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Internet Law and Practice in California

The only resource on Internet law and practice designed especially for California lawyers, this guide will help you advise your clients doing business online.

The only resource on Internet law and practice designed especially for California lawyers, this guide will help you advise your clients doing business online.

  • Intellectual property rights in cyberspace
  • Launching and operating a website
  • Electronic contracting; privacy issues
  • Licenses and development agreements
  • Advertising on the Internet
  • Cybersecurity
  • Tort and criminal liability, First Amendment issues
  • Jurisdiction; litigation issues; e-discovery
  • Sample attorney-drafted forms to save you time
Print BU33580

Package includes single user online access, 2 looseleaf print volumes (approx. 1000 pages), and Forms CD, updated 7/19


$ 525.00

The only resource on Internet law and practice designed especially for California lawyers, this guide will help you advise your clients doing business online.

  • Intellectual property rights in cyberspace
  • Launching and operating a website
  • Electronic contracting; privacy issues
  • Licenses and development agreements
  • Advertising on the Internet
  • Cybersecurity
  • Tort and criminal liability, First Amendment issues
  • Jurisdiction; litigation issues; e-discovery
  • Sample attorney-drafted forms to save you time


Copyrights and the DMCA

    • A.  Introduction  1.1
    • B.  Subject Matter of Copyright Law
      • 1.  Generally  1.2
      • 2.  Special Subject Matter: Compilations  1.2A
      • 3.  Special Subject Matter: Music  1.3
      • 4.  Special Subject Matter: Characters  1.4
      • 5.  Special Subject Matter: Websites  1.4A
      • 6.  Special Subject Matter: Databases  1.4B
      • 7.  Special Subject Matter: Output of Computer Programs  1.4C
      • 8.  Special Subject Matter: Governmental Works  1.4D
    • C.  Creation and Term of Copyright  1.5
    • D.  Ownership of Copyrighted Work, Joint Works, and Works Made for Hire
      • 1.  Joint Works  1.6
      • 2.  Works Made for Hire  1.7
    • E.  Rights of Copyright Holder  1.8
      • 1.  Reproduction Rights  1.9
      • 2.  Distribution Rights  1.10
      • 3.  Performance Rights  1.11
        • a.  Who “Performs” the Work?  1.11A
        • b.  Pre-1972 Sound Recordings  1.11B
      • 4.  Display Rights  1.12
    • F.  Copyright Notice  1.13
    • G.  FBI Anti-Piracy Warning Seal  1.14
    • H.  Copyright Registration
      • 1.  Advantages of Registration  1.15
      • 2.  Registration Procedures; Standing to Sue  1.16
      • 3.  When to Register  1.17
    • I.  Preregistration  1.18
    • J.  Transfer of Copyrights
      • 1.  Generally  1.19
      • 2.  Form: Copyright Assignment  1.20
      • 3.  Form: U.S. Copyright Office Cover Sheet  1.21
    • K.  Infringement
      • 1.  Generally  1.22
      • 2.  Direct, Contributory, and Vicarious Liability
        • a.  Generally  1.23
        • b.  Direct Infringement; Volitional Act Requirement  1.24
        • c.  Contributory Infringement  1.25
          • (1)  Inducement  1.26
          • (2)  Material Contribution  1.27
            • (a)  Online Service Providers  1.27A
            • (b)  Payment Processors  1.27B
          • (3)  Site and Facilities Test  1.28
        • d.  Vicarious Infringement  1.29
      • 3.  Selected Defenses
        • a.  Statute of Limitations  1.30
        • b.  Laches  1.31
        • c.  Express License  1.31A
        • d.  Implied License  1.32
        • e.  Estoppel  1.33
        • f.  De Minimis Use  1.33A
      • 4.  Safe Harbor for Certain Copies of Computer Programs  1.34
      • 5.  Remedies  1.35
      • 6.  Sovereign Immunity  1.36
      • 7.  Compulsory Licenses
        • a.  Broadcast Television  1.37
        • b.  Sound Recordings; Digital Music Rights  1.38
    • L.  Fair Use
      • 1.  Introduction  1.39
      • 2.  Purpose and Character of Use  1.40
        • a.  Transformative Use  1.41
          • (1)  Human-Made Uses
            • (a)  Parody/Satire   1.42
            • (b)  Appropriation Art  1.43
            • (c)  Digital Music Sampling  1.44
            • (d)  News Reporting  1.45
            • (e)  Reaction Videos  1.45A
            • (f)  Thumbnails to Sell Legal Copies  1.45B
            • (g)  Memes  1.45C
          • (2)  Technological Fair Use
            • (a)  Time- and Space-Shifting  1.46
            • (b)  Search Engines  1.47
            • (c)  Conversion of Text for Data Mining  1.48
            • (d)  Reverse Engineering  1.49
        • b.  Commercial Use  1.50
      • 3.  Nature of Copyrighted Work  1.51
        • a.  Informational or Creative Inquiry  1.52
        • b.   Published or Unpublished  1.53
      • 4.  Amount and Substantiality of Portion of Work Used  1.54
      • 5.  Effect of Use on Market  1.55
    • M.  First Sale  1.56
    • N.  Family Entertainment and Copyright Act  1.56A
    • A.  Introduction  1.57
    • B.  Status of Pre-1972 Sound Recordings  1.58
    • C.  Anti-Circumvention of Technological Protection Measures
      • 1.  Anti-Circumvention Prohibitions (17 USC §1201)  1.59
      • 2.  Copyright Management Information (17 USC §1202)  1.60
      • 3.  Exceptions to Anti-Circumvention Prohibitions  1.61
      • 4.  Remedies  1.62
    • D.  Limitations of Liability for Online Service Providers—Infringement Safe Harbors  1.63
      • 1.  General Conditions for Safe Harbors
        • a.  Service Provider  1.64
        • b.  Repeat Infringer Policy  1.65
          • (1)  Adoption of Policy  1.66
          • (2)  Informing Users of Policy  1.67
          • (3)  Reasonably Implement the Policy  1.68
        • c.  Interference With Standard Technical Measures  1.69
        • d.  Designating Agent to Receive Notifications  1.70
        • e.  No Duty to Police or Monitor  1.71
      • 2.  Transitory Digital Network Communications Safe Harbor (17 USC §512(a))  1.72
      • 3.  System Caching Safe Harbor (17 USC §512(b))  1.73
      • 4.  Safe Harbor for Information Residing on Systems or Networks at Direction of Users (17 USC §512(c))
        • a.  Generally  1.74
        • b.  Storage at Direction of User  1.75
        • c.  Lack of Knowledge (17 USC §512(c)(1)(A))  1.76
          • (1)  Actual Knowledge  1.77
          • (2)  “Red Flag” Knowledge  1.78
          • (3)  Willful Blindness  1.79
        • d.  Right and Ability to Control (17 USC §512(c)(1)(B))
          • (1)  Right and Ability to Control  1.80
          • (2)  Direct Financial Benefit  1.81
        • e.  Expeditious Removal or Disabling Access to Infringing Material (17 USC §512(c)(1)(C))  1.82
        • f.  Notification of Claimed Infringement (17 USC §512(c)(3))
          • (1)  Requirements for Notifications; “Good Faith Belief”  1.83
          • (2)  Safeguards Against Fraudulent Infringement Claims  1.83A
        • g.  Counter-Notification by Subscriber; Restoration of Material  1.84
        • h.  Checklist: Notice and Take-Down Checklist  1.85
      • 5.  Information Location Tools Safe Harbor (17 USC §512(d))  1.86
    • E.  Subpoena Power (17 USC §512(h))  1.87
    • F.  Impact on Internet Service Providers  1.88
    • G.  Checklist: Company DMCA Compliance Policy  1.89


