  9.85
      • 1.  Design and Improvement of Subdivisions  9.86
      • 2.  Consistency With General Plan  9.87
      • 3.  Environmental Protections  9.88
    • D.  Specific Conditions Authorized for Subdivisions of Four or Fewer Parcels  9.89
    • E.  Specific Conditions Authorized for Subdivisions of Five or More Parcels
      • 1.  Dedications  9.90
        • a.  Roads and Transportation  9.91
        • b.  Solar Access Easements  9.92
        • c.  Parks and Recreation (Quimby Act)  9.93
        • d.  Elementary Schools  9.94
      • 2.  Mandatory Public Access to Public Resources  9.95
      • 3.  Reservations  9.96
      • 4.  Fees  9.97
        • a.  Storm Drainage and Sanitary Sewer Facilities  9.98
        • b.  Bridges and Major Thoroughfares  9.99
        • c.  Groundwater Recharge Facilities  9.100
      • 5.  Other Conditions
        • a.  Grading and Erosion Control  9.101
        • b.  Adequacy of Water for Large Subdivisions  9.102
        • c.  Safety in Fire Hazard Zones  9.102A
        • d.  Passive or Natural Heating and Cooling  9.103
        • e.  Cable and Communication Systems  9.104
        • f.  Indemnification  9.105
    • F.  Procedural Issues Related to Imposition of Conditions
      • 1.  What Standards Apply?  9.106
      • 2.  Conditions for Subsequent Building Permits in Residential Subdivisions: “One Bite of the Apple”  9.107
      • 3.  Acceptance of Dedications  9.108
      • 4.  Reconveyance of Dedication  9.109
      • 5.  Refund of Fees  9.110
      • 6.  Reimbursement Agreements for “Oversized” Improvements  9.111
      • 7.  Timing of Construction of Required Improvements  9.112
      • 8.  Waiver of Off-Site Improvements  9.113
      • 9.  Challenging the Conditions  9.114
  • VIII.  LIFE OF TENTATIVE MAPS
    • A.  Generally  9.115
    • B.  Initial Duration and Discretionary Extensions  9.116
    • C.  Legislative Extensions  9.117
    • D.  Multiple Final Maps  9.118
    • E.  Conditions Imposed on Extensions  9.119
    • F.  Development Agreements and Related Permits  9.120
    • G.  Tolling of a Tentative Map’s Life  9.121
      • 1.  Development Moratorium  9.122
      • 2.  Litigation Stay  9.123
      • 3.  Table: Summary of Extensions  9.124
  • IX.  FINAL MAPS  9.125
    • A.  Final Map Must Be Filed Before Expiration of Tentative Map  9.126
    • B.  Final Map in Substantial Compliance With Tentative Map Must Be Approved  9.127
    • C.  Grounds for Disapproval of Final Map  9.128
    • D.  Improvement Security  9.129
      • 1.  Types of Improvement Agreements  9.130
      • 2.  Off-Site Improvements  9.131
      • 3.  Security for Agreements
        • a.  Obligations Secured  9.132
        • b.  Forms of Security  9.133
        • c.  Amount of Security  9.134
        • d.  Release of Security  9.135
    • E.  Final Map Standards and Requirements  9.136
  • X.  CERTIFICATES OF COMPLIANCE AND ANTIQUATED MAPS  9.137
    • A.  Significance  9.138
    • B.  Procedure for Issuance  9.139
    • C.  Grounds for Issuance  9.140
      • 1.  Was the Parcel Lawfully Created?  9.141
        • a.  Creation of Parcel by Deed or Patent  9.142
        • b.  Creation of Parcel by Map  9.143
        • c.  Other Grounds for Issuance of Certificates of Compliance  9.144
      • 2.  Has the Parcel Been Extinguished?  9.145
    • D.  Conditional Certificates of Compliance  9.146
  • XI.  ENFORCEMENT, PENALTIES, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW OF DECISIONS UNDER THE MAP ACT
    • A.  Prohibited Activities  9.147
    • B.  Remedies
      • 1.  Buyer’s Remedies
        • a.  Invalidation of Conveyance, Sale, or Purchase Agreement  9.148
        • b.  Damages  9.149
        • c.  Injunction or Other Equitable Remedy  9.150
      • 2.  Local Agency’s Remedies
        • a.  Injunction or Other Equitable Remedy  9.151
        • b.  Criminal Penalties  9.152
        • c.  Notice of Violation  9.153
        • d.  Denial of Permits  9.154
      • 3.  Third Party Remedies  9.155
        • a.  Invalidation of the Local Agency Decision  9.156
        • b.  Injunction or Other Equitable Remedy  9.157
      • 4.  Stay of Expiration of Tentative Map  9.158
    • C.  Judicial Review of Local Agency Action  9.159
      • 1.  Statute of Limitations  9.160
      • 2.  Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies  9.161
      • 3.  Standard of Review  9.162

10

Aesthetic Regulation and Design Review

Thomas Jacobson

  • I.  AESTHETIC REGULATION GENERALLY
    • A.  Legal Authority  10.1
    • B.  Legal Limitations
      • 1.  Preemption  10.2
        • a.  Preemption by First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution  10.3
        • b.  Preemption by the Lanham Act  10.4
      • 2.  Vagueness  10.5
    • C.  California Environmental Quality Act  10.6
  • II.  DESIGN REVIEW
    • A.  Defined  10.7
    • B.  Design Review versus Private Homeowners’ Association Design Regulations  10.8
    • C.  Motivation  10.9
    • D.  Legal Authority
      • 1.  Police Power  10.10
      • 2.  Case Law  10.11
    • E.  The Design Review Process
      • 1.  General Plans  10.12
      • 2.  Specific Plans  10.13
      • 3.  Design Review Ordinances  10.14
      • 4.  Design Guidelines; Design Review Flowchart  10.15
    • F.  Enforcement  10.16
    • G.  Legal Issues  10.17
      • 1.  Preemption  10.18
      • 2.  Judicial Review
        • a.  Substantial Evidence Test  10.19
        • b.  Burden of Proof; Deference to Local Agency  10.20
        • c.  “Heightened Scrutiny” Standard  10.21
        • d.  Expert Testimony Not Required  10.22
      • 3.  Challenges Based on Vagueness  10.23
      • 4.  Relationship to Zoning  10.24
    • H.  Design Review Under CEQA  10.25

11

Building Regulations

Joseph J. Chapman

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  11.1
  • II.  CALIFORNIA BUILDING STANDARDS LAW  11.2
    • A.  State Building Standards Versus Model Codes  11.3
    • B.  Local Adoption and Amendment  11.4
      • 1.  Effective Date of Local Changes  11.5
      • 2.  Adoption Requirements; Effect of Failure to Adopt  11.6
      • 3.  Maintenance of Copy of Title 24  11.7
    • C.  Adoption and Amendment by Local Fire District  11.8
    • D.  State Housing Law  11.9
      • 1.  Local Adoption  11.10
      • 2.  Local Amendment  11.11
  • III.  SPECIAL STANDARDS
    • A.  Accessibility for Individuals With Disabilities
      • 1.  Federal Standards  11.12
      • 2.  California Standards  11.13
      • 3.  Universal Design  11.14
    • B.  Earthquake Protection  11.15
      • 1.  Local Government Enforcement  11.16
      • 2.  Alquist-Priolo Earthquake Fault Zoning Act  11.17
    • C.  Historical Buildings  11.18
    • D.  Mobilehomes, Special Occupancy Units, and Factory-Built Housing
      • 1.  Mobilehomes and Special Occupancy Units  11.19
      • 2.  Construction Within Mobilehome and Special Occupancy Parks  11.20
      • 3.  Factory-Built Housing  11.21
    • E.  Green Building  11.21A
      • 1.  Rating Systems  11.21B
      • 2.  State Law  11.21C
        • a.  Green Building Standards Code  11.21D
        • b.  Building Energy Efficiency Standards  11.21E
      • 3.  Local Green Building Ordinances  11.21F
      • 4.  Incentives  11.21G
    • F.  Graywater Systems  11.21H
  • IV.  PERMITS AND ENFORCEMENT
    • A.  Submission and Processing of Plans; Plan Checking  11.22
    • B.  Inspections and Certificates of Occupancy  11.23
    • C.  Local Enforcement Obligations  11.24
    • D.  Stop Work Orders and Other Remedies for Violations  11.25
    • E.  Role of Building Permits in Conditions of Approval  11.26
    • F.  Permit Issuance: Avco Vested Rights  11.27
    • G.  Defense of Equitable Estoppel  11.28

12

Specially Regulated Land Uses

Steven T. Mattas

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  12.1
  • II.  FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
    • A.  Adult Business Regulation  12.2
      • 1.  General Overview  12.3
      • 2.  Substantial Government Interests Justifying Regulation  12.4
      • 3.  Appropriate Government Findings  12.5
      • 4.  Adult Business Zones  12.6
      • 5.  Regulation of Patron and Performer Conduct and Hours of Operation  12.7
      • 6.  Procedural Requirements for Licensing Schemes and Permits  12.8
    • B.  Newspaper Rack Regulation  12.9
    • C.  Sign Regulation  12.10
      • 1.  Authority to Regulate  12.11
      • 2.  Outdoor Advertising Act  12.12
      • 3.  Regulation of Sign Content  12.13
      • 4.  Commercial Speech and Preferential Treatment  12.14
      • 5.  Political Signs: Public Versus Private Property  12.15
      • 6.  Discretionary Approval for Sign Permits  12.16
      • 7.  Amortization of Nonconforming Signs  12.17
      • 8.  Mobile Billboard Advertising  12.18
    • D.  Right of Assembly and Public Forum Issues
      • 1.  Federal Cases  12.19
      • 2.  California Cases  12.20
    • E.  Fortune-Telling  12.21
    • F.  Religious Institutions
      • 1.  Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act  12.22
        • a.  RLUIPA and Land Use Decisions  12.23
        • b.  Free Exercise of Religion  12.24
        • c.  Substantial Burden on Exercise of Religion  12.25
        • d.  RLUIPA and Strict Scrutiny Review of Land Use Actions  12.26
          • (1)  Compelling Government Interest  12.27
          • (2)  Least Restrictive Means Possible  12.28
      • 2.  State Law Restrictions  12.29
    • G.  Religious Monuments on Public Property  12.30
  • III.  GAMBLING
    • A.  Native American Lands
      • 1.  Indian Gaming and Regulatory Act  12.31
      • 2.  Classes of Gambling Under IGRA  12.32
      • 3.  Tribal-State Compacts  12.33
    • B.  Cardrooms  12.34
  • IV.  NATIVE AMERICAN LANDS
    • A.  Land Use Ordinances On and Off Indian Land  12.35
    • B.  Sovereign Immunity of Tribes  12.36
    • C.  Regulation of Non-Indian Activity on Indian Lands  12.37
    • D.  Regulation of Tribal-Owned Lands Outside Indian Country and of Possible Burial Grounds and Remains  12.38
  • V.  FEDERAL AND STATE FACILITIES
    • A.  Regulation of Federal Land  12.39
      • 1.  Preemption Analysis and Conflict of Laws  12.40
      • 2.  Application of State and Local Laws to the Federal Government  12.41
      • 3.  Regulation of Activity Versus Regulation of Use  12.42
      • 4.  Federal Consent to Local Control  12.43
    • B.  Regulation of State Land  12.44
      • 1.  State Procedures and Special Exceptions  12.45
      • 2.  State Sovereign Immunity  12.46
      • 3.  Regulation of State Contractors  12.47
      • 4.  Regulation of Local Agencies of the State  12.48
      • 5.  Supremacy of the California Coastal Act  12.49
  • VI.  AIRPORT LAND USE ISSUES
    • A.  Background  12.50
    • B.  Airport Land Use Commissions  12.51
    • C.  County and City Zoning Related to Airports  12.52
    • D.  Federal Laws Relating to Airports
      • 1.  Restrictions on Objects Affecting Navigable Airspace  12.53
      • 2.  Other Restrictions Near Runway  12.54
      • 3.  Noise Restrictions/Guidelines  12.55
    • E.  State Laws Relating to Airports  12.56
  • VII.  COASTAL HARBORS AND PORTS  12.57
    • A.  Public Works Plans and Port Master Plans  12.58
    • B.  Other Statutory Regulation of Ports and Harbors  12.59
  • VIII.  ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGE SALE REGULATIONS
    • A.  State Regulation  12.60
    • B.  Nuisance Ordinances and Off-Site Alcohol Sales  12.61
  • IX.  CANNABIS (MARIJUANA) ACTIVITIES  12.62
  • X.  GUN SHOPS, CLUBS, AND SHOWS  12.63
  • XI.  DAY CARE
    • A.  Small-Family Day Care  12.64
    • B.  Large-Family Day Care  12.65
    • C.  Commercial Day-Care Facilities for Children  12.66
  • XII.  MASSAGE ESTABLISHMENTS  12.67
  • XIII.  WIRELESS TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND CELLULAR TOWERS  12.68
  • XIV.  RECREATIONAL VEHICLES  12.69
  • XV.  COTTAGE FOOD OPERATIONS  12.70

