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California Trial Objections 2020

Prepare for trial and depositions with this essential resource.

Prepare for trial and depositions with this essential resource.

  • Carry the laminated Checklist of Objections in your trial notebook
  • Confidently move to exclude inadmissible hearsay and opinion
  • Get in-depth treatment of all California privileges
  • Stay current on case law interpreting “testimonial statements” under Crawford and Davis
  • Confidently prepare your evidence and your experts for trial
OnLAW CP94550

Web access for one user.

$ 250.00
Print CP32554

softcover, 2020

$ 250.00

Prepare for trial and depositions with this essential resource.

  • Carry the laminated Checklist of Objections in your trial notebook
  • Confidently move to exclude inadmissible hearsay and opinion
  • Get in-depth treatment of all California privileges
  • Stay current on case law interpreting “testimonial statements” under Crawford and Davis
  • Confidently prepare your evidence and your experts for trial

1

Right to Present Relevant Evidence

  • I.  INTRODUCTION
    • A.  Using This Book to Object and Respond to Objections  1.1
    • B.  Organization and Scope of Book  1.2
  • II.  “EVIDENCE,” “PRESUMPTION,” AND “INFERENCE” DEFINED  1.3
  • III.  WHAT CONSTITUTES RELEVANT EVIDENCE?
    • A.  Civil Cases  1.4
    • B.  Criminal Cases  1.5
      • 1.  Proposition 8  1.6
      • 2.  Proposition 115  1.7
  • IV.  APPLICATION OF EVIDENCE CODE
    • A.  Civil Cases  1.8
    • B.  Criminal Cases  1.9
      • 1.  Provisions That Differ in Criminal Trials  1.10
      • 2.  Provisions That Do Not Apply in Criminal Trials  1.11
  • V.  APPLICATION OF CONSTITUTION AND CASE LAW TO CRIMINAL CASES  1.12
  • VI.  CHECKLIST: OBJECTING TO EVIDENCE  1.13

2

Motions in Limine

  • I.  HISTORY  2.1
  • II.  DEFINITION  2.2
  • III.  USES OF MOTION IN LIMINE
    • A.  To Exclude Evidence  2.3
    • B.  To Seek Limiting Instructions  2.4
    • C.  To Prevent Undue Prejudice  2.5
    • D.  To Prohibit Use of Evidence as Sanction for Abuse of Discovery  2.6
    • E.  To Seek Admission of Evidence  2.7
  • IV.  BENEFITS AND RISKS OF MAKING MOTION
    • A.  Benefits  2.8
    • B.  Risks  2.9
    • C.  Judge’s View  2.10
  • V.  PROCEDURES
    • A.  Timing of Motion  2.10A
    • B.  Format and Notice Requirements
      • 1.  Written Motions in Limine  2.11
      • 2.  Oral Motions in Limine  2.12
  • VI.  IN LIMINE ORDERS
    • A.  Preliminary or Conditional Rulings  2.13
    • B.  Final Rulings  2.14
  • VII.  RENEWING MOTION DURING TRIAL TO PRESERVE GROUND FOR APPEAL
    • A.  Reiteration Rule  2.15
    • B.  Making a Record  2.16
  • VIII.  VIOLATIONS OF IN LIMINE ORDERS  2.17
  • IX.  PRESERVING RECORD ON APPEAL  2.18
  • X.  FORMS
    • A.  Form: Motion in Limine  2.19
    • B.  Form: Order in Limine  2.20

3

Order of Proof

  • I.  TRIAL COURT’S POWER TO REGULATE  3.1
  • II.  USUAL ORDER OF PROCEEDINGS  3.2
    • A.  Civil Trials  3.3
    • B.  Criminal Trials  3.4
  • III.  ORDER OF EXAMINING WITNESS
    • A.  Usual Order  3.5
    • B.  Conditional Admission of Testimony  3.6
  • IV.  ORDER OF DETERMINING ISSUES
    • A.  Civil Trials  3.7
    • B.  Criminal Trials  3.8
  • V.  RULING ON ORDER OF PROOF IS NOT RULING ON ADMISSIBILITY  3.9

4

Objecting to Evidence

  • I.  INTRODUCTION
    • A.  Importance of Weighing Alternatives  4.1
    • B.  Reasons for Objecting  4.2
    • C.  Reasons for Not Objecting
      • 1.  Danger of Alienating Jury  4.3
      • 2.  Danger of Highlighting Harmful Evidence  4.4
      • 3.  Negligible Harm Threatened  4.5
      • 4.  Reversal on Appeal Unlikely  4.6
      • 5.  When Trial Judge’s Questions Are Objectionable  4.7
    • D.  Waiver; Invited Error  4.8
  • II.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING
    • A.  Not Objecting  4.9
    • B.  Combining Series of Objections
      • 1.  Introduction  4.10
      • 2.  Continuing Objections  4.11
      • 3.  Adoptive Objections  4.12
      • 4.  Summary Objections  4.13
    • C.  Impeaching the Witness  4.14
  • III.  MAKING THE OBJECTION
    • A.  Statutory Requirements  4.15
    • B.  Timeliness  4.16
    • C.  Form
      • 1.  Wording  4.17
      • 2.  Specific Ground Essential  4.18
      • 3.  General Objection Insufficient  4.19
    • D.  Obtaining a Ruling  4.20

5

Responding to Objections

  • I.  CHECKLIST OF RESPONSES  5.1
  • II.  INVOKING EXCEPTIONS TO EXCLUSIONARY RULES  5.2
  • III.  CONDITIONAL ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE  5.3
  • IV.  OFFERS OF PROOF
    • A.  Nature and Function; Proving Substance, Purpose, and Relevancy  5.4
    • B.  When Offer of Proof Is Not Required
      • 1.  During Cross-Examination  5.5
      • 2.  After Broad Exclusionary Ruling  5.6
      • 3.  If Question Contains Necessary Elements  5.7
      • 4.  If Necessary Elements Otherwise Apparent  5.8
    • C.  Procedure for Offer of Proof
      • 1.  Out of Jury’s Presence  5.9
      • 2.  Substance of Offered Evidence  5.10
      • 3.  Purpose of Offered Evidence  5.11
      • 4.  Relevancy of Offered Evidence  5.12
      • 5.  Availability of Offered Evidence  5.13
    • D.  Objections to Offers of Proof  5.14
  • V.  RESPONSES
    • A.  Counsel’s Duty to Seek Other Methods of Proof  5.15
    • B.  Rephrasing the Question  5.16
    • C.  Presenting Other Proof  5.17

6

Objections to Jury Voir Dire

  • I.  SCOPE OF CHAPTER  6.1
  • II.  PRE-VOIR DIRE PROCEDURES
    • A.  Challenges for Cause to Panel as a Whole
      • 1.  When Challenge Is Available  6.2
      • 2.  Procedure  6.3
      • 3.  Differences Between Civil and Criminal Cases  6.4
    • B.  Pre-Voir Dire Conference
      • 1.  Civil  6.5
      • 2.  Criminal  6.6
    • C.  Objections at Pre-Voir Dire Conference  6.7
      • 1.  Motions in Limine  6.8
      • 2.  Trial Brief  6.9
      • 3.  Juror Questionnaire  6.10
  • III.  METHODS OF SEATING JURORS FOR QUESTIONING AND CHALLENGING  6.11
    • A.  “Jury Box” Method  6.12
    • B.  “Six Pack” or “Struck Juror” Method  6.13
  • IV.  QUESTIONING BY TRIAL JUDGE AND COUNSEL  6.14
    • A.  Civil  6.15
    • B.  Criminal  6.16
  • V.  CHALLENGES
    • A.  Challenges for Cause
      • 1.  Grounds for Challenge  6.17
        • a.  General Disqualification  6.18
        • b.  Implied Bias  6.19
        • c.  Actual Bias  6.20
      • 2.  Both Court and Counsel May Exercise Challenge  6.21
      • 3.  How and When to Exercise Challenge  6.22
      • 4.  Trial of Challenge for Cause  6.23
    • B.  Peremptory Challenges
      • 1.  How and When to Exercise Challenges  6.24
      • 2.  Number of Challenges Permitted
        • a.  Civil  6.25
        • b.  Criminal  6.26
      • 3.  Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges: Wheeler-Elem Rule
        • a.  Discriminatory Use of Peremptory Challenges Prohibited in Both Civil and Criminal Trials  6.27
        • b.  Proving Prima Facie Case  6.28
        • c.  Rebutting Prima Facie Case  6.29
        • d.  Proof Currently Accepted at Hearing  6.30
        • e.  Determination by Court  6.31
        • f.  Appellate Review  6.32
  • VI.  GROUNDS FOR OBJECTING TO IMPROPER VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS
    • A.  Question Attempts to Indoctrinate Jurors on Law
      • 1.  Nature of Objection  6.33
      • 2.  Stating the Objection  6.34
    • B.  Question Based on Incorrect Statement of Law
      • 1.  Nature of Objection  6.35
      • 2.  Stating the Objection  6.36
    • C.  Question Asks Jurors to Prejudge Evidence
      • 1.  Nature of Objection  6.37
      • 2.  Stating the Objection  6.38
    • D.  Question Introduces Prejudicial Matter
      • 1.  Nature of Objection  6.39
      • 2.  Stating the Objection  6.40
    • E.  Question Improper if Not Related to Challenge for Cause (Special Rule for Criminal Cases)
      • 1.  Nature of Objection  6.41
      • 2.  Stating the Objection  6.42
      • 3.  Response to Objection: Connect Question to Basis for Challenge  6.43
    • F.  Question Prohibited by Judicial Administrative Standards  6.44
    • G.  Question in Improper Form  6.45
  • VII.  HOW TO OBJECT TO IMPROPER VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION
    • A.  Objection to Examination by Judge  6.46
    • B.  Objection to Examination by Counsel; “Speaking Objections”  6.47
    • C.  Motion for Mistrial  6.48
  • VIII.  WAIVER OF OBJECTION  6.49
  • IX.  ISSUES ON APPEAL  6.50
  • X.  SELECTED RULES OF COURT AND STATUTES
    • A.  Civil
      • 1.  California Rules of Court  6.51
      • 2.  Code of Civil Procedure  6.52
    • B.  Criminal
      • 1.  California Rules of Court  6.53
      • 2.  Code of Civil Procedure  6.54