Patents and Trade Secrets

    • A.  Introduction  2.1
    • B.  What Is a Patent?  2.2
    • C.  What Is Patentable; Types of Patents  2.3
    • D.  Term of Patents  2.4
    • E.  Additional Requirements for Patentability
      • 1.  Overview  2.5
      • 2.  Origination  2.6
      • 3.  Utility  2.7
      • 4.  Novelty  2.8
      • 5.  Nonobviousness  2.9
    • F.  Patent Applications
      • 1.  Overview of Patent Application Procedures  2.10
      • 2.  Specification; Enablement; Best Mode  2.11
      • 3.  Claims  2.12
      • 4.  Statutory Time Bars  2.13
    • G.  “First-to-File” Versus “First-to-Invent”; Other International Issues  2.14
    • H.  Transferring Patents
      • 1.  Introduction  2.15
      • 2.  Form: Patent Assignment  2.16
    • I.  Litigation Issues  2.16A
    • J.  Alternatives to Litigation  2.17
    • K.  Special Topics for Internet Businesses
      • 1.  Business Method Patents
        • a.  Business Methods  2.18
        • b.  Business Method Patents in the Courts   2.18A
        • c.  USPTO Examiner Instructions re Business Method Patent Applications  2.18B
        • d.  Practical Guidance  2.18C
      • 2.  Software Patents  2.19
      • 3.  The Internet of Things   2.19A
    • A.  Introduction  2.20
    • B.  Definition of Trade Secret
      • 1.  Statutory Definition  2.21
      • 2.  Examples of Trade Secrets  2.22
      • 3.  Computer Source and Object Code  2.22A
      • 4.  Recipes, Manufacturing Processes  2.22B
      • 5.  Customer Lists  2.23
    • C.  Loss of Trade Secret Protection  2.24
    • D.  Protection of Trade Secrets  2.25
      • 1.  Departing Employees  2.26
      • 2.  Practical Safeguards
        • a.  Firewalls and Encryption  2.27
        • b.  Physical Security  2.28
        • c.  Managing Documents and Files  2.29
    • E.  Sample Company Policy on Trade Secret Protection
      • 1.  Introduction  2.30
      • 2.  Form: Company Policy on Trade Secret Protection  2.31
    • F.  Confidentiality Agreement
      • 1.  Introduction  2.32
      • 2.  Form: Confidentiality Agreement  2.33
    • G.  Misappropriation of Trade Secrets
      • 1.  Asserting Claim of Misappropriation Under UTSA  2.34
      • 2.  Defenses  2.35
      • 3.  Damages  2.36
      • 4.  Privilege and Disclosures Due to Litigation  2.37
      • 5.  Economic Espionage Act of 1996  2.38
      • 6.  Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016  2.39


Domain Names and Trademark Issues

    • A.  Introduction  3.1
    • B.  Selecting Domain Name and Suffix
      • 1.  Domain Name  3.2
      • 2.  Suffix (Top-Level Domain Name)  3.3
      • 3.  ICANN gTLD Trademark Clearinghouse  3.3A
    • C.  Due Diligence
      • 1.  Domain Name as Trademark  3.4
      • 2.  Where to Look? Registered and Unregistered Trademark Searches  3.5
    • D.  Registration of Domain Name
      • 1.  Registration Procedures  3.6
      • 2.  Purchasing Registered Domain Name
        • a.  How to Purchase Registered Domain Name  3.7
        • b.  Form: Domain Name Purchase Agreement  3.8
    • E.  Maintaining and Preventing Loss of Domain Name  3.9
    • F.  Transferring Ownership of Domain Names  3.10
    • G.  Infringing Domain Names
      • 1.  Bringing Claim of Infringement  3.11
      • 2.  Uniform Domain Name Dispute Resolution Policy (UDRP)  3.12
        • a.  Elements of UDRP Claim  3.13
        • b.  Selection of Arbitrators  3.14
        • c.  Procedure Under UDRP  3.15
        • d.  Damages and Fees  3.16
        • e.  Model Form of UDRP Complaint
          • (1)  Introduction  3.17
          • (2)  Form: UDRP Complaint  3.18
        • f.  Model Form of UDRP Response
          • (1)  Introduction  3.19
          • (2)  Form: UDRP Response  3.20
        • g.  Appeals  3.21