13

Environmental Review and Mitigation

Kathleen Faubion

R. Clark Morrison

  • I.  CEQA: AN INTRODUCTION  13.1
    • A.  The CEQA Guidelines  13.2
    • B.  The CEQA Process: An Overview  13.3
  • II.  PUBLIC AGENCIES  13.4
    • A.  Lead Agency  13.5
    • B.  Responsible Agencies  13.6
    • C.  Effect of Lead Agency Decisions  13.7
    • D.  Trustee Agencies  13.8
    • E.  Other Consulting Agencies  13.9
  • III.  PROJECTS SUBJECT TO CEQA  13.10
    • A.  Is the Agency Decision Discretionary?  13.11
    • B.  Is the Activity a Project?  13.12
      • 1.  Whole of an Action  13.13
      • 2.  Direct or Indirect Physical Change  13.14
      • 3.  Agency Approval  13.15
    • C.  Is the Project Exempt From CEQA Review?  13.16
      • 1.  Statutory Exemptions  13.17
      • 2.  Categorical Exemptions  13.18
      • 3.  The General Exemption  13.19
      • 4.  Exemption Procedures  13.20
      • 5.  Standard of Review for Exemption Decisions  13.21
  • IV.  CEQA PROCESS
    • A.  Initial Study  13.22
    • B.  Negative Declaration
      • 1.  Preparation and Adoption of a Negative Declaration  13.23
      • 2.  Form: Notice of Intent to Adopt a Negative Declaration  13.24
      • 3.  Form: Negative Declaration  13.25
    • C.  Mitigated Negative Declaration  13.26
    • D.  Environmental Impact Report
      • 1.  Determining Scope, Notice of Preparation, and Contents of EIR  13.27
      • 2.  Preparation of Draft EIR  13.28
        • a.  EIR Must Be Legally Adequate  13.29
        • b.  Checklist: Required Contents of Draft EIR  13.30
        • c.  Methods to Simplify Format of EIRs  13.31
        • d.  Discussion of Significant Environmental Effects  13.32
        • e.  Analysis of Particular Impacts Required  13.33
        • f.  Cumulative Impacts  13.34
        • g.  Economic and Social Impacts  13.35
        • h.  Disagreements Over Methodology and Significance of Impacts  13.36
        • i.  Mitigation Measures  13.37
          • (1)  Payment of Fees as Mitigation  13.38
          • (2)  Mitigation of Cumulative Impacts  13.39
          • (3)  Mitigation for Particular Impacts  13.40
          • (4)  Authority to Mitigate Impacts  13.41
        • j.  Project Alternatives
          • (1)  Reasonable Range of Alternatives  13.42
          • (2)  No-Project Alternative  13.43
      • 3.  Notice of Completion  13.44
      • 4.  Consultation and Comment on Draft EIR  13.45
      • 5.  Final EIR  13.46
      • 6.  Response to Comments on the Draft EIR  13.47
      • 7.  Recirculation of EIR  13.48
      • 8.  Project Approval and Findings  13.49
        • a.  Adoption or Rejection of Mitigation Measures  13.50
        • b.  Findings Concerning Project Alternatives  13.51
        • c.  Statement of Overriding Considerations  13.52
      • 9.  Mitigation Monitoring Program  13.53
      • 10.  Notice of Determination; California Department of Fish and Wildlife Filing Fee  13.54
      • 11.  Project Approvals by Responsible Agencies  13.55
  • V.  STREAMLINING THE CEQA PROCESS THROUGH REUSE OF ENVIRONMENTAL DOCUMENTS
    • A.  Tiering Principles  13.56
    • B.  Subsequent or Supplemental EIRs, Negative Declarations  13.57
    • C.  Addendum to an EIR or Negative Declaration  13.58
    • D.  Program EIRs  13.59
  • VI.  CEQA AND OTHER LAWS  13.60
    • A.  NEPA  13.61
    • B.  Water Supply Planning and CEQA
      • 1.  Water Supply Assessments and Water Supply Verification  13.62
      • 2.  The Vineyard Area Citizens Case  13.62A
    • C.  Greenhouse Gas Emissions and CEQA  13.62B
    • D.  Sustainable Communities Strategies and Transit Priority Projects (SB 375)  13.62C
  • VII.  JUDICIAL REVIEW
    • A.  Statutes of Limitation  13.63
    • B.  Judicial Standard of Review  13.64
    • C.  Effect of Failing to File a CEQA Challenge  13.65
  • VIII.  GLOSSARY OF CEQA ACRONYMS  13.66
  • IX.  CEQA PROCESS FLOW CHART  13.67
  • X.  FORM: CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND WILDLIFE NO EFFECT DETERMINATION REQUEST FORM  13.68

14

Compliance With Federal, State, and Regional Agency Requirements

Adam U. Lindgren

Steven T. Mattas

Edgar B. Washburn

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  14.1
  • II.  FEDERAL AGENCIES
    • A.  United States Army Corps of Engineers
      • 1.  History and Mission  14.2
        • a.  The Corps, the EPA, and the Clean Water Act  14.3
        • b.  Section 404 Permit Program  14.4
      • 2.  Clean Water Act Jurisdiction Over Navigable Waters  14.5
        • a.  The Corps and the SWANCC Decision  14.6
        • b.  Post-SWANCC Case Law; Rapanos and EPA Guidance Document  14.7
        • c.  Regulatory Revisions to “Waters of the United States” Definition; Related Litigation  14.7A
      • 3.  Wetland Jurisdiction  14.8
      • 4.  Application of the Wetlands Definition  14.9
      • 5.  The Process for Determining Jurisdiction  14.10
      • 6.  Special Situations
        • a.  Wetland Delineation on Agricultural Lands  14.11
        • b.  Isolated Waters and Wetlands  14.12
      • 7.  Administrative Appeals From Jurisdictional Determination  14.13
      • 8.  Activities for Which a Permit Is Required
        • a.  Section 10 of the Rivers and Harbors Act (33 USC §403)  14.14
        • b.  Section 404 of the Clean Water Act  14.15
        • c.  Farming and Silviculture Exemption  14.16
        • d.  Maintenance of Serviceable Structures and Drainage Ditches  14.17
      • 9.  Section 404 Permitting Process
        • a.  Introduction  14.18
        • b.  Nationwide Permits  14.19
        • c.  The Individual Permit Review Process  14.20
        • d.  Section 404(b)(1) Guidelines  14.21
      • 10.  State Water Quality Certification Under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act  14.22
      • 11.  After-the-Fact Permits  14.23
      • 12.  Mitigation of Effects of Wetland Development  14.24
        • a.  Sequencing of Mitigation Efforts  14.25
        • b.  Mitigation Banks  14.26
        • c.  Mitigation Ratios  14.27
      • 13.  NEPA and the Corps’ Scope of Analysis  14.28
        • a.  The “Small Federal Handle”  14.29
        • b.  Current NEPA Focus  14.30
    • B.  Environmental Protection Agency  14.31
      • 1.  CWA Statutory Framework  14.32
        • a.  Point Source Pollution and NPDES Permits  14.33
        • b.  Regulation of Storm Water Discharges  14.34
        • c.  Total Maximum Daily Loads  14.35
        • d.  State Water Quality Management Plans  14.36
      • 2.  Implementation of Water Quality Regulation Within California  14.37
    • C.  U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) and NOAA (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) Fisheries
      • 1.  Introduction  14.38
        • a.  Protection of Listed Species Under ESA  14.39
        • b.  Incidental Take of Listed Species  14.40
      • 2.  Section 7 Interagency Consultations  14.41
      • 3.  Implementation of the Taking Permit Process—Survival and Recovery  14.42
      • 4.  The Services’ Response to Gifford Pinchot  14.43
  • III.  OTHER AREAS OF FEDERAL LAND USE INTERVENTION
    • A.  The Americans with Disabilities Act  14.44
      • 1.  Title II of the ADA  14.45
      • 2.  Title III of the ADA  14.46
    • B.  National Historic Preservation Act  14.47
    • C.  Federal Land Policy and Management Act  14.48
  • IV.  CALIFORNIA AGENCIES
    • A.  Resource Agencies  14.49
      • 1.  California Environmental Protection Agency  14.50
      • 2.  California Department of Fish and Wildlife  14.51
        • a.  Regulation of Waterways  14.52
        • b.  California Endangered Species Act  14.53
      • 3.  Department of Toxic Substance Control  14.54
      • 4.  California Energy Commission  14.55
      • 5.  State Lands Commission  14.56
        • a.  The Public Trust Doctrine  14.57
        • b.  Title Issues, Boundaries, Leases  14.58
      • 6.  California Historic Preservation Law
        • a.  Public Resources Code  14.59
        • b.  State Historical Building Code  14.60
    • B.  Regional Agencies
      • 1.  California Coastal Commission  14.61
        • a.  The California Coastal Zone  14.62
        • b.  Local Coastal Programs and Development Permits  14.63
        • c.  Constitutional Challenges to Coastal Act  14.64
        • d.  Open Issues Under the Coastal Act  14.65
      • 2.  Local Air Quality Districts  14.66
      • 3.  State and Regional Water Quality Control Boards  14.67
        • a.  Implementing Water Quality Objectives  14.68
        • b.  Water Quality Control Permits  14.69
      • 4.  Groundwater Sustainability Agencies  14.69A
      • 5.  Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC)  14.70
        • a.  San Francisco Bay Plan  14.71
        • b.  BCDC and the Coastal Zone Management Act  14.72
      • 6.  Lake Tahoe Regional Planning Agency  14.73
      • 7.  Transportation Agencies  14.74
        • a.  Regional Transportation Planning  14.75
        • b.  Congestion Management and Other Regional Plans  14.76
      • 8.  Councils of Governments  14.77
      • 9.  Delta Protection Commission  14.77A
      • 10.  Delta Stewardship Council  14.77B
    • C.  School Districts and Other Local Agencies  14.78
    • D.  Local Agency Formation Commission (LAFCO)  14.79
      • 1.  Commissioners  14.80
        • a.  Term  14.81
        • b.  Role  14.82
      • 2.  Key LAFCO Terms  14.83
      • 3.  LAFCO Powers  14.84
      • 4.  Limitations on Powers and Jurisdiction of LAFCOs  14.85
      • 5.  Spheres of Influence  14.86
      • 6.  Required Procedures for Change of Organization or Reorganization
        • a.  Boundary Changes  14.87
        • b.  Prezoning for Annexation  14.88
        • c.  Procedures for Requesting Boundary Changes  14.89
        • d.  LAFCO Review of Boundary Change Applications  14.90
        • e.  Notice and Hearing  14.91
        • f.  Factors to Consider  14.92
        • g.  Approval or Disapproval  14.93
        • h.  Reconsideration  14.94
        • i.  Protest Proceedings; Measure of Protests  14.95
        • j.  Elections  14.96
        • k.  Completion of Proceedings  14.97
        • l.  Judicial Review of LAFCO Determinations  14.98
      • 7.  Transfer of Assessment District Obligations as Part of Annexation  14.99
      • 8.  Extension of Public Services Into Unincorporated Areas  14.100