7

Question Is Ambiguous or Unintelligible

  • I.  DEFINITION  7.1
  • II.  DANGERS PRESENTED  7.2
  • III.  ANALYSIS  7.3
  • IV.  SPEAKING OBJECTIONS  7.4
  • V.  STATUTE  7.5
  • VI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  7.6

8

Question Is Compound

  • I.  DEFINITION  8.1
  • II.  DANGERS PRESENTED  8.2
  • III.  ILLUSTRATIONS  8.3
  • IV.  STATUTE  8.4
  • V.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  8.5
  • VI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  8.6

9

Question Is Too General

  • I.  DEFINITION  9.1
  • II.  DANGERS PRESENTED  9.2
  • III.  ILLUSTRATION  9.3
  • IV.  STATUTE  9.4
  • V.  STATING THE OBJECTION  9.5

10

Question Calls for Narrative Answer

  • I.  DEFINITION  10.1
  • II.  DANGERS PRESENTED  10.2
  • III.  ILLUSTRATIONS  10.3
  • IV.  TRIAL JUDGE’S ROLE  10.4
  • V.  STATUTE  10.5
  • VI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  10.6

11

Question Has Been Asked and Answered

  • I.  DEFINITION  11.1
  • II.  DANGERS PRESENTED  11.2
  • III.  ANALYSIS  11.3
  • IV.  STATUTE  11.4
  • V.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  11.5
  • VI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  11.6

12

Question Misquotes Witness

  • I.  DEFINITION  12.1
  • II.  ILLUSTRATIONS  12.2
  • III.  ADDITIONAL REMEDIES  12.3
  • IV.  STATUTE  12.4
  • V.  STATING THE OBJECTION  12.5

13

Question Is Leading

  • I.  DEFINITION  13.1
  • II.  ILLUSTRATIONS
    • A.  Leading Questions  13.2
    • B.  Questions Not Leading  13.3
  • III.  PROPER LEADING QUESTIONS DURING DIRECT OR REDIRECT EXAMINATION
    • A.  Introduction  13.4
    • B.  To Establish Preliminary Matters  13.5
    • C.  To Refresh Recollection  13.6
    • D.  To Aid Witnesses Requiring Assistance in Testifying  13.7
    • E.  To Question Expert Witnesses  13.8
    • F.  To Question Hostile Witnesses  13.9
    • G.  To Question Witnesses Who Have Changed Their Stories  13.10
    • H.  To Identify Exhibits  13.11
  • IV.  IMPROPER LEADING QUESTIONS DURING CROSS- OR RECROSS-EXAMINATION  13.12
  • V.  STATUTE  13.13
  • VI.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  13.14
  • VII.  STATING THE OBJECTION  13.15

14

Question Is Argumentative

  • I.  DEFINITION  14.1
  • II.  ILLUSTRATION  14.2
  • III.  STATUTE  14.3
  • IV.  STATING THE OBJECTION  14.4

15

Question Assumes Fact in Dispute or Not in Evidence

  • I.  DEFINITION  15.1
  • II.  DANGERS PRESENTED  15.2
  • III.  ANALYSIS
    • A.  Direct Examination  15.3
    • B.  Cross-Examination  15.4
  • IV.  ILLUSTRATIONS  15.5
  • V.  CONDITIONAL ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE  15.6
  • VI.  ADDITIONAL REMEDIES  15.7
  • VII.  STATUTE  15.8
  • VIII.  STATING THE OBJECTION  15.9

16

Question Calls for Speculation

  • I.  DEFINITION  16.1
  • II.  ILLUSTRATIONS  16.2
  • III.  ANALYSIS  16.3
    • A.  Lay Witnesses: Opinion Testimony Versus Speculation  16.4
    • B.  Expert Witnesses: Speculation  16.5
  • IV.  STATUTE  16.6
  • V.  STATING THE OBJECTION  16.7

17

Irrelevant Evidence

  • I.  STATUTORY PROVISIONS  17.1
  • II.  RELEVANCY
    • A.  Under Evidence Code  17.2
    • B.  Admissibility of Evidence to Which Opposing Counsel Offers to Stipulate  17.3
    • C.  Relevancy in Criminal Actions  17.4
    • D.  Admissibility of Prior Convictions  17.5
    • E.  Admissibility of Evidence to Support “Third Party Defense”  17.6
  • III.  LAYING FOUNDATION FOR RELEVANCY  17.7
  • IV.  “INCOMPETENT, IRRELEVANT, AND IMMATERIAL”  17.8
  • V.  FAILURE TO OBJECT TO IRRELEVANT EVIDENCE  17.9
  • VI.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  17.10
  • VII.  STATING THE OBJECTION  17.11

18

Incompetent Witness

  • I.  GENERAL DESCRIPTION
    • A.  Definition  18.1
    • B.  Statutory Grounds  18.2
    • C.  Statute  18.3
  • II.  ANALYSIS OF STATUTORY GROUNDS
    • A.  Inability to Communicate
      • 1.  Definition  18.4
      • 2.  Ruling on Objection  18.5
      • 3.  Statute  18.6
      • 4.  Alternatives to Objecting  18.7
      • 5.  Stating the Objection  18.8
    • B.  Inability to Understand Duty to Tell Truth
      • 1.  Definition  18.9
      • 2.  Ruling on Objection  18.10
      • 3.  Statute  18.11
      • 4.  Alternatives to Objecting  18.12
      • 5.  Stating the Objection  18.13
    • C.  Attorney as Witness
      • 1.  Definition  18.14
      • 2.  Statute; Rule of Professional Conduct  18.15
      • 3.  Stating the Objection  18.16
    • D.  Judge as Witness
      • 1.  Definition  18.17
      • 2.  Statute  18.18
      • 3.  Stating the Objection  18.19
    • E.  Juror as Witness  18.20
    • F.  Lack of Personal Knowledge
      • 1.  Definition  18.21
      • 2.  Illustrations  18.22
      • 3.  Ruling on Objection  18.23
      • 4.  Statute  18.24
      • 5.  Alternatives to Objecting  18.25
      • 6.  Stating the Objection  18.26
    • G.  Juror Impeaching Verdict
      • 1.  Discussion  18.27
      • 2.  Alternatives to Objecting  18.28
      • 3.  Stating the Objection  18.29
    • H.  Testimony Based on Use of Speedtrap
      • 1.  Discussion; Statute  18.30
      • 2.  Alternatives to Objecting  18.31
      • 3.  Stating the Objection  18.32

19

Hearsay

  • I.  DEFINITION  19.1
  • II.  HEARSAY RULE  19.2
  • III.  WHAT IS HEARSAY?
    • A.  Out-of-Court Statement  19.3
    • B.  Out-of-Court Statement Offered to Prove Truth of Matter Stated  19.4
  • IV.  WHAT IS NOT HEARSAY?
    • A.  Statement Offered as Circumstantial Evidence  19.5
    • B.  Statement Offered to Prove That Statement Was Made  19.6
    • C.  Statement Offered to Prove Knowledge or Belief  19.7
  • V.  EXCEPTIONS TO HEARSAY RULE: ADMISSIBLE HEARSAY
    • A.  Major Categories  19.8
    • B.  Important Considerations Regarding Exceptions
      • 1.  Other Exclusionary Rules May Apply  19.9
      • 2.  Testimonial Statements May Be Barred by Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
        • a.  Crawford v Washington: “Testimonial” Hearsay  19.9A
        • b.  Determining Whether Crawford Applies  19.9B
      • 3.  Proponent Must Lay Foundation  19.10
      • 4.  Declarant Is Unavailable  19.11
      • 5.  Statement Is Untrustworthy  19.12
    • C.  Descriptive Catalog of Exceptions
      • 1.  Confessions and Admissions
        • a.  Admissions of Parties  19.13
        • b.  Adoptive Admissions  19.14
        • c.  Authorized Admissions  19.15
        • d.  Admissions of Co-Conspirators  19.16
      • 2.  Statements Under Evid C §§1231–1231.4  19.16A
      • 3.  Statements Under Evid C §§1224–1228  19.17
      • 4.  Declarations Against Interest  19.18
      • 5.  Prior Statements of Witnesses
        • a.  Statement Inconsistent With Present Testimony  19.19
        • b.  Prior Consistent Statements Offered Under Evid C §1236  19.20
        • c.  Past Recollection Recorded  19.21
        • d.  Prior Statement Identifying Persons  19.22
      • 6.  Spontaneous, Contemporaneous, and Dying Declarations  19.23
      • 7.  Statements of Mental or Physical State  19.24
      • 8.  Statements Relating to Wills, Revocable Trusts, or to Claims Against Estates  19.25
      • 9.  Business Records  19.26
      • 10.  Official Records and Other Official Writings  19.27
      • 11.  Former Testimony
        • a.  Former Testimony Defined (Evid C §1290)  19.28
        • b.  Parties Same in Former Action (Evid C §1291)  19.29
        • c.  Party Different in Former Action (Evid C §1292)  19.30
        • d.  Minor in Child Dependency Action (Evid C §1293)  19.31
        • e.  Inconsistent Statement (Evid C §1294)  19.31A
      • 12.  Judgments  19.32
      • 13.  Family History  19.33
      • 14.  Reputation or Statements Concerning Community History, Property Interests, or Character  19.34
      • 15.  Dispositive Instruments or Ancient Writings  19.35
      • 16.  Statements in Commercial, Scientific, or Similar Publications  19.36
      • 17.  Parent’s or Guardian’s Failure to Cooperate in Child Welfare Services Case Plan as Evidence in Proceeding to Terminate Parental Rights  19.36A
      • 18.  Bills Offered to Corroborate Other Evidence  19.37
      • 19.  Testimony Given at Preliminary Hearing in Criminal Case  19.38
      • 20.  Testimony Given at CCP §527.8 Hearing to Enjoin Workplace Violence and Threats  19.38A
  • VI.  IMPEACHING HEARSAY DECLARANT  19.39
  • VII.  COMMON MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT HEARSAY RULE
    • A.  “Self-Serving” Is Not an Objection  19.40
    • B.  “Res Gestae” Is Not an Exception  19.41
  • VIII.  CHECKLIST: HEARSAY PROBLEMS  19.42
  • IX.  STATUTE  19.43
  • X.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  19.44
  • XI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  19.45