      • 3.  Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act  3.22
        • a.  Elements of Cause of Action  3.23
        • b.  ACPA Remedies  3.24
      • 4.  Whether to Proceed Under UDRP or ACPA?  3.25
    • A.  Introduction  3.26
    • B.  Definitions of Trademarks, Service Marks, Collective Marks, Certification Marks, Trade Dress, and Trade Names  3.27
    • C.  Characterization of Marks  3.28
    • D.  Priority and Limitations to Priority  3.29
    • E.  Registration Procedure
      • 1.  Why Federal Registration?  3.30
      • 2.  Common Law and State Trademark Rights  3.31
      • 3.  Unregistrable Trademarks  3.32
      • 4.  Trademark Searches  3.33
      • 5.  Principal and Supplemental Registers  3.34
      • 6.  Intent-to-Use Applications  3.35
      • 7.  Form of Application  3.36
      • 8.  Application Procedure  3.37
      • 9.  Contents of Application  3.38
        • a.  Applicant Information  3.39
        • b.  Verification  3.40
        • c.  Identification and Classification of Goods and Services; Filing Fees  3.41
        • d.  Bases for Filing  3.42
        • e.  Drawing Requirement  3.43
        • f.  Description of Mark  3.44
      • 10.  Registration of Domain Names as Trademarks
        • a.  Requirements  3.45
        • b.  Reasons for Refusal of Registration of Domain Names  3.46
        • c.  Hashtags  3.46A
      • 11.  Trade Names  3.47
    • F.  Madrid Protocol  3.48
    • G.  Grant or Denial of Registration
      • 1.  Opposition, Cancellation, or Registration  3.49
      • 2.  Appeals From Denials of Registration  3.50
    • H.  Use of Trademark Symbol  3.51
    • I.  Duration and Renewal  3.52
    • J.  Preservation of Trademark Rights  3.53
    • K.  Trademark Licensing  3.54
      • 1.  Form: Trademark Guidelines  3.55
      • 2.  Form: Trademark License Agreement  3.56
    • L.  Assignments of Trademarks
      • 1.  Generally  3.57
      • 2.  Form: Trademark Assignment  3.58
      • 3.  Form: U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Cover Sheet (Trademarks Only)  3.59
    • M.  Violations of Trademark Rights
      • 1.  Trademark Infringement  3.60
      • 2.  Contributory Trademark Infringement  3.60A
      • 3.  False Designation or Description  3.61
      • 4.  ACPA  3.62
      • 5.  Remedies for Trademark Infringement  3.63
      • 6.  Defenses to Trademark Infringement  3.64
      • 7.  Dilution of Famous Mark  3.65
        • a.  Factors Bearing on Whether Mark Is Famous  3.66
        • b.  Cybersquatting and Dilution  3.67
      • 8.  Remedies and Defenses to Anti-Dilution Claims  3.68
      • 9.  Sample Cease and Desist Letter
        • a.  Introduction  3.69
        • b.  Form: Sample Cease and Desist Letter  3.70
    • A.  Introduction  3.71
    • B.  Nominative Fair Use  3.72
    • C.  Initial Interest Confusion Test  3.73
    • D.  Protection of Fanciful Marks  3.74
    • E.  Misspellings of Trademarks and Direct Competitors  3.75
    • F.  “English Words”  3.76
    • A.  Introduction  3.77
    • B.  Website User Interfaces  3.78
    • C.  Trade Dress Infringement  3.79
      • 1.  Nonfunctionality
        • a.  Overview of the Doctrine  3.80
        • b.  Functionality and Nonfunctionality in the Courts
          • (1)  Outside the Ninth Circuit  3.80A
          • (2)  Ninth Circuit  3.81
        • c.  Doctrine of Aesthetic Functionality  3.82
        • d.  Functionality and Website User Interfaces  3.83
      • 2.  Inherent Distinctiveness or Secondary Meaning
        • a.  Inherent Distinctiveness Test  3.84
        • b.  Product Designs and Product Packaging  3.85
        • c.  Website User Interfaces: Product Design or Product Packaging?  3.86
      • 3.  Likelihood of Confusion in Trade Dress  3.87