15

Laws Related to Land Use Regulation

Adam U. Lindgren

  • I.  RELATED LAWS GENERALLY  15.1
  • II.  CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST LAWS  15.2
    • A.  Duty to Publicly Disclose Personal Economic Interests  15.3
    • B.  Duty to Disqualify From Participation in Agency Decisions
      • 1.  Political Reform Act  15.4
        • a.  Duty to Disqualify Because of Impact on Economic Interest  15.5
        • b.  Duty to Disqualify Because of Receipt of Campaign Contributions  15.6
      • 2.  Common Law Duty to Disqualify Because of Bias  15.7
    • C.  Duties Regarding Contractual Conflicts of Interest: Govt C §1090  15.8
    • D.  Restrictions on Receipt of Gifts and Honoraria  15.9
  • III.  OPEN AND PUBLIC MEETINGS: RALPH M. BROWN ACT  15.10
    • A.  Legislative Bodies Subject to the Brown Act  15.11
    • B.  Meetings Subject to the Brown Act  15.12
      • 1.  Serial Meetings  15.13
      • 2.  Content of Information [Deleted]  15.14
    • C.  Brown Act Requirements for Agenda Posting and Content  15.15
    • D.  Rights at Brown Act Meetings  15.16
      • 1.  Agendas and Printed Materials  15.17
      • 2.  Opportunity to Comment  15.18
    • E.  Closed Sessions  15.19
    • F.  Brown Act Violations  15.20
  • IV.  PERMIT STREAMLINING ACT (PSA)
    • A.  Purpose of the PSA  15.21
    • B.  Basic Requirements of the PSA  15.22
    • C.  PSA Applies Only to Development Projects  15.23
    • D.  PSA Applies Only to Adjudicatory Decisions  15.24
    • E.  Complete Application Triggers Initial PSA Time Limits  15.25
    • F.  CEQA Trigger for PSA Time Limits  15.26
    • G.  CEQA Documentation  15.27
    • H.  Project Approval  15.28
    • I.  Extensions  15.29
      • 1.  Extensions for CEQA Processing  15.30
      • 2.  Extensions for Project Approval  15.31
    • J.  Result of Noncompliance With the PSA  15.32
      • 1.  Notice of Deemed Approval  15.33
      • 2.  Right to Appeal Deemed Approval  15.34

16

Vested Rights

Adam U. Lindgren

  • I.  INTRODUCTION TO VESTED RIGHTS  16.1
  • II.  COMMON LAW VESTED RIGHTS: THE AVCO RULE
    • A.  Current Common Law Vested Rights Test  16.2
    • B.  The Avco Case  16.3
      • 1.  Facts  16.4
      • 2.  Basic Rule of Avco; Building Permit Requirement Upheld  16.5
      • 3.  Soft Costs Incurred Before Building Permit Do Not Create a Vested Right  16.6
      • 4.  Exception for Functional Equivalent of Building Permit  16.7
      • 5.  Earlier Vesting Rejected  16.8
    • C.  Clarifications, Interpretations, and Refinements of Avco
      • 1.  Historical View of Avco  16.9
      • 2.  What Permit Is Required to Vest?
        • a.  Building Permit Generally Required  16.10
        • b.  Building Permit and Its “Functional Equivalent” Are Sufficient to Vest  16.11
          • (1)  Functional Equivalent of a Building Permit  16.12
          • (2)  Condominium Conversions  16.13
          • (3)  Growth Management Allocations  16.14
        • c.  Last Discretionary Permit  16.15
        • d.  Phased Projects  16.16
        • e.  Invalid Permit Vests No Rights  16.17
        • f.  Scope of Permit Defines Scope of Vested Right  16.18
        • g.  Duration of Vested Right  16.19
      • 3.  Nature of Developer’s Reliance for Vesting Rights
        • a.  Soft Costs and Costs Not Incurred in Reliance on Building Permit Do Not Vest Rights  16.20
        • b.  Unjustified Reliance Does Not Create a Vested Right  16.21
        • c.  No Vested Right When Permit Issued on Basis of Developer’s Misrepresentation  16.22
        • d.  Reliance Must Be in Good Faith  16.23
      • 4.  Vested Right May Be Impaired If Necessary to Protect Public Health and Safety  16.24
  • III.  DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENTS
    • A.  Introduction  16.25
    • B.  Timing of Development Agreement  16.26
    • C.  Scope of Rights Vested by Development Agreement  16.27
    • D.  Drafting Development Agreements
      • 1.  Requirements and Mandatory Terms
        • a.  Required Property Interest  16.28
        • b.  Location of Property  16.29
        • c.  Duration  16.30
        • d.  Permitted Uses and Specifications of the Developed Property  16.31
      • 2.  Other Common Terms  16.32
      • 3.  Compliance With State and Federal Law  16.33
    • E.  Processing and Approval  16.34
      • 1.  Hearings  16.35
      • 2.  Required Findings  16.36
      • 3.  Subject to CEQA  16.37
    • F.  Recordation and Effective Date  16.38
    • G.  Amendments  16.39
    • H.  Enforcement, Compliance Review, and Termination  16.40
    • I.  Challenges to Development Agreements  16.41
  • IV.  VESTING TENTATIVE MAPS
    • A.  Generally  16.42
    • B.  Vested Right Conferred  16.43
    • C.  What Constitutes an Ordinance, Policy, or Standard?  16.44
    • D.  Imposition of New Conditions  16.45
    • E.  Impairment of a Vested Right Conferred by a Vesting Tentative Map  16.46
    • F.  Duration  16.47
    • G.  Amendments  16.48
    • H.  Processing and Approval  16.49
  • V.  ADDITIONAL LIMITATIONS ON AUTHORITY OF AGENCIES TO APPLY NEW LAWS TO DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS
    • A.  Limitations Under the Subdivision Map Act
      • 1.  Government Code §65961  16.50
      • 2.  Government Code §66474.1  16.51
      • 3.  Government Code §66474.2  16.52
      • 4.  Government Code §66473  16.53
    • B.  Vested Rights Under Local Ordinances  16.54
    • C.  Administrative Requirements for Determining Applicability of Certain Statutes  16.54A
  • VI.  CHART: COMPARISON OF CALIFORNIA VESTED RIGHTS STATUTES WITH COMMON LAW  16.55

17

Regulatory Takings

Daniel L. Siegel

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  17.1
    • A.  Eminent Domain Versus Inverse Condemnation: How Land Use Decisions Can Be Takings  17.2
    • B.  Types of Takings
      • 1.  Physical  17.3
      • 2.  Regulation of Use  17.4
      • 3.  Fees and Dedications  17.5
  • II.  HISTORY
    • A.  Origin of Regulatory Takings  17.6
    • B.  Development of California’s Takings Provision and Relationship to Federal Takings Clause  17.7
  • III.  BASIC PRINCIPLES  17.8
    • A.  Regulation “Goes Too Far”  17.9
    • B.  Fairness and Justice  17.10
    • C.  Functionally Equivalent to a Direct Condemnation  17.11
  • IV.  THE PROPERTY INTEREST REQUIREMENT  17.11A
  • V.  GENERAL TESTS  17.11B
    • A.  Penn Central and Beyond
      • 1.  Penn Central Factors  17.12
        • a.  Economic Impact  17.13
        • b.  Investment-Backed Expectations  17.14
        • c.  Character of Governmental Action  17.15
      • 2.  Additional Factors Recognized in Kavanau  17.16
    • B.  Per Se, or Categorical, Takings  17.17
      • 1.  Permanent Physical Occupation  17.18
      • 2.  All Economically Beneficial Use
        • a.  Original Formulation in Lucas  17.19
        • b.  Loss of Value, Not Loss of Use  17.20
    • C.  Repudiation of the “Substantially Advance” Test  17.21
    • D.  Lingle’s Repudiation of the “Substantially Advance” Test [Deleted]  17.22
  • VI.  OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
    • A.  Background Principles of State Law
      • 1.  Articulation of Background Principles Exception in Lucas  17.23
      • 2.  Subsequent Treatment in Courts  17.24
      • 3.  Related Emergency Exception  17.25
    • B.  Parcel as a Whole  17.26
      • 1.  Supreme Court Jurisprudence  17.27
      • 2.  Lower Federal Court Decisions  17.28
      • 3.  California Decisions  17.29
    • C.  Average Reciprocity of Advantage  17.30
  • VII.  TEMPORARY TAKINGS  17.31
    • A.  Moratoria  17.32
    • B.  Permitting Delays  17.33
      • 1.  Extraordinary Delays  17.34
      • 2.  Erroneous Delays  17.35
  • VIII.  ULTRA VIRES ACTIONS  17.36
  • IX.  RENT CONTROL  17.37
    • A.  Fair Rate of Return  17.38
    • B.  Penn Central Analysis  17.38A
    • C.  Former “Substantially Advance” Test  17.39
    • D.  Public Use  17.39A
    • E.  Rejection of Physical Appropriation Challenges  17.40
  • X.  KEY PROCEDURAL ISSUES  17.41
    • A.  Ripeness  17.42
      • 1.  Final Decision Requirement  17.43
      • 2.  Utilization of State Procedures
        • a.  Overview  17.44
        • b.  California’s Procedures  17.45
      • 3.  Issue Preclusion/Collateral Estoppel  17.46
    • B.  Statutes of Limitations
      • 1.  Time Period
        • a.  Federal Court Claims Against Federal Government  17.47
        • b.  Federal Court Claims Against Nonfederal Entities  17.48
        • c.  California State Court Claims  17.49
      • 2.  Accrual of Cause of Action  17.50
        • a.  Facial Claims  17.51
        • b.  As-Applied Claims  17.52
      • 3.  Tolling  17.53
        • a.  Continuing Wrong  17.54
        • b.  Effect of Moratorium  17.55
        • c.  Regulation Extensions  17.56
        • d.  Negotiations  17.57
        • e.  Intentional Concealment  17.58
    • C.  Jury Trial  17.59
    • D.  Standing  17.60
    • E.  Eleventh Amendment Immunity  17.61
      • 1.  Limitations  17.62
      • 2.  Federal Court  17.63
      • 3.  State Court  17.64
    • F.  Equitable Forfeiture  17.64A
  • XI.  JUDICIAL TAKINGS  17.64B
  • XII.  REMEDIES  17.65
    • A.  Calculating Damages  17.66
      • 1.  Permanent Taking  17.67
      • 2.  Temporary Taking  17.68
        • a.  Fair Rental Value  17.69
        • b.  Cash Flow (Bass Enterprises)  17.70
        • c.  Before-and-After Value  17.71
        • d.  Option Value  17.72
        • e.  Market Rate of Return (Nemmers)  17.73
        • f.  Equity Interest (Wheeler)  17.74
        • g.  Probability Formula (Herrington)  17.75
    • B.  Injunction When Damages Are Unavailable  17.76
    • C.  Attorney Fees  17.77
  • XIII.  RELATED CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS: DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION  17.78