20

Inadmissible Opinion

  • I.  DEFINITION  20.1
  • II.  ADMISSIBLE OPINION BY LAY WITNESS
    • A.  Introduction  20.2
    • B.  Lay Opinion Permitted on Certain Subject Matter  20.3
    • C.  Lay Opinion Otherwise Permitted  20.4
    • D.  Statute  20.5
  • III.  ADMISSIBLE OPINION BY EXPERT WITNESS
    • A.  Qualification as Expert  20.6
    • B.  Special Type of Subject Matter Beyond Common Experience  20.7
    • C.  Basis of Expert Opinion  20.8
      • 1.  Expert Generally Must Rely on Admissible Matter  20.9
      • 2.  Scientific Evidence  20.10
        • a.  Kelly-Frye Standard  20.11
        • b.  California’s Kelly Test
          • (1)  Establishing General Acceptance of New Scientific Technique or Theory  20.12
          • (2)  Applying Kelly Test to Scientific Evidence
            • (a)  Techniques That Passed Test  20.13
            • (b)  Techniques That Did Not Pass Test  20.14
        • c.  Federal Courts’ Daubert Test
          • (1)  Daubert I  20.15
          • (2)  Daubert II  20.16
        • d.  Impact of Daubert in California: People v Leahy  20.17
        • e.  Psychological Opinion  20.18
    • D.  Hypothetical Questions
      • 1.  Use  20.19
      • 2.  General Rules of Framing  20.20
    • E.  Appointment of Experts  20.21
    • F.  Statutes  20.22
  • IV.  PROCEDURES FOR TESTING OPINION TESTIMONY
    • A.  Foundational Examination Before Opinion Stated  20.23
    • B.  Voir Dire Examination of Expert  20.24
    • C.  Cross-Examination After Opinion Stated  20.25
    • D.  Impeachment of Expert by Extrinsic Evidence  20.26
    • E.  Cross-Examination of Third Person if Expert’s Opinion Is Based on Hearsay  20.27
  • V.  OPINION ON ULTIMATE ISSUE IS PERMISSIBLE  20.28
  • VI.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  20.29
  • VII.  STATING THE OBJECTION
    • A.  Lay Witness  20.30
    • B.  Expert Witness  20.31
  • VIII.  RESPONSE: MOTION TO STRIKE  20.32

21

Insufficient Foundation

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  21.1
  • II.  DETERMINING TYPE OF FOUNDATIONAL PROBLEM PRESENTED
    • A.  Determining Proper Classification (Evid C §§403, 405)  21.2
    • B.  When Evid C §403 Applies
      • 1.  Introduction  21.3
      • 2.  Relevancy  21.4
      • 3.  Personal Knowledge  21.5
      • 4.  Authenticity of Writing  21.6
      • 5.  Identity  21.7
    • C.  When Evid C §405 Applies  21.8
  • III.  COMPARING PROCEDURAL RULES
    • A.  Presence of Jury  21.9
    • B.  Procedure Under Evid C §403
      • 1.  Judge Determines Only Whether Prima Facie Showing Made  21.10
      • 2.  Conditional Admission if No Prima Facie Showing Made  21.11
      • 3.  Cautionary Instructions to Jury Under Evid C §403 Only  21.12
      • 4.  Exclusion of Evidence on Redetermination  21.13
      • 5.  Statute  21.14
    • C.  Procedure Under Evid C §405
      • 1.  Judge Alone Determines Admissibility  21.15
      • 2.  No Evid C §405 Conditional Admission  21.16
      • 3.  Separating Jury’s Role if Preliminary Fact Is Also Ultimate Fact  21.17
      • 4.  Statute  21.18
  • IV.  RESPONSES TO OBJECTION  21.19
  • V.  STATING THE OBJECTION  21.20

22

Improper Impeachment

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  22.1
  • II.  WIDE LATITUDE ALLOWED FOR IMPEACHMENT
    • A.  Increased Freedom to Impeach  22.2
    • B.  Impeachment on Collateral Matter Permitted  22.3
    • C.  Impeachment by Cross-Examination Not Limited to Scope of Direct Examination  22.4
    • D.  Impeachment by Prior Inconsistent Statement
      • 1.  Determination of Inconsistency  22.5
      • 2.  Permitted Without Showing Statement to Witness  22.5A
      • 3.  Permitted, in Judge’s Discretion, Even if Witness Has No Opportunity to Explain  22.6
  • III.  LIMITATIONS ON IMPEACHMENT
    • A.  Rules of General Applicability  22.7
    • B.  Rules Specifically Limiting Impeachment
      • 1.  Character Evidence  22.8
      • 2.  Absence of Religious Belief  22.9
      • 3.  Use of Texts for Impeachment  22.10
      • 4.  Noncompliance With CCP §2034 Expert Witness List  22.11
      • 5.  Judicial Arbitration  22.11A
  • IV.  STATUTE  22.12
  • V.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  22.13
  • VI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  22.14

23

Improper Rehabilitation

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  23.1
  • II.  WIDE LATITUDE ALLOWED FOR REHABILITATION  23.2
  • III.  LIMITATIONS ON REHABILITATION
    • A.  Rules of General Applicability  23.3
    • B.  Rules Specifically Limiting Rehabilitation  23.4
  • IV.  STATUTE  23.5
  • V.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  23.6
  • VI.  EFFECT OF FAILURE TO REHABILITATE  23.7
  • VII.  STATING THE OBJECTION  23.8

24

Excluding Secondary Evidence

  • I.  REPEAL OF BEST EVIDENCE RULE  24.1
  • II.  SECONDARY EVIDENCE RULE  24.2
  • III.  ADDITIONAL GROUND FOR EXCLUSION OF SECONDARY EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL ACTION  24.3
  • IV.  ORAL TESTIMONY OF CONTENT OF WRITING GENERALLY NOT ADMISSIBLE  24.4
  • V.  PRINTED REPRESENTATIONS OF COMPUTER INFORMATION OR PROGRAM, OR OF VIDEO OR DIGITAL IMAGES, PRESUMED ACCURATE  24.5
  • VI.  STATUTE  24.6
  • VII.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  24.7
  • VIII.  STATING THE OBJECTION  24.8

25

Inadmissible Parol Evidence

  • I.  DEFINITION  25.1
  • II.  STATUTORY BASIS  25.2
  • III.  WHEN RULE APPLIES; CONCEPT OF INTEGRATION  25.3
  • IV.  WHO MAY INVOKE RULE  25.4
  • V.  EXCEPTIONS TO RULE
    • A.  To Prove Mistake, Illegality, or Fraud  25.5
    • B.  To Prove Invalidity  25.6
    • C.  To Explain Terms  25.7
    • D.  To Resolve Ambiguity  25.8
    • E.  Several Writings Constituting Agreement  25.9
    • F.  Consistent Additional Terms  25.10
    • G.  Subsequent Modifications  25.11
  • VI.  REQUIREMENT OF PROMPT OBJECTION  25.12
  • VII.  STATING THE OBJECTION  25.13