Human Resources

    • A.  Introduction  4.1
    • B.  Ethical Considerations  4.2
    • C.  “At Will” Employment  4.3
    • D.  Offer Letter to Prospective Employee
      • 1.  Introduction  4.4
      • 2.  Form: Offer Letter to Prospective Employee  4.5
    • E.  Confidentiality and Invention Assignment Agreements
      • 1.  Employee Confidentiality Agreements  4.6
      • 2.  Employee Inventions  4.7
        • a.  Federal “Work for Hire” Doctrine  4.8
        • b.  Employer Ownership of Employee Inventions Under State Law  4.9
      • 3.  Invention Assignment Agreements  4.10
      • 4.  Form: Confidentiality and Invention Assignment Agreement  4.11
    • F.  Employee Overtime—Special Rules for Computer Programmers  4.12
    • A.  Introduction  4.13
    • B.  Classification of Independent Contractors
      • 1.  Exempt Versus Nonexempt Employees  4.14
      • 2.  Borello Right-to-Control Test  4.15
      • 3.  Dynamex ABC Test  4.16
      • 4.  Independent Contractor Classification Analysis  4.17
    • C.  Intellectual Property Issues in Independent Contractor Relationships  4.18
    • D.  Form: Independent Contractor Consulting Agreement  4.19
    • E.  Independent Contractor Nondisclosure Agreement
      • 1.  Introduction  4.20
      • 2.  Form: Nondisclosure Agreement  4.21
    • A.  Introduction  4.22
    • B.  Form: Advisory Board Letter Agreement  4.23