18

Exactions: Dedications and Development Impact Fees

Kenneth B. Bley

Andrew W. Schwartz

  • I.  INTRODUCTION
    • A.  Scope of Chapter  18.1
    • B.  Historical Background of Development Fees and Dedications
      • 1.  Taxpayer Revolt  18.2
      • 2.  Effects of Proposition 13 on Revenue  18.3
      • 3.  Infrastructure Funding Gap  18.4
      • 4.  Role of Dedications and Development Fees  18.5
    • C.  Comparison of Taxes, Assessments, and Fees  18.6
      • 1.  Development Fees and Dedications  18.7
      • 2.  Taxes
        • a.  General Taxes  18.8
        • b.  Special Taxes  18.9
        • c.  Excise Taxes  18.10
      • 3.  Assessments  18.11
      • 4.  User Fees  18.12
  • II.  AUTHORITY FOR EXACTIONS  18.13
    • A.  Constitutional Authority  18.14
    • B.  Statutory Authority
      • 1.  Subdivision Map Act  18.15
        • a.  Direct Authority for Dedications  18.16
        • b.  Direct Authority for Development Impact Fees  18.17
        • c.  Indirect Authority to Impose Exactions  18.18
        • d.  Limitations on Authority  18.19
          • (1)  Tentative Map  18.20
          • (2)  Vesting Tentative Map  18.21
          • (3)  Four or Fewer Lots  18.22
      • 2.  Educational Facilities  18.23
        • a.  School Impact Fees  18.24
          • (1)  Purpose and Application  18.25
          • (2)  Process for Imposing School Impact Fees
            • (a)  Adoption of Resolution  18.26
            • (b)  Limitations on Fees
              • (i)  Maximum Fees  18.27
              • (ii)  Special Rules for Manufactured Homes and Mobilehomes  18.28
            • (c)  Commercial and Industrial Development  18.29
            • (d)  Reasonable Relationship Requirement; Nexus Studies  18.30
            • (e)  Alternative Calculation of Fee  18.31
            • (f)  Overlapping Districts  18.32
          • (3)  Exemptions  18.33
          • (4)  Refunds and Challenges  18.34
        • b.  The School Facilities Act  18.35
          • (1)  Process for Imposing Exactions  18.36
          • (2)  Limitations  18.37
          • (3)  Relationship With Other Statutes; Challenges  18.38
      • 3.  Building Permits  18.39
      • 4.  Development Agreements  18.40
      • 5.  The Mello Act  18.41
      • 6.  The San Marcos Legislation  18.42
      • 7.  CEQA  18.43
      • 8.  Community Redevelopment  18.44
      • 9.  Regional Plans
        • a.  Air Quality Management Districts  18.45
        • b.  Regional Planning Districts  18.46
      • 10.  Additional Limitations on Authority
        • a.  Housing  18.47
        • b.  Maintenance and Operation of Public Facilities  18.48
  • III.  PROCEDURES FOR ADOPTION OF DEVELOPMENT FEES  18.49
    • A.  Application of Mitigation Fee Act  18.50
      • 1.  Definitions  18.51
      • 2.  Limitations  18.52
    • B.  Fee Adoption Process  18.53
    • C.  Reasonable Relationship Requirement  18.54
    • D.  Nexus Studies  18.55
      • 1.  Studies Examined by Courts  18.56
      • 2.  Preparing a Nexus Study  18.57
      • 3.  Nexus Study Examples
        • a.  San Francisco’s Transit Impact Development Fee Ordinance Nexus Study  18.58
        • b.  Residential Nexus Studies  18.58A
      • 4.  Data Supporting Fee  18.59
      • 5.  Update of Study  18.60
    • E.  Collecting and Expending Development Fees
      • 1.  Fee Collection  18.61
      • 2.  Accounting and Expenditure  18.62
      • 3.  Findings Related to Unexpended Funds  18.63
      • 4.  Refunds  18.64
  • IV.  CHALLENGES TO DEVELOPMENT FEES AND DEDICATIONS
    • A.  Overview of Statutory Authority  18.65
    • B.  Standards of Judicial Review  18.65A
      • 1.  Constitutional Standards  18.66
        • a.  Development Fees
          • (1)  Generally Applicable Fees
            • (a)  “Substantially Advance State Interest” Test  18.67
            • (b)  “Rational Basis” Test  18.68
          • (2)  Ad Hoc Fees  18.69
        • b.  Dedications
          • (1)  Ad Hoc Dedications  18.70
          • (2)  Generally Applicable Dedications  18.71
        • c.  Special Taxes  18.72
      • 2.  Statutory Standards
        • a.  Mitigation Fee Act  18.73
        • b.  Vesting Tentative Maps  18.74
    • C.  Procedures for Challenging Exactions
      • 1.  Government Code §§66020 and 66021  18.75
        • a.  Procedural Variations  18.76
        • b.  Effect of Successful Challenge Under Govt C §66020  18.77
      • 2.  Government Code §66022  18.78
      • 3.  Statute of Limitations: Facial Challenge to Development Fee Ordinance  18.79
      • 4.  Independent Audit  18.80
    • D.  Class Actions  18.81
    • E.  Challenges Alleging Misuse of Development Fees  18.82
  • V.  ASSESSMENT DISTRICTS
    • A.  Procedures for Levying Special Assessments  18.83
    • B.  Special Districts
      • 1.  Landscaping and Lighting Act  18.84
      • 2.  Mello-Roos Community Facilities District  18.85
        • a.  Types of Services and Facilities Financed  18.86
        • b.  Procedures for Establishing a District  18.87
      • 3.  County Service Areas  18.88

19

Substantive and Procedural Due Process and Equal Protection Claims

Andrew B. Sabey

Katherine E. Stone

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  19.1
  • II.  SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
    • A.  Substantive Due Process in Land Use Decisions  19.2
    • B.  Differences Between Federal and State Substantive Due Process Claims  19.3
    • C.  Federal Substantive Due Process Claims
      • 1.  Case Law Background  19.4
      • 2.  Essential Elements
        • a.  Protected Property Interest  19.5
        • b.  Arbitrary and Irrational Government Action  19.6
      • 3.  Ripeness  19.7
      • 4.  Substantive Due Process Claims After Armendariz and Lingle  19.8
      • 5.  Distinguishing Substantive Due Process From Takings, Equal Protection, and Other Claims  19.9
    • D.  State Substantive Due Process Claims  19.10
      • 1.  The Regional Welfare Doctrine  19.11
      • 2.  Arbitrary and Discriminatory Action  19.12
      • 3.  Arbitrary and Capricious Standard  19.13
      • 4.  Repeated Denials of Project Applications and Procedural Errors  19.14
      • 5.  Damages Are Not Available for Violation of Substantive Due Process Under the California Constitution  19.15
  • III.  PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
    • A.  Procedural Due Process Under Federal Law
      • 1.  Essential Elements of Claim  19.16
        • a.  Adjudicatory versus Legislative Proceedings  19.17
        • b.  Deprivation of Protected Property Interest  19.18
      • 2.  Ripeness  19.19
    • B.  Procedural Due Process Under State Law
      • 1.  Introduction  19.20
      • 2.  Essential Elements
        • a.  Adjudicatory Action  19.21
        • b.  Deprivation of Significant Property Interest  19.22
        • c.  Notice  19.23
        • d.  Fair Hearing  19.24
          • (1)  Bias  19.25
          • (2)  Ex Parte Contacts  19.26
          • (3)  Separation of Investigatory/Advocacy Role From Advisory/Decision-Making Role  19.27
          • (4)  Necessity of Findings  19.28
      • 3.  Due Process in Administrative Proceedings (Administrative Procedure Act)  19.29
    • C.  California Conflict of Interest Law; Bias  19.30
    • D.  Fact Patterns Giving Rise to Procedural Due Process Claims  19.31
  • IV.  EQUAL PROTECTION
    • A.  Federal Law
      • 1.  The Equal Protection Clause  19.32
      • 2.  Suspect Classification; Strict Scrutiny Test  19.33
      • 3.  Rational Relationship Test  19.34
      • 4.  Similarly Situated Property Treated Differently  19.35
      • 5.  Class of One  19.36
      • 6.  Fundamental Right  19.37
      • 7.  Vindictive Action, Illegitimate Animus, Ill Will  19.38
      • 8.  Pretextual Rationale  19.39
      • 9.  Ripeness  19.40
    • B.  State Constitutional Law  19.41
      • 1.  Elements of a State Equal Protection Claim  19.42
        • a.  Similarly Situated Property Treated Differently  19.43
        • b.  Rational Basis  19.44
        • c.  Strict Scrutiny
          • (1)  Fundamental Rights  19.45
          • (2)  Protected Class  19.46
      • 2.  Damages Are Not Available Under the California Constitution  19.47
    • C.  Fact Patterns That Give Rise to Equal Protection Claims
      • 1.  Selective Enforcement  19.48
      • 2.  Deviation From Government’s Own Rules  19.49
      • 3.  Spot Zoning  19.50
  • V.  THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT (42 USC §1983)
    • A.  Section 1983 Provides a Remedy, Not a Separate Claim  19.51
    • B.  Attorney Fees  19.52

20

Code Enforcement

Michael E. Gogna

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  20.1
    • A.  What Is Code Enforcement?  20.2
    • B.  Typical Goals and Methods of Code Enforcement  20.3
    • C.  Organizational Structure for Code Enforcement  20.4
    • D.  Authority for Code Enforcement
      • 1.  Constitutional Authority  20.5
      • 2.  Statutory Authority
        • a.  Regulatory State Statutes  20.6
        • b.  Local Agencies’ Nuisance Abatement Ordinances  20.7
        • c.  Local Agencies’ Administrative Sanctions  20.8
  • II.  IMPLEMENTATION OF CODE ENFORCEMENT  20.9
    • A.  Code Enforcement Legislation  20.10
    • B.  Policies and Procedures  20.11
    • C.  Property Inspections
      • 1.  Due Process Considerations  20.12
      • 2.  Is a Warrant Necessary?  20.13
  • III.  METHODS OF CODE ENFORCEMENT
    • A.  Introduction to Enforcement Methods  20.14
    • B.  Criminal Prosecution
      • 1.  Initiating Criminal Prosecution  20.15
      • 2.  Strict Liability and Criminal Intent  20.16
      • 3.  Procedures for Violations Charged as Misdemeanors  20.17
      • 4.  Procedures for Violations Charged as Criminal Infractions  20.18
      • 5.  Remedies in Criminal Prosecution  20.19
      • 6.  Probation Conditioned on Compliance  20.20
      • 7.  Alternative Methods of Criminal Disposition
        • a.  Bail Forfeiture  20.21
        • b.  Community Service  20.22
    • C.  Civil Action
      • 1.  Civil Injunctions  20.23
      • 2.  Contempt Proceedings for Enforcement of Injunction  20.24
      • 3.  Abatement by Local Agency Under Court Order  20.25
      • 4.  Civil Fines or Penalties  20.26
      • 5.  Appointment of Receiver  20.27
      • 6.  Recordation of Lis Pendens  20.28
    • D.  Administrative Enforcement  20.29
      • 1.  Due Process Considerations  20.30
      • 2.  Adequate Notice  20.31
      • 3.  Opportunity for Hearing  20.32
        • a.  Hearing Process  20.33
        • b.  Burden of Proof  20.34
        • c.  Informal Proceeding  20.35
      • 4.  Fair and Impartial Hearing
        • a.  Hearing Officer or Hearing Body  20.36
        • b.  Agency’s Legal Counsel  20.37
      • 5.  Summary Abatement of Nuisance Conditions Without Due Process  20.38
      • 6.  Administrative Remedies  20.39
  • IV.  AGENCY’S COST RECOVERY IN CODE ENFORCEMENT CASES
    • A.  General Cost Recovery  20.40
    • B.  Recovery of Costs Under Specific Statutes  20.41
      • 1.  Unfair Business Practices  20.42
      • 2.  Certain Specified Public Nuisances  20.43
    • C.  No Cost Recovery for Criminal Prosecution; Restitution for Graffiti  20.44
    • D.  Treble Damages for Repeat Violations  20.45
    • E.  Punitive Damages  20.46
    • F.  Collection
      • 1.  Liens and Assessments  20.47
      • 2.  Disallowance of State Tax Deductions  20.48
  • V.  COMMON DEFENSES AND RESPONSES TO CODE ENFORCEMENT
    • A.  Invalid Regulation  20.49
    • B.  Vague or Overbroad Regulations  20.50
    • C.  Laches and Estoppel  20.51
    • D.  Vested Rights  20.52
    • E.  Discriminatory or Selective Enforcement  20.53
  • VI.  SUMMARY  20.54