26

Cross-Examination Exceeds Scope of Direct Examination

  • I.  TYPES OF CROSS-EXAMINATION  26.1
  • II.  STATEMENT OF RULE
    • A.  Statutory Provisions Establishing Restricted Scope  26.2
    • B.  Unlimited Scope for Impeachment Cross-Examination  26.3
    • C.  Determining “Scope”  26.4
  • III.  “OPENING THE DOOR” EXCEPTION
    • A.  Limited Nature of Exception  26.5
    • B.  When “Curative Admissibility” Exception Applies
      • 1.  Offsetting Highly Prejudicial Evidence: Curative Admissibility  26.6
      • 2.  Putting Evidence in Proper Context: Rule of Completeness  26.7
  • IV.  ADDITIONAL PROTECTION BASED ON CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION  26.8
  • V.  RELATED OBJECTIONS TO RECROSS- AND REDIRECT EXAMINATION  26.9
  • VI.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  26.10
  • VII.  STATING THE OBJECTION  26.11

27

Corpus Delicti Not Proved

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  27.1
  • II.  PROOF REQUIRED  27.2
  • III.  PROCEDURE
    • A.  Judge’s Determination Regarding Corpus Delicti  27.3
    • B.  Trial Jury’s Determination
      • 1.  Separate Determination Required  27.4
      • 2.  Determination Regarding Corpus Delicti  27.5
      • 3.  Determination Regarding Guilt  27.6
      • 4.  Difficulty of Separating Jury’s Determinations  27.7

28

Illegally Obtained Evidence

  • I.  SCOPE OF CHAPTER  28.1
  • II.  SUMMARY  28.2
  • III.  SEARCH AND SEIZURE EXCLUSIONARY RULE
    • A.  Constitutional Provisions  28.3
    • B.  Applicability
      • 1.  Criminal Cases  28.3A
      • 2.  Civil Cases  28.4
      • 3.  Quasi-Criminal Cases  28.5
      • 4.  Administrative Proceedings  28.6
  • IV.  EXCLUDING EVIDENCE UNDER EVID C §352  28.7
  • V.  EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY FRAUD AND DECEIT  28.8
  • VI.  EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OBTAINED BY OUTRAGEOUS OR SHOCKING METHODS  28.9
  • VII.  EXCLUDING ILLEGALLY OBTAINED CONFESSIONS AND ADMISSIONS  28.10
  • VIII.  EXCLUDING EVIDENCE OBTAINED DURING ADMINISTRATIVE INSPECTIONS  28.11
  • IX.  PROCEDURE  28.12
  • X.  STATING THE OBJECTION
    • A.  Illegal Search and Seizure  28.13
    • B.  Illegally Obtained Confessions and Admissions  28.14
    • C.  Other Illegally Obtained Evidence  28.15

29

Objecting to Misconduct

  • I.  SCOPE OF CHAPTER  29.1
  • II.  MISCONDUCT OF COUNSEL
    • A.  Definition  29.2
    • B.  Examples of Misconduct of Counsel
      • 1.  Primary Categories  29.3
      • 2.  Misconduct Before Trial or During Voir Dire Examination  29.4
      • 3.  Misconduct During Opening Statement  29.5
      • 4.  Misconduct During Examination of Witnesses  29.6
      • 5.  Misconduct During Argument  29.7
      • 6.  Misconduct After Trial  29.8
    • C.  Determining Prejudicial Effect  29.9
    • D.  Remedies
      • 1.  Objection
        • a.  Purpose  29.10
        • b.  Timeliness  29.11
        • c.  Objecting to Misconduct  29.12
        • d.  Laying Foundation for Misconduct That Occurred Without Judge’s Knowledge  29.13
      • 2.  Requesting Curative Admonition  29.14
      • 3.  Contempt  29.15
      • 4.  Motion for Mistrial  29.16
      • 5.  Motion for New Trial  29.17
      • 6.  Appeal  29.18
    • E.  Alternatives to Objecting  29.19
    • F.  Stating the Objection  29.20
  • III.  MISCONDUCT OF JUDGE
    • A.  Standards of Conduct  29.21
    • B.  Examples of Misconduct of Judge  29.22
      • 1.  Abuse of Power to Comment on Evidence  29.23
      • 2.  Abuse of Power to Examine Witnesses or Prospective Witnesses  29.24
      • 3.  Interference With Production of Proof  29.25
      • 4.  Coercive Actions  29.26
      • 5.  Disparagement of Counsel, Witness, or Party  29.27
    • C.  Remedies
      • 1.  Objection  29.28
      • 2.  Motion for Mistrial  29.29
      • 3.  Motion for New Trial  29.30
      • 4.  Appeal  29.31
    • D.  Alternatives to Objecting  29.32
    • E.  Stating the Objection  29.33
  • IV.  MISCONDUCT OF JURORS
    • A.  Standards of Conduct  29.34
    • B.  Examples of Misconduct of Jurors
      • 1.  Concealing Information During Voir Dire Examination  29.35
      • 2.  Receiving Evidence Out of Court
        • a.  General Restrictions  29.36
        • b.  Specific Prohibitions
          • (1)  Independent Investigations or Research  29.37
          • (2)  Independent Experiments  29.38
          • (3)  Unauthorized Discussions  29.39
          • (4)  Personal Knowledge of Facts  29.40
          • (5)  Personal Knowledge of Law  29.41
          • (6)  Unauthorized Matter in Jury Room  29.42
      • 3.  Arriving at Verdict by Chance or by Quotient  29.43
      • 4.  Inattentiveness During Trial  29.44
      • 5.  Failure to Deliberate  29.44A
    • C.  Remedies
      • 1.  Before Verdict Rendered  29.45
      • 2.  After Verdict Rendered  29.46
    • D.  Alternatives to Objecting  29.47
    • E.  Stating the Objection
      • 1.  Before Verdict Rendered  29.48
      • 2.  After Verdict Rendered  29.49

30

Unduly Inflammatory

  • I.  DEFINITION  30.1
  • II.  ANALYSIS  30.2
  • III.  TACTICS; PROCEDURE  30.3
  • IV.  ILLUSTRATIONS
    • A.  Discretion Upheld  30.4
    • B.  Abuse of Discretion  30.5
  • V.  STATUTE  30.6
  • VI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  30.7

31

Excluding Relevant Evidence Under Evid C §352

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  31.1
  • II.  APPLICABILITY  31.2
    • A.  Unduly Prejudicial
      • 1.  Civil Trials  31.3
      • 2.  Criminal Trials  31.4
    • B.  Unduly Time Consuming  31.5
    • C.  Cumulative Evidence  31.6
      • 1.  Analysis  31.7
      • 2.  Illustrations  31.8
      • 3.  Tactics  31.9
      • 4.  Stating the Objection  31.10
    • D.  Confuses Issues or Misleads Jury  31.11
  • III.  DURING TRIAL
    • A.  Court’s Balancing Factors  31.12
    • B.  Responses
      • 1.  Motion to Strike  31.13
      • 2.  Offer of Proof  31.14
      • 3.  Argument  31.15
      • 4.  Record for Appeal  31.16
  • IV.  PROCEDURE  31.17
  • V.  STATUTE  31.18
  • VI.  INVOKING JUDGE’S AUTHORITY  31.19

32

Other Policy Exclusions of Evidence

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  32.1
  • II.  EVIDENCE OF SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS
    • A.  Offer of Compromise Payment in Civil Cases  32.2
    • B.  Acceptance of Compromise Payment in Civil Cases  32.3
    • C.  Offer to Plead Guilty  32.4
  • III.  EVIDENCE OF SUBSEQUENT SAFETY MEASURES  32.5
  • IV.  EVIDENCE REGARDING LIABILITY INSURANCE  32.6
  • V.  MEDIATION CONFIDENTIALITY  32.6A
  • VI.  EVIDENCE OF SIMILAR ACTS OR OCCURRENCES  32.7
  • VII.  LIMITED ADMISSIBILITY INSTRUCTION  32.8
  • VIII.  MISCELLANEOUS OTHER STATUTES  32.9
  • IX.  EVIDENCE OF COLLATERAL SOURCE PAYMENTS
    • A.  Collateral Source Rule  32.10
    • B.  Limits on Application of Rule
      • 1.  Action Against Public Entity  32.11
      • 2.  Action Against Health Care Provider  32.12
      • 3.  Malingering Claim  32.13
      • 4.  FELA Action in State Court  32.14
  • X.  ALTERNATIVES TO OBJECTING  32.15
  • XI.  STATING THE OBJECTION  32.16

33

Privileges: General Rules and Considerations

  • I.  INTRODUCTION
    • A.  Overview of Privileges  33.1
    • B.  Applicability  33.2
    • C.  Exclusively Statutory Basis  33.3
    • D.  Confidentiality Distinct From Privilege  33.3A
  • II.  EXERCISING PRIVILEGES
    • A.  Determining Who Can Invoke or Waive
      • 1.  Meaning of “Holder”  33.4
      • 2.  Claim or Assertion  33.5
      • 3.  Waiver  33.6
      • 4.  Remedies for Erroneous Denial  33.7
    • B.  Privileges in Preparing for Trial
      • 1.  Role of Counsel  33.8
      • 2.  Discovery Proceedings  33.9
      • 3.  Selection of Privileges to Be Invoked  33.10
    • C.  Assertion of Privilege at Trial
      • 1.  Claim of Privilege  33.11
      • 2.  Use of Privileged Writing to Refresh Memory  33.12
      • 3.  Avoiding Need to Claim Privilege Before Jury  33.13
      • 4.  Exclusion of Privileged Information in Absence of Claimant
        • a.  Privileges Covered by Exclusion Procedure  33.14
        • b.  Evid C §916 Requirements for Exclusion of Information Subject to Claim  33.15
        • c.  Exceptions  33.16
    • D.  Upholding Privilege Contested at Trial
      • 1.  Procedure for Ruling on Privilege  33.17
      • 2.  Burden of Proof  33.18
      • 3.  Offer of Proof  33.19
    • E.  Evid C §913 Protection Against Comment and Inference  33.20
    • F.  Remedies for Erroneous Denial of Privilege
      • 1.  Party’s Assertion of Error  33.21
      • 2.  Seeking Extraordinary Writ
        • a.  Privilege Claimed by Witness  33.22
        • b.  Privilege Claimed by Person Other Than Witness  33.23
      • 3.  Objection to Subsequent Use of Erroneously Compelled Disclosure  33.24
  • III.  OPPOSITION TO PRIVILEGES
    • A.  Before Trial  33.25
    • B.  Response to Assertion of Privilege at Trial
      • 1.  Controverting Privilege  33.26
      • 2.  Offer of Proof  33.27
    • C.  Subsequent Admission of Evidence Excluded as Privileged in Absence of Claimant  33.28
    • D.  Comment on Opponent’s Failure to Explain or Deny Evidence  33.29
    • E.  Remedy for Erroneous Allowance of Privilege  33.30
  • IV.  STATUTES  33.31