Website and App Development; Disability Accommodation Issues

    • A.  Introduction  5.1
    • B.  Assignment of Intellectual Property by Company Founder  5.2
    • C.  Form: Agreement for Transfer and Assignment of Intellectual Property  5.3
    • A.  Introduction  5.4
    • B.  Ethical Considerations  5.5
    • C.  Preparing for Negotiations  5.6
    • D.  Types of Website and App Developers  5.7
      • 1.  Freelancers  5.8
      • 2.  Website and Mobile App Development Specialists  5.9
      • 3.  General Technology Companies  5.10
    • E.  Understanding Issues of Ownership
      • 1.  Conflicting Ownership Interests  5.11
      • 2.  Why a Website or App Probably Is Not a “Work Made for Hire”  5.12
      • 3.  Domain Name Registration and Ownership  5.13
    • F.  Drafting Website and Mobile App Development Agreement  5.14
      • 1.  Responsibilities of Parties  5.15
      • 2.  Deliverables and Timelines for Delivery  5.16
      • 3.  Ownership and License Grants  5.17
        • a.  Ownership  5.18
        • b.  License Rights  5.19
        • c.  Confidentiality  5.20
      • 4.  Representations and Warranties of Developer  5.21
      • 5.  Ongoing Obligations of Developer  5.22
    • G.  Website and Mobile App Development Agreements
      • 1.  Independent Contractor Agreements  5.23
      • 2.  Form of Website Development Agreement
        • a.  Introduction  5.24
        • b.  Form: Website Development Agreement  5.25
    • A.  Federal and California Statutes  5.27
    • B.  Website Accessibility Case Law  5.28
    • C.  DOJ Rulemaking and Enforcement Efforts  5.29
    • D.  Web Content Accessibility Guidelines (WCAG)  5.30


Hosting and Related Services; Cloud Computing

    • A.  Introduction  6.1
    • B.  Negotiating Hosting Agreement  6.2
    • C.  Key Hosting Agreement Terms
      • 1.  Responsibilities of Host  6.3
        • a.  Website Hosting  6.4
        • b.  Monitoring  6.5
        • c.  Access to Software  6.6
        • d.  Content Uploading and Maintenance  6.7
        • e.  Data Collection and Reporting  6.8
      • 2.  Responsibilities of Customer  6.9
    • D.  Warranties  6.10
    • E.  Form of Hosting Services Agreement
      • 1.  Introduction  6.11
      • 2.  Form: Hosting Services Agreement  6.12
    • A.  Introduction  6.13
    • B.  Decision to Co-Locate  6.14
    • C.  Co-Location Services and Customer Responsibilities
      • 1.  Overview  6.15
      • 2.  Customer Responsibilities  6.16
      • 3.  Provider Warranties  6.17
    • D.  Form of Co-Location Agreement
      • 1.  Introduction  6.18
      • 2.  Form: Co-Location Agreement  6.19
    • E.  Equipment Considerations  6.20
    • A.  Introduction  6.21
    • B.  Use of Service Level Agreements Generally
      • 1.  Content  6.22
      • 2.  When to Request Service Level Agreement  6.23
      • 3.  Monitoring and Enforcement of Service Level Agreement Terms  6.24
    • C.  Standard Service Level Agreement Terms
      • 1.  Availability; Uptime  6.25
      • 2.  Service Levels  6.26
        • a.  Low-Priority Requests  6.27
        • b.  Medium-Priority Requests  6.28
        • c.  High-Priority Requests  6.29
      • 3.  Response Times and Response Actions  6.30
      • 4.  Service Credits and Chronic Problems  6.31
      • 5.  Additional Terms  6.32
        • a.  Customer Support  6.33
        • b.  Performance Measurement  6.34
        • c.  Reporting  6.35
    • D.  Service Level Agreement Forms
      • 1.  Sample Short Form Service Level Agreement
        • a.  Introduction  6.36
        • b.  Form: Short Form Service Level Agreement  6.37
      • 2.  Sample Website Hosting Service Level Agreement
        • a.  Introduction  6.38
        • b.  Form: Website Hosting Service Level Agreement  6.39
    • A.  Introduction  6.40
    • B.  Obtaining Technical Support from Vendors  6.41
    • C.  Key Issues in Obtaining Support From Vendors
      • 1.  Upgrades and New Versions  6.42
      • 2.  Support Services  6.43
      • 3.  Training and Help Desk Support  6.44
    • D.  Technical Support and Maintenance Agreement
      • 1.  Introduction  6.45
      • 2.  Form: Technical Support and Maintenance Agreement  6.46
    • E.  Providing Technical Support to Customers  6.47
    • F.  Basic Technical Support Exhibit
      • 1.  Introduction  6.48
      • 2.  Form: Basic Technical Support Exhibit  6.49
  • V.  Cloud Computing
    • A.  Introduction  6.50
    • B.  Statutory Limitations  6.51
    • C.  Data Security, Privacy, and Confidentiality
      • 1.  Overview  6.52
      • 2.  Access to Data  6.53
      • 3.  Voluntary or Compelled Disclosure
        • a.  General Considerations  6.54
        • b.  National Security Letters  6.55
      • 4.  Data Security  6.56
      • 5.  Duty of Confidentiality  6.57
    • D.  Service Levels  6.58
    • E.  Indemnification, Warranty, and Liability  6.59
    • F.  Data Portability and Deletion  6.60
    • G.  Guidance for Specific Industries  6.61
    • H.  Variations on Cloud Computing  6.62
    • I.  Sample Cloud Services Agreement  6.63
    • J.  Security Addendum  6.64
    • K.  Form: Security Addendum  6.65