21

Land Use Litigation

Julia L. Bond

Joseph P. DiCiuccio

Daniel L. Siegel

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  21.1
  • II.  OVERVIEW OF MANDATE PROCEEDINGS
    • A.  Types of Mandate  21.2
    • B.  Deadlines for Filing Petition  21.3
      • 1.  Administrative Mandate  21.4
      • 2.  Traditional Mandate  21.5
  • III.  THE MANDATE LITIGATION PROCESS
    • A.  Preliminary Preparation
      • 1.  Obtaining Information  21.6
      • 2.  Participating in the Administrative Process  21.7
    • B.  Drafting the Mandate Petition
      • 1.  The Parties  21.8
      • 2.  Substantive Allegations  21.9
    • C.  Pretrial Proceedings
      • 1.  Obtaining Stay Pending Hearing: Administrative Mandate  21.10
      • 2.  Obtaining Stay Pending Hearing: Traditional Mandate  21.11
      • 3.  Requesting Administrative Record  21.12
      • 4.  Responding to the Mandate Petition  21.13
      • 5.  Setting a Hearing Date  21.14
      • 6.  Briefing the Case  21.15
      • 7.  Oral Argument  21.16
    • D.  Evidence at Trial
      • 1.  Administrative Mandate  21.17
      • 2.  Traditional Mandate  21.18
    • E.  Standard of Review  21.19
      • 1.  Administrative Mandate  21.20
      • 2.  Traditional Mandate  21.21
  • IV.  AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES TO MANDATE ACTIONS
    • A.  Statute of Limitations  21.22
      • 1.  Determining Which Statute Applies  21.23
      • 2.  When Service Is Required  21.24
      • 3.  When Statute Begins to Run  21.25
    • B.  Table: Statutes of Limitations in Land Use Challenges  21.26
    • C.  Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies  21.27
      • 1.  Raising Issues at Administrative Proceedings  21.28
      • 2.  Taking Required Administrative Appeals  21.29
      • 3.  Exceptions to Exhaustion Requirement  21.30
    • D.  Indispensable Parties  21.31
    • E.  Standing  21.32
  • V.  MANDATE REMEDIES, APPEALS, AND ADR
    • A.  Remedies  21.33
      • 1.  Remedies Available in Administrative Mandate  21.34
      • 2.  Remedies Available in Traditional Mandate  21.35
      • 3.  Return on Writ  21.36
    • B.  Appeals
      • 1.  Stay Pending Appeal  21.37
      • 2.  Final Judgment Rule  21.38
    • C.  Settlement or Alternative Dispute Resolution  21.39
  • VI.  SPECIAL LAND USE LITIGATION PROCEEDINGS
    • A.  CEQA Cases
      • 1.  Statutes of Limitations  21.40
      • 2.  Limitations Periods for Challenges Based on CEQA  21.41
      • 3.  Litigation Procedures  21.42
        • a.  Service of Summons; Notice  21.43
        • b.  Public Agency List  21.44
        • c.  Request for Administrative Record  21.45
        • d.  Settlement Meeting  21.46
        • e.  Response; Statement of Disputed Issues  21.47
        • f.  Scheduling Hearing and Briefing  21.48
        • g.  Expedited Appeal Process  21.49
      • 4.  Judicial Standard of Review  21.50
      • 5.  Remedies  21.51
      • 6.  Effect of Failing to File a CEQA Challenge  21.52
    • B.  Validation Actions
      • 1.  Nature of Validation Actions  21.53
      • 2.  Table: Certain Statutes Requiring Use of Validation Action  21.54
      • 3.  Statute of Limitations  21.55
      • 4.  Procedural Requirements  21.56
        • a.  Publication of Summons; Notice of Action  21.57
        • b.  Response and Cross-Complaint  21.58
        • c.  Reverse Validation Action  21.59
        • d.  Consolidation and Trial Preference  21.60
        • e.  Effect of Dismissal  21.61
        • f.  Validation Remedy Exclusive  21.62
      • 5.  Judgment; Expedited Appeal  21.63
    • C.  Declaratory Relief
      • 1.  Available to Challenge Validity of Statute or Regulation  21.64
      • 2.  Not Available to Challenge Adjudicatory Actions  21.65
    • D.  SLAPPs and Anti-SLAPP Motions to Strike  21.66
      • 1.  Definition of SLAPPs  21.67
      • 2.  Defenses to SLAPPs
        • a.  Constitutionally Protected Free Speech  21.68
        • b.  Right to Petition Government for Redress  21.69
        • c.  Anti-SLAPP Motions to Strike  21.70
          • (1)  Scope of Anti-SLAPP Statute  21.71
          • (2)  Procedures Under Anti-SLAPP Statute  21.72
          • (3)  Attorney Fees Under Anti-SLAPP Statute  21.73
          • (4)  Table: Anti-SLAPP Motions in Selected Reported Land Use Cases  21.74
  • VII.  TAKINGS, DUE PROCESS, AND EQUAL PROTECTION LITIGATION
    • A.  Overview of Litigation Procedures
      • 1.  Normal Litigation Rules Apply  21.75
      • 2.  Federal Civil Rights Act (42 USC §1983)  21.76
    • B.  Affirmative Defenses
      • 1.  Ripeness  21.77
        • a.  Final Decision Requirement
          • (1)  Federal Court Actions  21.78
          • (2)  State Court Actions  21.79
          • (3)  Exceptions to the Final Decision Requirement  21.80
            • (a)  Facial Challenge  21.81
            • (b)  Futility  21.82
        • b.  Federal Suits: Utilization of State Procedures
          • (1)  Prior Utilization of State Procedures No Longer Required  21.83
          • (2)  California Procedures Held Adequate  21.84
          • (3)  Effect of Issue Preclusion  21.85
        • c.  Application to Substantive Due Process Claims  21.86
        • d.  Application to Procedural Due Process Claims  21.87
        • e.  Application to Equal Protection Claims  21.88
        • f.  State Suits: Must Exhaust State Judicial Remedies  21.89
        • g.  Relationship to Statute of Limitations  21.90
      • 2.  Statute of Limitations
        • a.  Time Periods for Section 1983 Claims  21.91
        • b.  Time Periods for Takings and Other Claims  21.92
        • c.  Accrual  21.93
          • (1)  Facial Claims  21.94
          • (2)  As-Applied Claims  21.95
        • d.  Tolling  21.96
          • (1)  Continuing Wrong  21.97
          • (2)  Moratorium  21.98
          • (3)  Regulation Extensions  21.99
          • (4)  Negotiations  21.100
          • (5)  Intentional Concealment  21.101
      • 3.  Standing  21.102
      • 4.  Eleventh Amendment Immunity  21.103
    • C.  Discovery Issues
      • 1.  Normal Rules Apply  21.104
      • 2.  Legislative Privilege
        • a.  Legal Basis; Application  21.105
        • b.  Exceptions  21.106
        • c.  Federal Privilege Narrower  21.107
    • D.  Pretrial Dispositive Motions  21.108
    • E.  Trial Issues
      • 1.  Jury Trial  21.109
      • 2.  Bifurcation  21.110
      • 3.  Use of Experts  21.111
    • F.  Remedies
      • 1.  Damages for Takings Claims  21.112
        • a.  Permanent Taking  21.113
        • b.  Temporary Taking  21.114
      • 2.  Damages for Due Process and Equal Protection Claims  21.115
      • 3.  Injunction  21.116
      • 4.  Attorney Fees  21.117

Selected Developments

October 2019 Update

This update addresses the most significant statutory and regulatory changes since the previous update was published and includes reminders of several important developments that were covered in the 2018 update. It also includes discussion and analysis of relevant cases. Among the most significant developments and improvements in this book since the last update are the following:

Ethics; Rules of Professional Conduct

REMINDER: On November 1, 2018, the new and amended Rules of Professional Conduct approved by the California Supreme Court went into effect. The contents of this book have been updated to incorporate the new rules. Visit the State Bar website (http://www.calbar.ca.gov/) to see both the previous and new rules.

Overview of Land Use Regulation

Effective January 1, 2019, a number of land use statutes were amended to apply to charter cities. See §§1.11B, 2.2, 2.18.

General and Specific Plans

Effective January 1, 2019, various statutes governing the housing element in city and county general plans were revised to add new requirements and objectives. See §§2.13, 2.16.

Effective January 1, 2018, as part of a major effort to spur development of affordable housing statewide, the California legislature passed several bills establishing new streamlined housing development plans, including Workforce Housing Opportunity Zones (SB 540) and Housing Sustainability Districts (AB 73). For details, see §2.59A.

Zoning

Effective January 1, 2019, charter cities with populations under 2 million are no longer exempt from the consistency requirement of Govt C §65860 (requiring zoning ordinances to be consistent with the applicable general plan). See §4.25.

In City of Morgan Hill v Bushey (2018) 5 C5th 1068, the supreeme court held that the electorate’s referendum power applies even if a successful referendum would result in zoning being inconsistent with the general plan. See discussion in §§4.38, 12.45.

Sustainability and Climate Change Regulations

On December 28, 2018, the California Natural Resources Agency amended several provisions of the CEQA Guidelines, including those relating to analysis of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. See §5.4.

By September 1, 2018, and every 4 years thereafter (to align with GHG reduction target setting), the California Air Resources Board must prepare a report assessing the progress made by each metropolitan planning organization (MPO) toward meeting the regional GHG reduction targets. The report must include changes to the GHG emissions in each region, data-supported metrics for the strategies used to meet the targets, and discussion of best practices used and challenges faced by the MPOs. See Govt C §65080(b)(2)(J)(iv), discussed in §5.6.

Under amendments to Govt C §65584.05 effective January 1, 2018, each council of governments must distribute to each local government a proposed draft of the regional housing needs allocation (RHNA) at least 18 months before the scheduled revision of the RHNA. Effective January 1, 2019, the period of time within which a local government can request a revision of its allocation has been reduced from 60 days to 45 days after receiving the draft. Other provisions relating to the appeal process have been amended as well. See §5.8.

Housing

After the extensive revisions made in 2017 to the statutes governing residential “accessory dwelling units” (ADUs) (primarily Govt C §65852.2), which generally made it easier for property owners to get approval for creation of ADUs, further revisions went into effect January 1, 2018. For example, the 2018 amendments clarified that an ADU may be rented separate from the primary residence, but may not be sold or conveyed separate from the primary residence. Also, beginning in 2019, the ADU statutes apply to charter cities. See §6.3.

A new section on the required notices and other procedures for processing density bonus applications has been added to chapter 6. See §6.4A.

Beginning in 2019, Govt C §65915 was amended to provide a new density bonus for student housing set aside for lower-income students. For details, see §6.10.

Effective January 1, 2018, California’s new Housing Accountability Act provides standards for local agencies’ findings that an affordable housing development or emergency shelter is inconsistent with applicable plans or programs. Various provisions regarding those required findings were amended effective January 1, 2019. See §6.16.

Also effective in 2018, the California legislature enacted several new laws to expedite the approval of affordable housing developments, notably SB 35 and SB 329. For details, see new §6.16B.

Conditional Use Permits; Conditions of Land Use Approval

In Hauser v Ventura County Bd. of Supervisors (2018) 20 CA5th 572, the court upheld the board of supervisors’ denial of a conditional use permit allowing a landowner to keep up to five tigers on her residential property. See §7.28.

Subdivision Map Act

Once again, the legislature has provided for an extension the life of certain tentative maps. Effective January 1, 2019, Govt C §66452.26 authorizes a discretionary extension for up to 24 months for any unexpired map approved between January 1, 2006, and July 11, 2013, that was extended under Govt C §66452.25 and still in effect on January 1, 2019. See §§9.107, 9.117, 9.124.

Aesthetic Regulation and Design Review

In Georgetown Preservation Soc’y v County of El Dorado (2018) 30 CA5th 358 (a CEQA case), the court noted that design review can, but does not always, mitigate aesthetic impacts. See §10.25.

Specially Regulated Land Uses

In Citizens for Amending Proposition L v City of Pomona (2018) 28 CA5th 1159, the court declared invalid a development agreement amendment to extend the term of the agreement because the amendment violated the provisions set forth in an initiative measure approved by city voters. See §12.11.

In Eagle Point Educ. Ass’n/SOBC/OEA v Jackson County Sch. Dist. No. 9 (9th Cir 2018) 880 F3d 1097, the Ninth Circuit held that school district policies prohibiting picketing, strikers, and signs in a nonpublic forum were neither reasonable nor viewpoint-neutral. See §12.19.

In Save Lafayette v City of Lafayette (2018) 20 CA5th 657, the court held that a city must submit a citizen referendum to a public vote even if the referendum could result in zoning that would be inconsistent with the city’s general plan. See §12.45.

The California Supreme Court reversed the court of appeal in City & County of San Francisco v Regents of Univ. of Cal. (2019) 7 C5th 536 and upheld a San Francisco ordinance (enacted under home rule authority) requiring state universities to collect and remit a parking tax from users of university parking lots within the city’s jurisdiction. See discussion in §12.46.

In Westsiders Opposed to Overdevelopment v City of Los Angeles (2018) 27 CA5th 1079, the court upheld a charter city’s general plan amendment for a transit-oriented development project on the ground that the city’s interpretation of its own charter must be upheld if it has a reasonable basis. See §12.46.