34

Attorney-Client Privilege

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  34.1
  • II.  DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE AND WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE  34.2
  • III.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Attorney-Client Relationship
      • 1.  Professional Consultation  34.3
      • 2.  Who Is the Client?
        • a.  Individual as Client  34.4
        • b.  Corporation as Client  34.5
          • (1)  Attorney as Witness  34.5A
          • (2)  Current and Former Corporate Employees  34.6
          • (3)  Upjohn Decision  34.7
        • c.  Joint Clients  34.7A
      • 3.  Who Is the Attorney?  34.8
    • B.  Communication  34.9
    • C.  Confidentiality  34.10
    • D.  Mediation Confidentiality  34.10A
  • IV.  WHO CAN CLAIM THE PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Client or Client’s Representative  34.11
    • B.  Attorney’s Duty to Claim  34.12
    • C.  Judge May Exclude Information  34.13
  • V.  EXCEPTIONS  34.14
    • A.  Based on Nature of Attorney-Client Relationship
      • 1.  Assistance in Crime or Fraud  34.15
      • 2.  Breach of Attorney-Client Duty  34.16
      • 3.  Subsequent Litigation Between Joint Clients  34.17
    • B.  Claims Through Deceased Client
      • 1.  Issues Between Claimants  34.18
      • 2.  Deceased Client’s Written Instrument  34.19
  • VI.  TERMINATION BY DEATH, DISSOLUTION, OR WAIVER
    • A.  Effect of Client’s Death  34.20
    • B.  Effect of Organization Client’s Dissolution  34.21
    • C.  Waiver
      • 1.  Disclosure of Significant Part of Communication  34.22
      • 2.  Failure to Claim Privilege  34.22A
      • 3.  Joint Defense Agreements and Disclosure  34.22B
  • VII.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  34.23
    • B.  Burden of Proof  34.24
  • VIII.  STATUTES  34.25
  • IX.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  34.26
  • X.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Client-Witness  34.27
    • B.  By Attorney-Witness  34.28
    • C.  By Trial Counsel  34.29

35

Work Product Doctrine

  • I.  DEFINITION AND PURPOSE  35.1
  • II.  DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN WORK PRODUCT DOCTRINE AND ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE  35.2
  • III.  TYPES OF WORK PRODUCT
    • A.  Civil Cases  35.3
    • B.  Criminal Cases  35.4
  • IV.  WHO MAY CLAIM PROTECTION?  35.5
  • V.  DURATION AND AVAILABILITY OF PROTECTION  35.6
  • VI.  EXCEPTIONS  35.7
  • VII.  WAIVER  35.8
  • VIII.  IN CAMERA REVIEW IN CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CASES  35.9
  • IX.  STATUTES  35.10
  • X.  STATING THE CLAIM  35.11

36

Physician-Patient Privilege

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  36.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Physician-Patient Relationship  36.2
    • B.  Communication or Information  36.3
    • C.  Confidentiality  36.4
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM?
    • A.  Patient or Patient’s Representative  36.5
    • B.  Physician’s Duty to Claim  36.6
    • C.  Judge May Exclude Information  36.7
  • IV.  EXCEPTIONS  36.8
    • A.  Patient-Litigant  36.9
    • B.  Criminal and Quasi-Criminal
      • 1.  Criminal Proceedings  36.10
      • 2.  Civil Damages for Patient’s Conduct  36.11
      • 3.  Disciplinary Proceedings  36.12
      • 4.  Child Abuse  36.13
    • C.  When Patient’s Competence Is at Issue  36.14
    • D.  Nature of Physician-Patient Relationship
      • 1.  Assistance in Crime or Tort  36.15
      • 2.  Breach of Physician-Patient Duty  36.16
    • E.  Claims Through Deceased Patient  36.17
    • F.  Public Record  36.18
  • V.  TERMINATION BY DEATH OR WAIVER
    • A.  Effect of Patient’s Death  36.19
    • B.  Waiver  36.20
  • VI.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  36.21
    • B.  Burden of Proof  36.22
  • VII.  STATUTES  36.23
  • VIII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  36.24
  • IX.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  36.25
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  36.26

37

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  37.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Psychotherapist-Patient Relationship  37.2
    • B.  Communication or Information  37.3
    • C.  Confidentiality  37.4
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM?
    • A.  Patient or Patient’s Representative  37.5
    • B.  Psychotherapist’s Duty to Claim  37.6
    • C.  Judge May Exclude Information  37.7
  • IV.  EXCEPTIONS
    • A.  Patient-Litigant
      • 1.  Civil Trials  37.8
      • 2.  Criminal Trials  37.9
    • B.  Psychotherapist Considers Patient to Be Dangerous  37.10
    • C.  Nature of Psychotherapist-Patient Relationship
      • 1.  Assistance in Crime or Tort  37.11
      • 2.  Breach of Psychotherapist-Patient Duty  37.12
    • D.  Claims Through Deceased Patient  37.13
    • E.  Public Record  37.14
    • F.  Child Abuse  37.15
    • G.  Medical Board Investigation  37.15A
  • V.  TERMINATION BY DEATH OR WAIVER
    • A.  Effect of Patient’s Death  37.16
    • B.  Waiver  37.17
  • VI.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  37.18
    • B.  Burden of Proof  37.19
  • VII.  STATUTES  37.20
  • VIII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  37.21
  • IX.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  37.22
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  37.23

38

Sexual Assault Counselor-Victim Privilege

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  38.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Counselor-Victim Relationship  38.2
    • B.  Communication or Information  38.3
    • C.  Confidentiality  38.4
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM
    • A.  Victim or Victim’s Representative  38.5
    • B.  Counselor’s Duty to Claim  38.6
    • C.  Judge May Exclude Information  38.7
  • IV.  TERMINATION BY DEATH OR WAIVER
    • A.  Effect of Victim’s Death  38.8
    • B.  Waiver  38.9
  • V.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Dispute Over Nature of Communication; Procedure  38.10
    • B.  Other Issues  38.11
    • C.  Burden of Proof  38.12
  • VI.  STATUTES  38.13
  • VII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  38.14
  • VIII.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  38.15
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  38.16

39

Domestic Violence Counselor-Victim Privilege

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  39.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Counselor-Victim Relationship  39.2
    • B.  Communication or Information  39.3
    • C.  Confidentiality  39.4
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM
    • A.  Victim or Victim’s Representative  39.5
    • B.  Counselor’s Duty to Claim  39.6
    • C.  Judge May Exclude Information  39.7
  • IV.  TERMINATION BY DEATH OR WAIVER
    • A.  Effect of Victim’s Death  39.8
    • B.  Waiver  39.9
  • V.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Court-Compelled Disclosure; Procedure  39.10
    • B.  Other Issues  39.11
    • C.  Burden of Proof  39.12
  • VI.  STATUTES  39.13
  • VII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  39.14
  • VIII.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  39.15
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  39.16

39A

Human Trafficking Caseworker-Victim Privilege

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  39A.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Caseworker-Victim Relationship  39A.2
    • B.  Communication or Information  39A.3
    • C.  Confidentiality  39A.4
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM
    • A.  Victim or Victim’s Representative  39A.5
    • B.  Caseworker’s Duty to Claim  39A.6
    • C.  Judge May Exclude Information  39A.7
  • IV.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Dispute Over Nature of Communication; Procedure  39A.8
    • B.  Other Issues  39A.9
    • C.  Burden of Proof  39A.10
  • V.  STATUTES  39A.11
  • VI.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  39A.12
  • VII.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  39A.13
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  39A.14

40

Privilege for Confidential Marital Communications

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  40.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Valid Marriage or Domestic Partnership  40.2
    • B.  Communication  40.3
    • C.  Confidentiality  40.4
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM
    • A.  Either Spouse or Domestic Partner  40.5
    • B.  Guardian or Conservator  40.6
    • C.  Judge May Exclude Information  40.7
  • IV.  EXCEPTIONS
    • A.  Assistance in Crime or Fraud  40.8
    • B.  Communication Offered by Defendant Spouse in Criminal Proceeding  40.9
    • C.  Particular Proceedings  40.10
      • 1.  Spouse’s Competence Is at Issue  40.11
      • 2.  Litigation Between Spouses  40.12
      • 3.  Litigation Between Surviving Spouse and Claimant Through Deceased Spouse  40.13
      • 4.  Juvenile Court Proceedings  40.14
      • 5.  Spouse Charged With Certain Crimes  40.15
      • 6.  Law Enforcement Administrative Investigations and Hearings  40.15A
  • V.  TERMINATION BY DEATH OR WAIVER
    • A.  Effect of Spouse’s Death  40.16
    • B.  Waiver  40.17
  • VI.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  40.18
    • B.  Burden of Proof  40.19
  • VII.  STATUTES  40.20
  • VIII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  40.21
  • IX.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  40.22
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  40.23