Electronic Contracting

    • A.  Shrink-Wrap Software Licenses  7.2
    • B.  Click-Wrap Agreements  7.3
    • C.  Browse-Wrap Agreements  7.4
    • D.  Embedded Links  7.4A
  • III.  E-SIGN
    • A.  Introduction  7.5
    • B.  Electronic Signatures  7.6
    • C.  Consumer Protection Features  7.7
    • D.  Electronic Record Retention  7.8
    • A.  Overview; Federal Preemption Issue  7.9
    • B.  Consent to Conduct Transactions Electronically Required  7.10
    • C.  Authentication of Electronic Signatures  7.10A
    • A.  Six Basic Principles  7.14
    • B.  Additional Practical Considerations  7.15
    • C.  Amendments  7.16


Terms of Use; Online Agreements; Linking; Downloading; Social Networking

    • A.  Drafting Considerations  8.2
    • B.  Form: Website Terms of Use  8.3
    • A.  Introduction  8.4
    • B.  Form: Online End-User Software License Agreement  8.5
    • C.  Online Beta User Evaluation Agreement
      • 1.  Introduction  8.6
      • 2.  Form: Online Beta User Evaluation Agreement  8.7
    • D.  Open Source Licensing
      • 1.  Introduction  8.8
      • 2.  Form: Open Source Software License Agreement  8.9
    • E.  Software Evaluation License Agreement
      • 1.  Introduction  8.10
      • 2.  Form: Evaluation License Agreement  8.11
    • F.  Online Software Developer Toolkit License Agreement
      • 1.  Introduction  8.12
      • 2.  Form: Online Software Developer Toolkit License Agreement  8.13
    • A.  Introduction  8.14
    • B.  Linking and Framing
      • 1.  Generally  8.15
      • 2.  Copyright Infringement Issues  8.16
      • 3.  Potential Liability for Trespass to Chattels  8.17
    • C.  Form: Linking Agreement  8.18
    • A.  Generally  8.19
    • B.  Copyright Infringement Issues  8.20
    • C.  Music on the Internet
      • 1.  Introduction  8.21
      • 2.  Technologies  8.22
      • 3.  Federal Statutes  8.23
        • a.  Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA)  8.24
        • b.  Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995 (DPRA)  8.25
        • c.  No Electronic Theft Law  8.26
        • d.  Internet Piracy (Pen C §653aa)  8.26A
        • e.  The Family Entertainment and Copyright Act  8.26B
      • 4.  Case Law  8.27
      • 5.  RIAA Litigation Strategy  8.28
    • A.  Overview  8.29
    • B.  Social Networking and the Law  8.30
    • C.  Copyright Issues
      • 1.  Infringement; Fair Use  8.31
      • 2.  Practice Guidelines  8.31A
    • D.  Privacy Issues
      • 1.  Generally  8.32
      • 2.  FTC Actions Concerning Privacy of User Information on Social Networks  8.32A
      • 3.  California Privacy Laws Protecting Social Media Users’ Privacy  8.32B
    • E.  Need for Valid End-User License Agreements (EULAs)  8.33
    • F.  Social Media in the Workplace  8.34
    • G.  Violation of Nonsolicitation Agreements  8.35