In a case involving the supremacy of the California Coastal Act of 1976 (Coastal Act), Greenfield v Mandalay Shores Community Ass’n (2018) 21 CA5th 896, the court held that the banning of short-term rentals constitutes development under the Coastal Act and must be decided by the local government or the Coastal Commission, not by a homeowner’s association. See §12.49.

In another Coastal Act case, Fudge v City of Laguna Beach (2019) 32 CA5th 193, the court held that the Coastal Commission has de novo authority over a coastal zone development permit once it accepts an appeal because the Coastal Act takes precedence over CEQA. See §12.49.

In San Diego Unified Port Dist. v California Coastal Comm’n (2018) 27 CA5th 1111, the court ruled that the Coastal Commission properly exercised its statutory mandate in deciding that the port’s master plan amendment did not adequately protect lower-cost visitor and public recreational opportunities. See §12.57.

Effective June 27, 2017, the California legislature enacted the Medicinal and Adult-Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (MAUCRSA) (Bus & P C §§26000–26231.2), which effectively repealed and replaced the former Medical Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act (MCRSA) (former Bus & P C §§19300–19360 and former Health & S C §§11362.769, 11362.777, enacted in 2015), and combined medical and recreational cannabis laws into one comprehensive piece of legislation. See §12.62.

In J. Arthur Props., II, LLC v City of San Jose (2018) 21 CA5th 480, the court ruled that a medical marijuana collective was not a medical office permitted by zoning ordinance, and thus was not a legal nonconforming use. See §12.62.

On January 16, 2019, the Office of Administrative Law officially approved new state regulations for cannabis businesses, which took effect immediately. The official regulations are available at https://www.bcc.ca.gov/law_regs/cannabis_regs.html. See Note in §12.62.

In T-Mobile W. LLC v City & County of San Francisco (2019) 6 C5th 1107, the California Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal ruling that a local ordinance requiring additional aesthetic review for wireless equipment located in specific areas within the city was not preempted by Pub Util C §§7901 and 7901.1. See §12.68.

CEQA; Environmental Review and Mitigation

The most significant recent CEQA cases include the following:

  • County of Ventura v City of Moorpark (2018) 24 CA5th 377 (settlement agreement setting truck haul routes and staging areas for beach restoration project was part of whole of action); see §13.13.

  • John R. Lawson Rock & Oil, Inc. v State Air Resources Bd. (2018) 20 CA5th 77 (CARB’s issuance of regulatory advisory that it would temporarily forego enforcement action against small fleet operators before formal modification of regulations improperly committed CARB to definite course of action before CEQA compliance); see §13.15.

  • Aptos Residents Ass’n v County of Santa Cruz (2018) 20 CA5th 1039 (petitioner’s ambiguous and unreliable information about possible future cellular transmission facilities was insufficient to support fair argument that cumulative impact exception applied); see §13.21.

  • Friends of Riverside’s Hills v City of Riverside (2018) 26 CA5th 1137 (no substantial evidence to support fair argument that hillside subdivision would violate land use regulation intended to mitigate environmental impacts of development); see §13.22.

  • Jensen v City of Santa Rosa (2018) 23 CA5th 877 (non-expert noise analysis did not constitute substantial evidence of fair argument that signficiant noise impacts would occur); see §13.23.

  • Protect Niles v City of Fremont (2018) 25 CA5th 1129 (particularly sensitive context—an established historic district—required evaluation of aesthetic impacts in EIR, not mitigated negative declaration); see §13.23.

  • Georgetown Preservation Soc’y v County of El Dorado (2018) 30 CA5th 358 (comments expressing subjective opinion may constitute substantial evidence of potentially significant aesthetic impacts, requiring EIR, when they indicate broadly shared objection to project); see §13.23.

  • San Franciscans for Livable Neighborhoods v City & County of San Francisco (2018) 26 CA5th 596 (reliance on population projections as future baseline was appropriate because project [revisions to housing element of general plan] was growth-accommodating, rather than growth-inducing); see §13.32.

  • Sierra Club v County of Fresno (2018) 6 C5th 502 (EIR must provide sense of nature and magnitude of health and safety problems caused by physical changes resulting from project, including either (1) analysis that connects significant air quality effects to human health consequences or (2) showing that such analysis is infeasible); see §§13.32, 13.37.

  • Covina Residents for Responsible Dev. v City of Covina (2018) 21 CA5th 712 (review of traffic impacts in mitigated negative declaration was properly tiered from specific plan EIR); see §13.56.

  • Save Our Heritage Org. v City of San Diego (2018) 28 CA5th 656 (new findings are not required when agency approves changes to project based on addendum, but agency must substantiate its reasons for determining why those changes do not necessitate further environmental review); see §13.58.

  • Golden Door Props. v County of San Diego (2018) 27 CA5th 892 (“efficiency metric” threshold based on statewide GHG data must be supported with substantial evidence showing that threshold is appropriate for use for local projects); see §13.62B.

  • Rodeo Citizens Ass’n v County of Contra Costa (2018) 22 CA5th 214 (EIR was not deficient for failure to quantify GHG emissions from downstream users because such analysis would be speculative); see §13.62B.

Federal and Regional Regulations; Clean Water Act; Hazardous Substances

In National Ass’n of Mfrs. v Department of Defense (2018) ___ US ___, 138 S Ct 617, the U.S. Supreme Court held that challenges to the “waters of the United States” rule must first be brought in federal district courts. See §§14.5, 14.7A.

A new section has been added to chapter 14 on the regulatory revisions to the definition of “water of the United States” and related litigation. See §14.7A.

In Hawai’i Wildlife Fund v County of Maui (9th Cir 2018) 886 F3d 737, the Ninth Circuit held that wastewater discharges from wells into the groundwater require NPDES permits if the pollutants are “fairly traceable” from the point source to navigable waters. See §14.33.

In San Francisco Baykeeper, Inc. v State Lands Comm’n (2018) 29 CA5th 562, the court ruled that sand mining was not a public trust use and rejected the Commission’s claim that use of a boat for commercial sand dredging and transporting the resource was consistent with the public trust purposes of navigation and commerce. See §14.57.

Other Laws Related to Land Use Regulation

Under a recent amendment to Govt C §65950, for a development project consisting of either (1) residential units only or (2) mixed uses in which nonresidential units comprise less than 50 percent of the total square footage, the time period within which the lead agency must approve or disapprove the project is 120 days from the date of certification of the CEQA document. Under a related amendment to Govt C §65952(b), for a responsible agency other than the California Coastal Commission, the time limit to take action on such a development project is the longer of either 90 days from the date the lead agency approves the project or 90 days from the date the responsible agency has accepted the application as complete. See §15.28.

Vested Rights

Effective January 1, 2019, certain provisions of the Development Agreement Law (Govt C §§65864–65869.5) have been amended to expressly apply to charter cities. See §16.25.

Regulatory Takings

In Bottini v City of San Diego (2018) 27 CA5th 281, after the city erroneously determined that a residential project required CEQA review, the owner asserted that resultant construction delays imposed a taking. The court of appeal affirmed the trial court’s rejection of the claim, but disagreed with the trial court’s reasoning. See §17.35.

The Ninth Circuit continues to apply the Penn Central factors in reviewing challenges to rent control measures. Its most recent such decision is Colony Cove Props., LLC v City of Carson (9th Cir 2018) 888 F3d 445. See §§17.38A, 17.45.

The U.S. Supreme Court overruled the state-litigation requirement established in Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v Hamilton Bank (1985) 473 US 172, 105 S Ct 3108, concluding Williamson was poorly reasoned, “imposes an unjustifiable burden on takings plaintiffs,” and conflicts with the rest of the Court’s takings jurisprudence. Knick v Township of Scott (2019) ___ US ___, 139 S Ct 2162. The Court did not disturb the “final decision” requirement of Williamson, which was not at issue in Knick. See §§17.42, 17.44, 17.63, 19.4, 19.7–19.8, 19.19, 21.77–21.78, 21.83.

In York v City of Los Angeles (2019) 33 CA5th 1178, a takings claim was held not ripe when the city had denied the owner’s request to allow 79,700 cubic yards of grading in connection with a proposed new residence, but the owner had not sought permission for a smaller amount of grading, nor established that the full amount was the minimum needed for the home. See §17.43.

The court in Sierra Palms Homeowners Ass’n v Metro Gold Line Foothill Extension Constr. Auth. (2018) 19 CA5th 1127 ruled that, in state court takings actions, homeowners associations may have standing under CC §5980 to assert the ownership claims of their members. See §17.60.

A new section on equitable forfeiture has been added to chap 17, discussing the California Supreme Court’s decision in Lynch v California Coastal Comm’n (2017) 3 C5th 470. See §17.64A.

General and Special Taxes; Exactions

In Paradise Irrig. Dist. v Commission on State Mandates (2019) 33 CA5th 174, the court held that a water district is not relieved from collecting fees to pay for compliance with the California Water Conservation Act of 2009, if the fees are otherwise authorized, even if those fees are subject to majority protests under Proposition 218. See §18.2.

The case of Johnson v County of Mendocino (2018) 25 CA5th 1017 involved a ballot measure approved by 63 percent of the voters imposing a tax on commercial cannabis businesses, describing it as a “business tax.” An accompanying advisory (but nonbinding) measure stated that the revenues from the tax should be used for specified government services. Both the trial and appellate courts held that the suggested uses of the revenues did not transform what was otherwise a general tax into a special tax (one which would have required a two-thirds vote for passage). See §18.8.

In Citizens for Fair REU Rates v City of Redding (2018) 6 C5th 1, a city-owned utility made annual payments to the city’s general fund to pay the cost of services provided to the utility by other city departments, called “PILOT payments.” Plaintiffs argued that the PILOT payments were essentially being “passed through” to rate payers via rate increases, and constituted a “back-door” tax in contravention of Proposition 26. The supreme court disagreed, and held that the PILOT payment was merely an interagency transfer of funds. See discussion in §18.12.

The court in SummerHill Winchester LLC v Campbell Union Sch. Dist. (2018) 30 CA5th 545 held that a school fee will be invalid if the related nexus study fails to conduct the analysis required to satisfy all three prongs of the test established in Shapell Indus., Inc. v Governing Bd. of the Milpitas Unified Sch. Dist. (1991) 1 CA4th 218. Because the school fee was based on an invalid nexus study, the court ordered the district to refund $500,000 in school fees to the plaintiff-developer. See §§18.30, 18.56, 18.73.

In Tanimura & Antle Fresh Foods, Inc. v Salinas Union High Sch. Dist. (2019) 34 CA5th 775, the court of appeal held that a school district need not treat agricultural employee housing that would exclude dependent school-age children as a separate “type” of residential housing, and thus was entitled to require payment of the school fees at the normal residential rate. See §§18.30, 18.73.

In Boatworks, LLC v City of Alameda (2019) 35 CA5th 290, the court ruled that the nexus study for a parks and recreation fee was flawed because it included the cost of (1) acquiring land that the city already owned (and had received for free from the Navy) and (2) constructing recreational facilities that which were not yet available for use by the public. See §18.56.

Due Process and Equal Protection Claims

In Tucker v City of Chicago (7th Cir 2018) 907 F3d 487, the Seventh Circuit held that the plaintiff’s failure to avail herself of post-deprivation remedies was highly relevant to her claim of due process violation. See discussion in §19.16.

Code Enforcement

The maximum fines for violation of local building or safety codes have increased. See §§20.19, 20.26.

Land Use Litigation

In Save Lafayette Trees v City of Lafayette (2019) 32 CA5th 148, the court held that the 90-day limitations period for claims based on violations of planning and zoning laws (rather than 180-day period provided under municipal code) applied to causes of action challenging the city’s agreement with an electric company to remove numerous trees, because Govt C §65009 preempted the municipal code provisions due to an express conflict. See §§21.23, 21.43.

In LandWatch San Luis Obispo County v Cambria Community Servs. Dist. (2018) 25 CA5th 638, a community services district was awarded costs for preparing the administrative record after the petitioner elected to prepare the record but unreasonably delayed in preparing it beyond the 60-day time limit. See §21.45.