41

Privilege Not to Testify Against Spouse

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  41.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Valid Marriage  41.2
    • B.  Demand for Testimony “Against” Spouse
      • 1.  Testimony “For” Spouse Not Privileged  41.3
      • 2.  Testimony “Against” Party Spouse
        • a.  Two-Party Action  41.4
        • b.  Multiple Parties Including One Spouse  41.5
        • c.  Both Spouses Are Parties  41.6
      • 3.  Testimony “Against” Nonparty Spouse  41.7
  • III.  ONLY WITNESS SPOUSE CAN CLAIM  41.8
  • IV.  EXCEPTIONS  41.9
    • A.  Litigation Between Spouses  41.10
    • B.  Spouse’s Competence Is at Issue  41.11
    • C.  Juvenile Court Proceedings  41.12
    • D.  Spouse Charged With Certain Crimes  41.13
    • E.  Criminal Act Occurred Before Marriage of Spouses  41.14
    • F.  Certain Proceedings Brought by One Spouse Against Other or to Enforce Child Support Obligations  41.15
  • V.  TERMINATION BY DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE OR BY WAIVER
    • A.  Dissolution of Marriage  41.16
    • B.  Waiver
      • 1.  Waiver by Testimony  41.17
        • a.  Testimony for Spouse  41.18
        • b.  Testimony Against Party Spouse  41.19
        • c.  Testimony Against Nonparty Spouse  41.20
        • d.  Extent of Waiver  41.21
      • 2.  Action or Defense for Immediate Benefit of Spouse  41.22
  • VI.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  41.23
    • B.  Burden of Proof  41.24
  • VII.  STATUTES  41.25
  • VIII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  41.26
  • IX.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  If Witness’s Spouse Is Party
      • 1.  By Witness  41.27
      • 2.  By Trial Counsel for Party Spouse  41.28
    • B.  If Particular Question Calls for Testimony Against Witness’s Nonparty Spouse
      • 1.  By Witness  41.29
      • 2.  By Trial Counsel  41.30

42

Privilege Not to Be Called as Witness Against Spouse

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  42.1
  • II.  EFFECT OF MULTIPLE PARTIES  42.2
  • III.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Valid Marriage  42.3
    • B.  Witness’s Spouse Must Be Party  42.4
    • C.  Witness Called by Adverse Party
      • 1.  Criminal Actions
        • a.  Witness Called by Prosecutor  42.5
        • b.  Witness Called by Codefendant  42.6
      • 2.  Civil Actions
        • a.  Two-Party Action  42.7
        • b.  Multiple Parties Including One Spouse  42.8
        • c.  Both Spouses Are Parties  42.9
  • IV.  EXERCISE OF PRIVILEGE  42.10
  • V.  EXCEPTIONS
    • A.  Witness Called in Good Faith Ignorance of Marital Relationship  42.11
    • B.  Proceedings in Which Privilege Is Not Available  42.12
  • VI.  TERMINATION BY DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE OR BY WAIVER
    • A.  Dissolution of Marriage  42.13
    • B.  Waiver
      • 1.  Acquiescence in Being Called by Adverse Party  42.14
      • 2.  Waiver by Testimony  42.15
      • 3.  Action or Defense for Immediate Benefit of Spouse  42.16
  • VII.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  42.17
    • B.  Burden of Proof  42.18
  • VIII.  STATUTES  42.19
  • IX.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  42.20
  • X.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  42.21
    • B.  By Trial Counsel for Party Spouse  42.22

43

Privilege for Official Information

  • I.  NATURE OF PRIVILEGE  43.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Information Acquired by Public Employee  43.2
    • B.  Confidentiality  43.3
    • C.  Grounds for Nondisclosure
      • 1.  Federal or California Statute  43.4
      • 2.  Military and State Secrets  43.5
      • 3.  Balancing of Necessities  43.6
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM?  43.7
  • IV.  EFFECT IN CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
    • A.  Order or Finding Adverse to Prosecution  43.8
    • B.  Exceptions to Adverse Finding Rule
      • 1.  Privilege Invoked by Non-California Public Entity  43.9
      • 2.  Federal Statute Forbidding Disclosure  43.10
      • 3.  Information to Support Search Warrant  43.11
  • V.  TERMINATION AND WAIVER  43.12
  • VI.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  43.13
    • B.  Burden of Proof  43.14
  • VII.  STATUTES  43.15
  • VIII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  43.16
  • IX.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  43.17
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  43.18
  • X.  MOTION FOR ORDER OR FINDING ADVERSE TO PROSECUTION  43.19

44

Privilege for Identity of Informer

  • I.  NATURE OF PRIVILEGE  44.1
  • II.  PRETRIAL PROCEDURES CONCERNING PRIVILEGE FOR IDENTITY OF INFORMER  44.2
  • III.  PROCEDURES WHEN INFORMER PRIVILEGE ARISES DURING TRIAL
    • A.  Information From Informer
      • 1.  Purported Disclosure of Law Violation  44.3
      • 2.  Recipient of Information  44.4
      • 3.  Confidentiality  44.5
    • B.  Grounds for Nondisclosure of Identity  44.6
    • C.  Who Can Claim?  44.7
    • D.  Termination and Waiver  44.8
    • E.  Hearings and Ruling on Privilege
      • 1.  Privilege Raised  44.9
      • 2.  In Camera Hearing; Final Hearing  44.10
      • 3.  Burden of Proof  44.11
  • IV.  STATUTES  44.12
  • V.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  44.13
  • VI.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  44.14
    • B.  By Prosecutor  44.15
  • VII.  DEFENSE COUNSEL’S MOTION FOR ORDER OR FINDING ADVERSE TO PROSECUTION  44.16

45

Trade Secrets Privilege

  • I.  NATURE OF PRIVILEGE  45.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Trade Secret  45.2
    • B.  Privilege Allowed Only if No Injustice Will Result  45.3
  • III.  WHO MAY CLAIM?  45.4
  • IV.  TERMINATION AND WAIVER  45.5
  • V.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  45.6
    • B.  Burden of Proof  45.7
  • VI.  STATUTE  45.8
  • VII.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  45.9
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  45.10

46

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

  • I.  SCOPE OF CHAPTER  46.1
  • II.  NATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS  46.2
  • III.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Demand for Testimony or Communication Belonging to Witness  46.3
    • B.  Evidence Would Subject Witness to Criminal Penalty  46.4
    • C.  Connection Between Evidence and Punishable Act  46.5
  • IV.  WRITINGS THAT QUALIFY  46.6
  • V.  CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Who Can Claim?  46.7
    • B.  Form of Claim  46.8
    • C.  When to Raise Privilege; Questioning Before Jury  46.9
    • D.  Court Has No Duty to Warn Self-Represented Criminal Defendant of Privilege  46.10
  • VI.  RESPONSES OF PARTY OPPOSING PRIVILEGE IN CIVIL CASE  46.11
  • VII.  RULE AGAINST COMMENT ON OR INFERENCE FROM EXERCISE OF PRIVILEGE  46.12
  • VIII.  TERMINATION OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Prosecution Barred  46.13
    • B.  Immunity
      • 1.  Principal Immunity Provisions  46.14
        • a.  Transactional and Use Immunity in Criminal Proceedings  46.15
        • b.  Immunity in Civil Cases  46.16
      • 2.  Other Immunity Provisions  46.17
      • 3.  Criminal Defense Witness Immunity  46.18
    • C.  Waiver  46.19
  • IX.  BURDEN OF PROOF AND RULING; WRIT REVIEW  46.20
  • X.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION  46.21

47

Privilege of Defendant in Criminal Case Not to Be Called and Not to Testify

  • I.  NATURE AND CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS  47.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Criminal Prosecution of Defendant  47.2
    • B.  Testimonial or Communicative Evidence  47.3
  • III.  DECIDING WHETHER TO TESTIFY  47.4
  • IV.  ASSERTION OF PRIVILEGE  47.5
  • V.  RULE AGAINST COMMENT ON OR INFERENCE FROM FAILURE TO TESTIFY  47.6
  • VI.  WAIVER  47.7
  • VII.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE  47.8
  • VIII.  STATUTE  47.9
  • IX.  STATING OBJECTIONS BASED ON PRIVILEGE  47.10