Privacy Law and Privacy Policies

    • A.  How Businesses Obtain Customer Information Online
      • 1.  Willing Disclosure  9.3
      • 2.  Cookies  9.4
      • 3.  Web Bugs  9.5
      • 4.  Tracking Software  9.6
      • 5.  Adware  9.6A
      • 6.  Spyware  9.6B
      • 7.  Phishing  9.6C
    • B.  Federal Privacy Laws
      • 1.  United States Constitution  9.7
      • 2.  Federal Legislation  9.8
        • a.  Federal Trade Commission Initiatives  9.8A
          • (1)  FTC Actions Concerning Privacy Policies  9.9
          • (2)  FTC Actions Concerning Data Security  9.9A
          • (3)  The FTC’s “Red Flags Rule”  9.9B
          • (4)  FTC Actions Concerning Unwanted Adware  9.9C
          • (5)  The Internet of Things  9.9D
          • (6)   FTC Guidelines  9.9E
        • b.  Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA)
          • (1)  Privacy Aspects of HIPAA and Supporting Regulations  9.10
          • (2)  Protected Health Information, Contract Requirements  9.11
        • c.  Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act  9.12
        • d.  Right to Financial Privacy Act  9.13
        • e.  Computer Fraud and Abuse Act  9.14
        • f.  Electronic Communications Privacy Act  9.15
        • g.  Video Privacy Protection Act  9.15A
        • h.  Fair Credit Reporting Act  9.15B
        • i.  Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights   9.15C
    • C.  California Privacy Laws
      • 1.  California Constitution
        • a.  Constitutional Right of Privacy  9.16
        • b.  Standing Issue in Privacy Litigation  9.16A
      • 2.  Common Law Right of Privacy  9.17
      • 3.  California Legislation  9.18
        • a.  California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) (CC §§1798.100–1798.199)  9.18A
        • b.  Online Privacy Protection Act (OPPA) (Bus & P C §§22575–22579)
          • (1)  Privacy Policy Posting Requirement  9.19
          • (2)  Required Contents of Privacy Policy  9.20
          • (3)  Failure to Comply With Act  9.21
        • c.  California Attorney General’s Recommended Best Practices for Mobile App Developers  9.21A
        • d.  “Anti-Paparazzi” Statute  9.21B
        • e.  California Financial Information Privacy Act  9.22
        • f.  California Right to Financial Privacy Act (Govt C §§7460–7493)  9.23
        • g.  Song-Beverly Credit Card Act  9.23A
        • h.  Required Notice of Security Breaches
          • (1)  Civil Code Provisions  9.24
          • (2)  Potential Safe Harbor  9.25
          • (3)  Obligation to Maintain Security  9.25A
        • i.  Civil Code §1798.83  9.26
        • j.  Consumer Protection Against Computer Spyware Act (Bus & P C §§22947–22947.6)  9.26A
        • k.  California Electronic Communications Privacy Act  9.26B
        • l.  Student Online Personal Information Protection Act  9.26C
        • m.  Unfair Competition Law  9.27
        • n.  “Revenge Porn”  9.27A
    • D.  Other States’ Data Protection Programs  9.27B
    • E.  Special Legal Protections for Children  9.28
      • 1.  Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA)  9.29
        • a.  Application of COPPA  9.30
        • b.  Requirements for Online Collection of Information From Children  9.31
        • c.  Parental Consent  9.32
        • d.  FTC Enforcement Actions Under COPPA  9.33
        • e.  State Enforcement Actions Under COPPA  9.33A
        • f.  Safe Harbor Under COPPA  9.34
      • 2.   Final FTC Children’s Online Protection Act Rule  9.34A
      • 3.  Dot-Kids Act [Deleted]  9.35
      • 4.  FTC’s Children’s Privacy Website  9.36
      • 5.  California Legislation  9.36A
        • a.  Prohibition on Certain Advertising to Minors (Bus & P C §22580)  9.36B
        • b.  “Eraser Button” Law  9.36C
    • F.  European Union Rules and Regulation
      • 1.  EU Data Protection Directive [Deleted]  9.37
      • 2.  EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)  9.37A
      • 3.  EU-U.S. Privacy Shield  9.38
    • A.  Need for Privacy Policies  9.39
    • B.  Content of Privacy Policies  9.40
    • C.  Enforceability of Privacy Policies  9.41
    • D.  Additional Resources  9.42
    • E.  Basic Website Policy
      • 1.  Introduction  9.43
      • 2.  Form: Basic Website Privacy Policy  9.44
    • F.  Commercial Website Policy
      • 1.  Introduction  9.45
      • 2.  Form: Commercial Website Privacy Policy  9.46