In Santa Clara Waste Water Co. v County of Ventura Envt’l Health Div. (2017) 17 CA5th 1082, the court ruled that the Health Division had made a prima facie case that the action against it arose from an act in furtherance of its right and responsibility to make a statement involving a public issue and that action was barred by the anti-SLAPP law. See §§21.72, 21.74.

In Takhar v People ex rel Feather River Air Quality Mgmt. District (2018) 27 CA 5th 15, the court granted a motion to strike a taxpayer waste action brought by a property owner who was allegedly creating fugitive dust emissions, because the property owner neither demonstrated that he qualified for the public interest exemption to the anti-SLAPP statute nor showed a probability of prevailing on the merits. See §§21.71, 21.74.

As noted more fully under “Regulatory Takings” above, in Knick v Township of Scott (2019) ___ US ___, 139 S Ct 2162, the U.S. Supreme Court overruled the state-litigation requirement established in Williamson County Reg’l Planning Comm’n v Hamilton Bank (1985) 473 US 172, 105 S Ct 3108. The Court did not disturb the “final decision” requirement of Williamson, which was not at issue in Knick. See §§17.42, 17.44, 17.63, 19.4, 19.7–19.8, 19.19, 21.77–21.78, 21.83.

About the Authors

ADAM U. LINDGREN, author of chapters 1, 15, and 16, and coauthor of chapters 2, 9, and 14, is a principal at Meyers Nave and in charge of the firm’s Sacramento office. He received his B.A. (cum laude) from Columbia College, Columbia University, in 1990, and his J.D. (with distinction as Public Interest Law Scholar) from Georgetown University Law Center in 1993. Mr. Lindgren specializes in land use and municipal law, and is the City Attorney for the City of Rancho Cordova, and the former City Attorney and current Assistant City Attorney for the City of Fort Bragg. He is an active member of the League of California Cities City Attorneys Department, and he has served as a member of the Ad Hoc Committee on Ethics and Practice Management (2004), Municipal Law Handbook Revision Committee (2003–2004), and chair of the Municipal Law Handbook 2003 Editorial Board. He was co-chair of the American Bar Association Committee on State and Local Government Subcommittee on Education and Impact Fees in 1997–1998. In 2005 Mr. Lindgren was designated a Northern California “Super Lawyer” by Law and Politics magazine (appearing in San Francisco magazine). Mr. Lindgren regularly makes land use presentations to conferences sponsored by the League of California Cities and the State Bar. Mr. Lindgren has written and edited numerous publications on land use topics, including CEB’s California Zoning Practice Update from 2001 to 2005.

STEVEN T. MATTAS, author of chapters 5, 6, and 12, and coauthor of chapters 2 and 14, is a principal at Meyers Nave and chair of that firm’s Land Use Practice Group. He received his B.A. in social ecology from the University of California, Irvine, in 1986, his M.A. in urban planning from the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1988, and his J.D. from the University of California, Davis, School of Law in 1991. Mr. Mattas specializes in land use, environmental, and redevelopment law, and advises public agencies. Mr. Mattas serves as City Attorney for the City of South San Francisco (1994–present) and the Town of Los Altos Hills (2002–present). Mr. Mattas previously served as City Attorney in Milpitas and Half Moon Bay. He is a member of the State Bar Environmental Law Section, was a League of California Cities Municipal Law Handbook contributing author (1999–2001), and was author of “SB 1818 Density Bonus Law, the New Math” (League of California Cities, 2005). Mr. Mattas regularly makes land use presentations to conferences sponsored by the League of California Cities and the State Bar. He also served as coauthor for CEB’s California Zoning Practice Update from 2001 to 2005.

KENNETH B. BLEY, coauthor of chapter 18, is a partner in the Los Angeles office of Cox, Castle & Nicholson, LLP, and formerly chaired its Land Use Group. He received his J.D. (magna cum laude) from Harvard Law School in 1974; before receiving his law degree, he was an aerospace engineer, having received his B.S. and M.S. degrees from the University of California, Berkeley, and his Ph.D. from the University of California, Los Angeles. Mr. Bley specializes in land use law and eminent domain, representing developers in obtaining land use approvals and litigation. He serves on the Legal Action Committees of the National Association of Home Builders, the California Building Industry Association, and the Building Industry Association of Southern California, where he is also a director of the Building Industry Legal Defense Foundation. He has also served as a member, vice-chair, and chair of the State Bar Committee on Appellate Courts. He has published numerous articles and has lectured widely in the fields of land use and land use litigation, taught remedies and land use at the University of Southern California Law School for 25 years as an adjunct professor, and taught courses on land use to trial judges in California and other states.

JULIA L. BOND, coauthor of chapter 21, is of counsel at Meyers Nave, specializing in CEQA and land use litigation. She is also a member of the firm’s Appellate Group. She received her B.A. in Mathematics and Government from Smith College (cum laude; Phi Beta Kappa) in 1990 and her J.D. from the University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law in 1993, where she served as editor for the UCLA Law Review. Ms. Bond represents primarily public entity clients in litigation involving a wide range of land use, environmental, and other laws. She represented the City of Rancho Cordova and the developer in a California Supreme Court CEQA case involving water supply issues, and the Los Angeles World Airports in a California Supreme Court case concerning the Public Records Act. She has also served as a Deputy City Attorney for the cities of Yorba Linda and Villa Park (1994–1998), and also has represented private clients in CEQA and land use litigation. She is a member of the State Bar Environmental Law Section.

JERI L. BURGE, author of chapter 7, is the Managing Assistant City Attorney for the Land Use Division of the Los Angeles Office of the City Attorney. She received her undergraduate degree from the University of California, Los Angeles, in 1977 and her J.D. from Loyola Law School in 1981.

JOSEPH J. CHAPMAN, author of chapter 11, is an attorney for the State of California and former associate with Meyers Nave in its Sacramento office. He received his B.A. from the University of Missouri, Columbia, in 1966 and his J.D. from the University of Washington School of Law in 2000. Mr. Chapman specializes in municipal law and is a member of the Sacramento County Bar Association.

JOSEPH P. DICIUCCIO, coauthor of chapter 21, is a Senior Deputy City Attorney for the City of San Jose. He received his B.A. from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1970 and his J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law (Order of the Coif), where he was a member of the California Law Review. Mr. DiCiuccio specializes in land use litigation, CEQA, mandamus, and intergovernmental litigation. He is a member of the Santa Clara County Bar Association and is a Judge Pro Tem for the Santa Clara County Superior Court.

KATHLEEN FAUBION, coauthor of chapter 13, is of counsel at Meyers Nave in its Oakland office. She received her B.A. from Pitzer College in 1973, her M.S.W. from the University of Michigan in 1975, and her J.D. from the University of California, Davis, School of Law in 1987. Ms. Faubion specializes in CEQA and land use law and is a member of the American Institute of Certified Planners, the State Bar Public Law Section, and the Association of Environmental Professionals. She is the Legislative Director for the Northern Section California Chapter of the American Planning Association.

SUE A. GALLAGHER, coauthor of chapter 9, is a Deputy County Counsel for the County of Sonoma. She received her B.A. from the University of California, Santa Cruz, in 1977, her M.A. from the University of Chicago in 1981, and her J.D. from the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law in 1985. Ms. Gallagher specializes in land use and local government law and litigation. She is a vice-chair of the Zoning and Land Use Subsection–North of the State Bar Real Property Section, a member of the County Counsels’ Association Land Use Section, and a member of the State Bar Environmental Law Section. She has lectured on Subdivision Map Act issues, has testified before the state legislature on local government matters, and was the recipient of the Litigation Award from the County Counsels’ Association of California in both 2003 and 2006.

MICHAEL E. GOGNA, author of chapter 20, is an associate with Meyers Nave in its Santa Rosa office. He received his B.A. degree from the University of California, Davis (cum laude), and his J.D. at Empire School of Law in Santa Rosa (with honors). Mr. Gogna serves as city attorney and redevelopment agency counsel for the cities of Healdsburg and Fort Bragg, assistant town attorney for the Town of Windsor, and as general counsel for the Sweetwater Springs Water District in western Sonoma County. He specializes in land use, municipal and environmental law, and code enforcement, and has assisted in drafting code enforcement legislation for the cities of Healdsburg, Windsor, Half Moon Bay, San Leandro, Clearlake, and Pinole. He served as chapter editor for the code enforcement chapter for the League of California Cities, Municipal Law Handbook.

THOMAS JACOBSON, author of chapters 3 and 10, is Director of the Institute for Community Planning Assistance at Sonoma State University. He received his B.A. from Sonoma State University, a Master’s Degree in City Planning from the University of California, Berkeley, and a J.D. from the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. He has practiced as a land use and environmental attorney and as a planner throughout California, and has lectured widely on various aspects of land use law. He is a member of the American Institute of Certified Planners and the California Planning Roundtable, and was an adjunct professor at the University of San Francisco School of Law. His academic and professional interests include land use and environmental regulation, sustainable development, and environmental justice.

VIVIAN KAHN, FAICP, coauthor of chapter 4 and former chapter 5 (the latter was integrated into chapter 4 in 2009), is an associate principal with Dyett and Bhatia, Urban and Regional Planners, San Francisco, and a principal with Kahn Mortimer Associates, Oakland. Ms. Kahn received her B.A. (cum laude; Phi Beta Kappa) from the City College of New York in 1965. She has drafted general plans, planning studies, land use regulations, and telecommunication policies and regulations for a number of California cities and counties, as well as downtown zoning for Chicago. Her clients include many other cities, developers, schools, and the State of California. She has lectured extensively in the fields of land use planning and CEQA and as an adjunct instructor at the University of California Extension (Berkeley and Davis) from 1996 to the present. She is a fellow and charter member of the American Institute of Certified Planners (AICP), a former board of directors and executive committee member of the American Planning Association, a member of the editorial advisory board of the Journal of the American Planning Association, and a current member of the California Planning Roundtable.

MARY JO LANZAFAME, author of chapter 8, is Senior Deputy County Counsel for the County of San Diego. She received her B.A. from the University of California, Santa Cruz, and her J.D. from California Western School of Law, San Diego. Ms. Lanzafame specializes in land use and municipal law, with 19 years of experience in the field. From 2004 to the present, she has been an adjunct professor for the graduate program in land use and environmental law at the San Diego State University School of Public Administration and Urban Studies.

R. CLARK MORRISON, coauthor of chapter 13, is a partner in Morrison & Foerster, LLP, in the firm’s San Francisco Bay Area and Sacramento offices. He received his A.B. with High Distinction from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1984 and his law degree from the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law in 1987. He specializes in land use, CEQA, NEPA, natural resources, wetlands and endangered species regulation, mining and timber, public lands, water rights and water quality permitting, and litigation. His clients include public agencies, commercial and industrial developers, environmental organizations, agricultural concerns, energy companies, and home builders. He has lectured and written extensively on land use, natural resource, and environmental issues for University of California Extension (Davis and Berkeley), University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, University of San Francisco Law School, Chapman University, San Jose State University, the American Bar Association, the Association of Environmental Professionals, CLE International, and a number of other professional organizations and periodicals. He also serves on the advisory board of the California Land Use Law and Policy Reporter.

DANIEL A. MULLER, coauthor of chapter 4 and former chapter 5 (the latter was integrated into chapter 4 in 2009), is a partner with Morgan Miller Blair, Walnut Creek. He received his B.S. and B.A. degrees from the University of California, Davis, and his J.D. degree from the University of California, Davis, School of Law. Mr. Muller specializes in land use law, eminent domain, and inverse condemnation. He represents property owners, business owners, home builders, and developers seeking project entitlements from, or facing condemnation of their property by, public entities such as cities, counties, state agencies, and special districts. He is a member of the State Bar Real Property Law, Environmental Law, and Civil Litigation Sections, and vice-chair of the Zoning and Land Use Subsection–North of the State Bar Real Property Law Section. From 2003 to 2005 he was president of the Litigation Section of the Contra Costa County Bar Association and has served as co-chair of the Contra Costa Council’s Land Use Task Force since 2004.