48

Journalist’s Immunity From Contempt

  • I.  NATURE OF JOURNALIST’S “SHIELD LAW”  48.1
    • A.  Federal and State Constitutional Basis for Privilege Not to Disclose Information
      • 1.  Historical Development of Privilege  48.2
      • 2.  Showing Required to Compel Testimony of Journalist  48.3
      • 3.  Guidelines for Issuing Subpoenas to Journalists  48.4
      • 4.  Interpretation of Privilege by California Supreme Court  48.5
    • B.  Constitutional and Statutory Sources for California’s Immunity From Contempt  48.6
      • 1.  Requirements
        • a.  Who Is Considered a “Journalist”?  48.7
        • b.  Information Covered by Immunity  48.8
        • c.  When Immunity May Be Claimed  48.9
      • 2.  Scope of Immunity
        • a.  Civil Trials  48.10
        • b.  Criminal Trials  48.11
  • II.  ASSERTION OF PRIVILEGE OR CLAIM OF IMMUNITY  48.12
    • A.  Civil Trials  48.13
    • B.  Criminal Trials
      • 1.  Triggering Delaney Protection  48.14
      • 2.  Applying Delaney Balancing Test  48.15
      • 3.  [Deleted]  48.16
  • III.  WAIVER  48.17
  • IV.  STATING THE OBJECTION  48.18
  • V.  RESPONSE IF JOURNALIST IS CITED FOR CONTEMPT  48.19
  • VI.  CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION; STATUTE  48.20

49

Voter’s Privilege

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  49.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Public Election; Secret Ballot  49.2
    • B.  Tenor of Vote Permitted  49.3
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM?  49.4
  • IV.  EXCEPTION FOR ILLEGAL VOTE  49.5
  • V.  WAIVER THROUGH DISCLOSURE  49.6
  • VI.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  49.7
    • B.  Burden of Proof  49.8
  • VII.  STATUTE  49.9
  • VIII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  49.10
  • IX.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  49.11
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  49.12

50

Penitent’s Privilege

  • I.  NATURE OF PRIVILEGE  50.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Cleric  50.2
    • B.  Penitent  50.3
    • C.  Communication  50.4
    • D.  Confidentiality  50.5
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM?  50.6
  • IV.  TERMINATION AND WAIVER
    • A.  Death of Penitent  50.7
    • B.  Waiver  50.8
  • V.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  50.9
    • B.  Burden of Proof  50.10
  • VI.  STATUTE  50.11
  • VII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  50.12
  • VIII.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  50.13
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  50.14

51

Cleric’s Privilege

  • I.  NATURE OF PRIVILEGE  51.1
  • II.  REQUIREMENTS
    • A.  Cleric  51.2
    • B.  Penitent  51.3
    • C.  Communication  51.4
    • D.  Confidentiality  51.5
  • III.  WHO CAN CLAIM?  51.6
  • IV.  TERMINATION AND WAIVER
    • A.  Death of Cleric  51.7
    • B.  Waiver  51.8
  • V.  RULING ON PRIVILEGE
    • A.  Procedure  51.9
    • B.  Burden of Proof  51.10
  • VI.  STATUTE  51.11
  • VII.  ILLUSTRATIONS OF PRIVILEGE  51.12
  • VIII.  STATING CLAIM OF PRIVILEGE
    • A.  By Witness  51.13
    • B.  By Trial Counsel  51.14

52

Motion to Strike

  • I.  NATURE AND PURPOSE  52.1
  • II.  WHO CAN MAKE MOTION TO STRIKE? USES OF MOTION  52.2
  • III.  WHEN MOTION TO STRIKE IS PROPER
    • A.  Nonresponsive Answer to Proper Question  52.3
    • B.  Improper Question Answered Too Quickly for Objection  52.4
    • C.  Failure to Prove Foundation for Conditionally Admitted Evidence  52.5
    • D.  Admissible Evidence That Becomes Inadmissible  52.6
  • IV.  HOW MOTION MUST BE MADE
    • A.  Timeliness; Request for Admonition  52.7
    • B.  Specification of Particular Evidence to Be Stricken  52.8
    • C.  Specification of Grounds  52.9
    • D.  Striking by Judge on Own Motion  52.10
  • V.  POSSIBLE SANCTIONS: ADMONITION, MISCONDUCT, MISTRIAL  52.11
  • VI.  EFFECT ON TRIAL RECORD OF STRIKING EVIDENCE  52.12
  • VII.  FORFEITURE
    • A.  Failure to Make Proper Motion  52.13
    • B.  Failure to Obtain Ruling  52.14
  • VIII.  DECIDING WHETHER TO MAKE MOTION
    • A.  Tactical Advantages and Disadvantages  52.15
    • B.  Alternatives to Motion to Strike  52.16
  • IX.  EFFECT AT TRIAL OF FAILURE TO OBJECT TO NONRESPONSIVE ANSWER GIVEN DURING DEPOSITION  52.17
  • X.  STATING MOTION AND REQUEST FOR ADMONITION  52.18

53

Jury Admonitions

  • I.  ADMONITIONS
    • A.  During Trial  53.1
    • B.  As Part of Jury Instructions  53.2
  • II.  COMMON USE OF ADMONITIONS
    • A.  Misconduct  53.3
    • B.  Stricken or Excluded Evidence  53.4
    • C.  Evidence Admitted for Limited Purpose
      • 1.  Counsel’s Request for Limiting Admonition or Instruction  53.5
      • 2.  Sample Limiting Instructions  53.6
    • D.  Exercise of Privilege  53.7

54

Motion for Continuance

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  54.1
  • II.  GOOD CAUSE REQUIRED
    • A.  Civil Trials  54.2
    • B.  Criminal Trials  54.3
  • III.  CONTINUANCE BASED ON SURPRISE EVIDENCE
    • A.  Surprise Must Be Genuine  54.4
    • B.  Relevant Opposing Evidence Must Be Available  54.5
    • C.  Opposing Evidence Must Be Disputed  54.6
  • IV.  PROCEDURE
    • A.  Civil Cases
      • 1.  Request for Continuance  54.7
      • 2.  Stipulation to Avoid Continuance  54.8
      • 3.  Factors Considered by Judge in Ruling on Continuance Motion  54.9
      • 4.  Allowing Depositions  54.10
      • 5.  Awarding Costs  54.11
      • 6.  Jury Fees  54.12
      • 7.  Consideration of Ruling on Appeal  54.13
      • 8.  Effect of Failure to Make Motion for Continuance on Motion for New Trial  54.14
    • B.  Criminal Cases  54.15
      • 1.  Conditional Examination of Witnesses  54.16
      • 2.  Writ Review  54.17

55

Extraordinary Writs

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  55.1
  • II.  USUALLY NOT OBTAINABLE TO CORRECT RULINGS ON EVIDENCE  55.2
  • III.  WHEN OBTAINABLE
    • A.  To Enforce Privilege  55.3
    • B.  To Protect Right to Privacy  55.4
    • C.  To Stay Contempt Order  55.5
    • D.  To Overcome Shield Law Order  55.6
  • IV.  OTHER EXCEPTIONS  55.7

56

Motion for Mistrial

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  56.1
  • II.  GROUNDS
    • A.  Irreparable Prejudicial Incident  56.2
    • B.  Irregularity in Proceedings  56.3
  • III.  TRIAL JUDGE’S DISCRETION  56.4
  • IV.  TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS  56.5
  • V.  PROCEDURE
    • A.  Irreparable Prejudicial Incident
      • 1.  Incident Constituting Misconduct  56.6
      • 2.  Incident Not Constituting Misconduct  56.7
    • B.  Irregularity in Proceedings  56.8

57

Contempt

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  57.1
  • II.  DEFINITION  57.2
  • III.  TYPES OF CONTEMPT
    • A.  Direct, Indirect, and Hybrid Contempt  57.3
    • B.  Civil and Criminal Contempt  57.3A
  • IV.  COMMON EXAMPLES OF CONTEMPTUOUS TRIAL CONDUCT  57.4
  • V.  PROCEDURE
    • A.  Who Can Bring and Punish Contempt?  57.5
    • B.  Procedures Under CCP §1209
      • 1.  Direct Contempt  57.6
      • 2.  Indirect Contempt  57.7
      • 3.  Hybrid Contempt  57.8
      • 4.  Sentence  57.9
    • C.  Procedures Under Pen C §166  57.10
    • D.  Stay of Contempt Sentence  57.11
  • VI.  REVIEW BY APPELLATE COURT  57.12

About the Authors

Edwin A. Heafey, Jr. was a Director in the California firm of Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May, with offices in Oakland, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, where he specialized in civil litigation in both state and federal courts. He was a graduate of Stanford Law School. Mr. Heafey was a member of the American College of Trial Lawyers, a member and past president of the American Board of Trial Advocates, and a member of the International Society of Barristers. He taught trial practice at University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, for 17 years. Mr. Heafey had been listed in The Best Lawyers in America (Woodward/White, 1987–2000).

Stephen G. Blitch was a partner in Crosby, Heafey, Roach & May (where the late Ed Heafey was his esteemed colleague and good friend) and later Reed Smith LLP. He tried dozens of civil cases in state and federal courts throughout California and in several other states. Mr. Blitch lectured frequently on the subjects of trial evidence and trial practice, and taught at the National Institute for Trial Advocacy (NITA). He left his active law practice in 2010 and practiced mediation until 2016 with ADR Services, Inc. He is a graduate of the University of California, Berkeley, College of Environmental Design (Architecture) and the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law. Mr. Blitch was a Fellow of the American College of Trial Lawyers and a member of the American Board of Trial Advocates (ABOTA), the Association of Business Trial Lawyers, a member of the Alameda County Bar Association and past chair of its Trial Practice Section, a member of the Litigation Section of the California State Bar Association, and a member of the Bar Association of San Francisco.

Marshall C. Wallace is a partner in the firm of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP, in San Francisco. He is a civil trial lawyer, focusing on complex business cases, including business tort, unfair competition, real estate, financial services, insurance, and land use litigation. He has handled dozens of jury trials, bench trials, arbitrations, expedited injunction proceedings, and class actions. He graduated from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1986, receiving a J.D. degree from the School of Law and an M.B.A. degree from the School of Business. He graduated summa cum laude and Phi Beta Kappa from Princeton University’s School of Engineering and Applied Science in 1981. Mr. Wallace is a member of the Association of Business Trial Lawyers, the Trial Practice Section of the Alameda County Bar Association, and the Litigation Section of the California State Bar Association.

Keith D. Yandell is the General Counsel at DoorDash, Inc., in San Francisco. He co-founded the litigation group at Uber Technologies, Inc., where he worked as Director of Litigation. Prior to that, Mr. Yandell was a partner at the firm of Allen Matkins Leck Gamble Mallory & Natsis LLP, in the firm’s Litigation Department. He earned a degree in political science (with Highest Honors) from the University of California, Davis, and his law degree from the University of California, Los Angeles, School of Law. Mr. Yandell has lectured on a wide variety of topics, including the Truth in Lending Act, the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law, and certification of class actions. Mr. Yandell’s extensive courtroom experience includes a 5-week trial in which he obtained a jury verdict in his clients’ favor and a seven-figure damages award, including an award of punitive damages.

Selected Developments

September 2020

Attorney-Client Communications

The attorney-client privilege is absolute, and in the criminal context can take precedence even over a criminal defendant’s trial rights. For example, in People v Bell (2019) 7 C5th 70, a criminal defendant’s right to due process did not entitle him to invade the attorney-client privilege of another. See §34.1.

In Dickinson v Cosby (2019) 37 CA5th 1138, revealing that a particular communication did not occur would not necessarily result in a waiver of the attorney-client privilege. See §34.9.

In People v Rhoades (2019) 8 C5th 393, a client who communicated loudly with his attorney near a deputy who was openly and permissibly present 10–15 feet away waived his attorney-client privilege. See §34.10.

Expert Witnesses

In Orozco v WPV San Jose, LLC (2019) 36 CA5th 375, 397, the court held that the defendant waived its objection to the expert’s qualifications to testify on lost profits by failing to object, but the trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the expert to testify. See §20.6.

In People v Polk (2019) 36 CA5th 340, 354, the court held that the expert properly relied on his training, which included discussions with other prison officers on the usable amount of methamphetamine. See §20.8.

Hearsay

Testimony regarding derogatory comments was not hearsay because it was not offered for truth of matter asserted, but rather to show discriminatory animus. Ortiz v Dameron Hosp. Ass’n (2019) 37 CA5th 568. See §19.4.

In People v McDaniel (2019) 38 CA5th 986, the court held that the fact that the defendant did not text his mother back to deny her indirect accusation that he had committed robberies was not sufficient to show that he had adopted his mother’s statement for purposes of hearsay exception in Evid C §1221. See §19.14.

In People v Calhoun (2019) 38 CA5th 275, 317, statements made during a police interview were properly admitted for their truth under the hearsay exception for prior consistent statements in Evid C §1236. See §19.20.

Even “contradictory statements” are admissible under the adoptive admission rule in Evid C §1221. See People v Mendez (2019) 7 C5th 680. If a reasonable jury could take the conversation as showing that defendant adopted his codefendant’s accusation that he shot victim, it does not make the adoptive admission inadmissible just because defendant also denied shooting victim at other points in this conversation. See §19.14.

The trial court abused its discretion in determining that a confession was insufficiently trustworthy to be admitted under Evid C §1230 in People v Reyes (2019) 35 CA5th 538. See §19.18.

It was error to admit statements as a past recollection recorded as they were made 6 years after the events in question and the prosecution did not establish that the witness’s recollection was fresh when the statements were recorded. People v Royal (2019) 43 CA5th 121. See §19.21.

For a recent case decided under Evid C §1323, see McDermott Ranch, LLC v Connolly Ranch, Inc. (2019) 43 CA5th 549, which found that statements made in ordinary conversation and before a boundary dispute arose by a deceased declarant regarding fence lines were trustworthy and admissible. See §19.34.

Human Trafficking Counselor-Victim Privilege

Legislation effective January 1, 2020, amends Evid C §1038 and adds Evid C §1038.3, expanding the scope of the human trafficking counselor-victim privilege such that a human trafficking victim’s current caseworker may claim the human trafficking counselor-victim privilege even if that caseworker was not the victim’s caseworker at the time the confidential communication was made. Stats 2019, ch 197. See chap 39A.

Insufficient Foundation

In Valentine v Plum Healthcare Group, LLC (2019) 37 CA5th 1076, the court held that defendants laid no foundation to support admission of a document because

[t]here is no authentication of the signatures or the handwritten note, no eyewitness testimony of the document’s execution or modification, no description of how the document came into counsel’s possession, and no evidence the document was seen, possessed, or relied upon by defendants. Counsel does not testify she had personal knowledge of the subject matter, nor does she make any attempt to prove what the document purports to be.

See §21.6.

Journalist’s Immunity From Contempt

The court may weigh the interests sought to be protected by the journalist’s shield law; however, the defendant must first make the threshold showing that there is a reasonable possibility that the information will materially assist the defendant’s defense. People v Frederickson (2020) 8 C5th 963. See §48.14.

Privileges Held by Professionals

An attorney representing a dependent child has the authority to invoke the physician-patient privilege on behalf of that child. In re Charlotte C. (2019) 33 CA5th 404. See §36.5. Psychotherapists and clergy may do so as well. See §§37.5, 50.6.

Privilege for Official Information

A law enforcement agency does not violate Pen C §832.7(a) by sharing with prosecutors the fact that a peace officer, who is a potential witness in a pending criminal prosecution, may have relevant exonerating or impeaching material in his or her confidential personnel file. Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs v Superior Court (2019) 8 C5th 28. See §43.8.

Effective January 1, 2020, legislation amends Evid C §§1043 and 1047, related to the discovery or disclosure of peace or custodial officer personnel records in civil and criminal actions. Stats 2019, ch 585.

Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

Asking a DUI suspect to perform physical tests is not an “interrogation” requiring a Miranda warning. People v Cooper (2019) 37 CA5th 642. See §46.6.

In People v Capers (2019) 7 C5th 989, the supreme court held that the trial court did not deny due process to a defendant, and properly granted the Fifth Amendment privilege to a witness consistent with Evid C §404. See §46.20.

Psychotherapist-Patient Privilege

To qualify for the psychotherapist-patient privilege, the therapist must be acting as a therapist when the statements are made. See In re A.C. (2019) 37 CA5th 262. See §37.2.

A defendant charged with DUI crimes did not waive his psychotherapist-patient privilege by disclosing that the psychotherapist had prescribed medications because this information was not a significant part of defendant’s communications with the psychotherapist. Fish v Superior Court (2019) 42 CA5th 811. See §37.17.

Similar Acts or Occurrences

For purposes of considering whether to overturn a default taken against defendant attorney in a legal malpractice action, the trial court erroneously admitted the attorney’s two previous instances of discipline for not having properly communicated with clients; the fact that the attorney “had failed to comply with standards of professional conduct in the past should not have colored the determination of whether she deserved an extension in this case.” Lasalle v Vogel (2019) 36 CA5th 127. See §32.7.

Trade Secrets Privilege

In Global Protein Prods., Inc. v Le (2019) 42 CA5th 352, the court held that a trade secret is extinguished once publicly disclosed in a patent and information is placed in public domain. See §45.5.

Unduly Prejudicial Evidence

The California Supreme Court in People v Caro (2019) 7 C5th 463 held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the prejudice arising from graphic autopsy photos did not substantially outweigh their probative value; photos provided context for understanding how the expert reached her conclusions on the nature of the shootings. The court also found that the trial court properly admitted computer animation illustrating the expert’s opinion that blowback of blood from the gunshot to the victim’s head was consistent with the bloodstain patterns on the defendant’s clothes because the prejudice was substantially outweighed by the animation’s probative value. See §31.2.

In Hernandez v First Student, Inc. (2019) 37 CA5th 270, the court of appeal found that, although evidence of plaintiff’s use of crystal meth had the potential to be prejudicial, it was relevant to her wrongful death damages claim and thus the trial court did not err in admitting it for the limited purpose of determining the plaintiff’s relationship with her deceased son. See §31.2.

The trial court in D.Z. v Los Angeles Unified Sch. Dist. (2019) 35 CA5th 210 erroneously excluded evidence that was relevant to prove an issue in a case involving sexual abuse by a teacher. There was no support for any countervailing considerations under Evid C §352 of undue prejudice, confusion, or undue consumption of time. See §31.2.

Voir Dire

Effective January 1, 2020, legislation amends CCP §203, revising a portion of the Trial Jury Selection and Management Act related to eligibility for service as jurors by those who have been convicted of a felony. Stats 2019, ch 591. See §6.18.

Work Product Doctrine

The qualified work product privilege applies in habeas corpus proceedings following an order to show cause if the discovery sought exceeds the scope of the criminal discovery scheme. Jimenez v Superior Court (2019) 40 CA5th 824. See §35.4.

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PRACTICE AREA Evidence
PRODUCT GROUP Publication