ANDREW B. SABEY, coauthor of chapter 19, is a partner in the Walnut Creek office of Morrison & Foerster, LLP. He received his B.A. from St. Lawrence University in 1987 and his J.D. from the University of California, Davis, School of Law in 1992. Mr. Sabey specializes in complex commercial litigation with an emphasis on land use, energy, and construction contract issues. His litigation practice focuses on home builders and other project applicants in actions alleging violation of CEQA, state planning and zoning laws, the Subdivision Map Act, and water supply laws, as well as federal claims arising under NEPA and the Endangered Species Act.

ANDREW W. SCHWARTZ, coauthor of chapter 18, is of counsel in the firm of Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger LLP following 22 years in the San Francisco City Attorney’s Office. He received his B.A. from Stanford University in 1976 and his J.D. from the University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law in 1979, where he was a member of the Law Review. Mr. Schwartz specializes in regulatory takings, eminent domain, development impact fees, real estate, and land use and real estate litigation. He represented the City of San Francisco in many precedent-setting land use cases, including San Remo Hotel v City & County of San Francisco, in which he won a unanimous decision in the United States Supreme Court. Mr. Schwartz’s publications include the Takings Litigation Handbook: Defending Takings Challenges to Land Use Regulation (2000) and The Basics of Takings Law (Institute for Local Self Government of California 1999); the articles Reciprocity of Advantage: The Antidote to the Antidemocratic Trend in Regulatory Takings (UCLA Journal of Environmental Law & Policy, Fall 2003) and Overripe Takings Claims Produce Rotten Fruit for Regulatory Agencies (Policy Awareness Quarterly, Winter 1999); and California Municipal Law Handbook 2003 update (contributing editor). He received the County Counsels’ Association of California Litigation Program Award for 2003, the American Bar Association Pro Bono Service Award in 2003, and the California Lawyer of the Year Award in 2006. He is a regular presenter at conferences of the Georgetown Environmental Law and Policy Institute and the National College of District Attorneys, an adjunct professor of law at Golden Gate University Law School, and a co-founder of the Community Land Use Project of California.

DANIEL L. SIEGEL, author of chapter 17 and coauthor of chapter 21, is the Supervising Deputy Attorney General in charge of the California Attorney General’s Land Law Section in Sacramento. He obtained his undergraduate degree from Cornell University in 1972 and his law degree from New York University School of Law in 1975. Mr. Siegel represents various state agencies in complex state and federal land use lawsuits, including many takings actions, and represents the Attorney General directly regarding matters such as redevelopment and the protection of Lake Tahoe. Mr. Siegel represented the State of California at trial and during appeals in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency and he authored amicus curiae briefs on behalf of the Attorney General in takings cases such as Brown v Legal Foundation of Washington (United States Supreme Court) and San Remo Hotel v City & County of San Francisco (California Supreme Court). Mr. Siegel regularly delivers speeches and writes articles concerning takings issues.

KATHERINE E. STONE, coauthor of chapter 19, is of counsel at Myers, Widders, Gibson, Jones and Schneider, LLP, Ventura. She received her B.A. from the University of Southern California in 1971 and her J.D. (cum laude) from Loyola Law School in 1974. Ms. Stone specializes in appellate law and environmental land use law, is special counsel to a variety of cities, counties, and special districts, and provides expertise to state agencies, including the California Coastal Commission. She is a frequent lecturer and has published articles and numerous amicus briefs. She is a member of the American Bar Association, the Ventura County Bar Association, and the Advisory Committee, Community Land Use Project, League of California Cities.

EDGAR B. WASHBURN, coauthor of chapter 14, is a partner in Morrison & Foerster, LLP, San Francisco. He received his B.A. from Stanford University in 1959 and his LL.B. from the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law in 1962. Mr. Washburn specializes in natural resource and environmental litigation. He represents various clients seeking development entitlements from local, regional, and state land use agencies, and has appeared in administrative proceedings and conducted permit acquisition concerning compliance with various federal and state statutes on waterfront development, water pollution, wetlands, water rights, endangered species, and waste disposal, as well as for matters concerning the preservation and securing of rights on federal lands. Mr. Washburn is a nationally recognized expert in the trial of complex environmental and natural resource cases, having tried more than 100 cases to decision and handled more than 40 appeals, including appeals before the United States Supreme Court. He has litigated complex property, tidelands, and resource issues in cases arising in Alaska, Florida, and the Missouri River and Colorado River basins, in addition to a large number of federal and state cases arising in California. He is a member of the State Bar Litigation and Environmental Law Sections and the American Bar Association Natural Resources and Litigation Sections.

About the 2019 Update Authors

ADAM U. LINDGREN, update coauthor of chapters 1, 3, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 14, 15, and 16. For a full bio, see the About the Authors section. Mr. Lindgren gratefully acknowledges the research and drafting assistance of Meyers Nave principal Gregory J. Newmark (chapter 14) and the following Meyers Nave associates: Alex J. Mog (chapters 3, 8, and 20), Trevor T. Taniguchi (chapters 7 and 16), and Frank A. Splendorio (chapters 1, 11, and 15).

STEVEN T. MATTAS, update coauthor of chapters 2, 5, 6, 12, and 21. For a full bio, see the About the Authors section. Mr. Mattas gratefully acknowledges the research and drafting assistance of the following Meyers Nave associates: Naree Chan (chapter 12), Claire Lai (chapter 5), and 2019 Meyers Nave Summer Fellow Anthony Felix (chapters 5 and 21).

KENNETH B. BLEY, update coauthor of chapter 18. For a full bio, see the About the Authors section.

CHRISTIAN H. CEBRIAN, update coauthor of chapter 13, is a partner in the San Francisco office of Cox, Castle & Nicholson, LLP. He received his B.S. degree from the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, and his J.D. degree (cum laude) from the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Mr. Cebrian’s practice includes advising residential, commercial, and renewable energy developers regarding land use entitlements and environmental compliance. He has counseled on such topics as the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), the Public Trust Doctrine, the San Francisco Bay Plan, and Federal Aviation Administration navigation hazard regulations. His practice also involves property and environmental litigation on such issues as CEQA, public dedication, and inverse condemnation.

NAREE CHAN, update coauthor of chapter 12, is an associate with Meyers Nave. She received her B.A. degree from Stanford University and her J.D. degree from the University of Colorado Law School. Mrs. Chan provides advice on the full range of legal issues facing cities and local government agencies, including land use, the Public Records Act, the Brown Act, conflicts of interest, the Medicinal and Adult Use Cannabis Regulation and Safety Act, and district elections. Currently, Mrs. Chan serves as Assistant City Attorney for the City of South San Francisco. Mrs. Chan has assisted in preparing and reviewing municipal general plans and zoning codes and has worked on negotiating and drafting public contracts.

DANIEL S. CUCCHI, update coauthor of chapter 14, is the Assistant City Attorney for the City of Rocklin. He received his B.A. from California State University, Chico, his Master of Urban Planning from San Jose State University, and his J.D. from the University of the Pacific, McGeorge School of Law. Mr. Cucchi provides advice to the Planning Commission and City Council, as well as several city departments, including Community Development, Public Services, Parks & Recreation, and Finance. Before joining the City of Rocklin, Mr. Cucchi provided legal advice to both private and public sector clients primarily in the areas of land use, CEQA, real estate, natural resources, and municipal law.

ELENA O. GEKKER, update coauthor of chapter 13, is an associate with Meyers Nave in the firm’s Land Use and Environmental Law Practice Group. She received her B.A. degree (magna cum laude) in Political Science and History from the Notre Dame de Namur University, and her J.D. degree from the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Ms. Gekker represents and advises public and private clients in land use and environmental matters relating to CEQA, ESA, the Housing Accountability Act, and other related environmental laws and regulations, as well as local agency permitting and land use entitlement issues.

DAVID P. HALE, APC, update coauthor of chapter 14, serves as General Counsel to the Five Cities Fire Authority and the South San Joaquin County Fire Authority, and as City Attorney for the City of Grover Beach. He received his B.S. from California State University, Los Angeles, and his J.D. from La Verne University Law School. He previously managed the Civil Advisory Unit of the City of Fresno City Attorney’s Office as Chief Assistant, specializing in land use, environmental law, and public contracting. His firm currently advises municipal agencies in all areas of municipal law including land use and planning, CEQA, LAFCOs, and public finance related to establishment of assessment districts, issuance of municipal bonds, and adoption of municipal fees. He has represented clients in trial and appellate litigation involving land use, CEQA, public finance, and code enforcement. While working for a petroleum company, he negotiated and managed the construction contracting for numerous high-rise office buildings in multiple states, along with advising and negotiating complex commercial office leases for the company.

PETER S. HAYES, update coauthor of chapter 13, is Of Counsel to Meyers Nave. He specializes in trial and appellate litigation, representing clients in cases involving a wide range of state and federal land use and environmental laws, including CEQA, state land use and planning laws, the Subdivision Map Act, the Cortese-Knox-Hertzberg Government Reorganization Act, the Mitigation Fee Act, the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), and constitutional civil rights claims in the land use context. Mr. Hayes also regularly advises clients on compliance with the laws listed above and with a variety of other state and federal environmental and land use laws, including the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the Coastal Zone Management Act, the California Coastal Act, the Endangered Species Act (ESA), and the National Historic Preservation Act.

CLAIRE S. LAI, update coauthor of chapters 2, 6, and 21, is an associate with Meyers Nave in the firm’s Municipal and Special District Law Practice Group. She received her B.A. from the University of California, San Diego, and her J.D. from the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Ms. Lai advises cities and special districts on a wide range of municipal and public law issues, including land use, planning and housing, telecommunications, code enforcement, the Public Records Act, the Brown Act, conflicts of interest, and public contracting. Ms. Lai currently serves as Assistant City Attorney to the cities of Walnut Creek and South San Francisco and the Town of Los Altos Hills.

ANDREW B. SABEY, update author of chapter 19, is a partner in the San Francisco office of Cox, Castle & Nicholson, LLP. He received his B.A. from St. Lawrence University in 1987 and his J.D. from the University of California, Davis, School of Law in 1992. His practice focuses on helping project applicants, land owners, and public agencies resolve disputes arising out of the land use entitlement and permitting process under state and federal laws. Mr. Sabey has successfully resolved numerous cases involving CEQA, NEPA, ESA, state planning and zoning laws, the Subdivision Map Act, development agreement law, and related proceedings, as well as claims involving water law, ballot box planning, and due process. For earlier biographical information about Mr. Sabey that pertained at the time he coauthored chapter 19 for the first edition of this book (2006), see the About the Authors section.

ANDREW W. SCHWARTZ, update coauthor of chapter 18. For a full bio, see the About the Authors section. Mr. Schwartz gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Joseph D. Petta, an associate at Shute, Mihaly & Weinberger LLP, in updating chapter 18.

DANIEL L. SIEGEL, update author of chapter 17, is a Deputy Attorney General with the California Attorney General’s Land Law Section in Sacramento. Mr. Siegel represented the State of California at trial and during appeals in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, and he authored amicus curiae briefs in takings cases such as Koontz v St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., Stop the Beach Renourishment v Florida Dep’t of Envt’l Protection, and Brown v Legal Found. of Washington (U.S. Supreme Court), as well as CBIA v City of San Jose and San Remo Hotel v City & County of San Francisco (California Supreme Court). Mr. Siegel has had various takings related articles published in the Stanford, UCLA, U.C. Hastings, Vermont, and NYU law school journals. In addition, he has testified before Congress and the California legislature regarding takings issues. Mr. Siegel obtained his undergraduate degree from Cornell University in 1972, and his law degree from New York University School of Law in 1975. For biographical information about Mr. Siegel that pertained when he wrote chapter 17 for the first edition of this book (2006), see the About the Authors section.

STEPHANIE R. STRAKA, update coauthor of chapter 13, is a land use and natural resources associate in the San Francisco office of Cox, Castle & Nicholson, LLP. She received her B.A. degree from the University of California, Berkeley, and her J.D. degree from the University of California, Hastings College of the Law. Ms. Straka’s experience includes advising clients on all aspects of CEQA, NEPA, and related environmental laws, and assisting clients with local agency permitting and land use entitlement issues. She has particular expertise in ensuring compliance with CEQA and in the application of state and local density bonus laws. Ms. Straka has represented developers of housing, commercial and office centers, energy projects, schools, and hospitals.

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PRODUCT GROUP Publication