E-Commerce Transactions; Tax and Insurance Issues

    • A.  Introduction  10.1
    • B.  Electronic Contracting  10.2
    • C.  Forms of Payment
      • 1.  Credit Cards  10.3
      • 2.  Debit Cards  10.4
      • 3.  Internet Checks  10.5
      • 4.  Virtual Currency  10.5A
      • 5.  Blockchain Technology  10.5B
      • 6.  Initial Coin Offerings  10.5C
      • 7.  Other Electronic Payment Services  10.6
    • D.  Additional Payment and Security Issues  10.7
      • 1.  Secure Transaction Processing Software  10.8
      • 2.  Fraud Prevention Tools  10.9
      • 3.  Phone and Fax Orders  10.10
      • 4.  Security Certificates  10.11
      • 5.   Purchases by Children  10.11A
    • E.  Shopping Cart Services
      • 1.  Overview  10.12
      • 2.  Evaluating Shopping Cart Services  10.13
    • F.  Sample Website or App End User Payment Terms
      • 1.  Introduction  10.14
      • 2.  Form: Sample Clauses re Payment of Subscription Fees  10.15
    • G.  FTC’s Mail, Internet, or Telephone Order Merchandise Rule  10.16
    • H.  Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act  10.16A
    • I.  Subscription Offers: Business and Professions Code §17602  10.16B
    • A.  Formulation of E-Commerce Tax Policy  10.17
      • 1.  International Tax Policy  10.18
      • 2.  United States Federal Tax Policy
        • a.  Role of Treasury Department  10.19
        • b.  The Internet Tax Freedom Act  10.20
        • c.  The Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement  10.20A
      • 3.  California Sales and Use Tax Policy  10.21
    • B.  Sales and Use Taxes
      • 1.  General Principles  10.22
      • 2.  Constitutional Restrictions; South Dakota v Wayfair, Inc.  10.23
      • 3.  Sales by California E-Businesses to Out-of-State Residents  10.23A
      • 4.  California Sales and Use Taxes: General Rules  10.24
      • 5.  The “Amazon Tax”: Out-of-State Retailers With In-State Agents  10.24A
      • 6.  Post-Wayfair Sales and Use Tax Obligations of Out-of-State Retailers  10.25
      • 7.  California Sales and Use Tax Treatment of Software Sales and Related Services  10.26
    • A.  Introduction  10.27
    • B.  Commercial Form General Liability Insurance  10.28
      • 1.  Loss of Tangible Property: Is Computer Data “Tangible Property?”  10.29
      • 2.  Loss of Tangible Property: Has There Been a “Loss”?  10.30
      • 3.  “Physical Loss or Damage”  10.31
      • 4.  Intellectual Property Infringement  10.32
    • C.  Business Interruption Coverage  10.33
    • D.  Industry Response  10.34
    • E.  Cyberinsurance  10.35
    • F.  Practical Advice  10.36


Strategic Alliances

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  11.1
    • A.  Introduction  11.4
    • B.  Form: Strategic Alliance Agreement  11.5
    • A.  Introduction  11.6
    • B.  Form: Co-Branding Agreement  11.7


Software License Agreements

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  12.1
    • A.  Exclusive Licenses  12.2
    • B.  Nonexclusive Licenses  12.3
    • C.  Scope of License
      • 1.  Scope of Rights Granted  12.4
      • 2.  Number of End Users  12.4A
    • D.  Payment Structures  12.5
    • A.  Introduction  12.6
    • B.  Form: Software License Agreement  12.7
    • A.  General Considerations
      • 1.  Restrictions on Scope or Field of Use  12.8
      • 2.  Performance Milestones; Minimum Royalties  12.9
    • B.  Form: Exclusivity Clause  12.10
    • A.  Introduction  12.11
    • B.  Executory Contracts and Bankruptcy Code §365(n)  12.12
    • C.  Drafting Considerations  12.13


Software Development Agreements

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  13.1
    • A.  Introduction  13.4
    • B.  Form: Software Test and Evaluation Agreement  13.5


Content Clearances, Licensing, and Fair Use

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  14.1
    • A.  Public Domain  14.5
    • B.  Fair Use  14.6
    • A.  Individual Release (Videotape of Testimonial)
      • 1.  Introduction  14.9
      • 2.  Form: Endorsement Agreement  14.10
    • B.  Still Photograph License
      • 1.  Introduction  14.11
      • 2.  Form: Still Photograph License  14.12
    • C.  Reprint Rights License
      • 1.  Introduction  14.13
      • 2.  Form: Digital Reprint Rights License  14.14
    • D.  Streaming Video License
      • 1.  Introduction  14.15
      • 2.  Form: Streaming Video License  14.16
    • E.  Special Issues in Music Licensing  14.17
    • F.  Creative Commons and Other Innovative Licensing Solutions  14.18


Source Code Escrows

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  15.1


Financing an Online Business

    • A.  Introduction  16.1
    • B.  Equity Versus Debt
      • 1.  Equity  16.2
      • 2.  Debt  16.3
    • C.  Sources of Equity Funding  16.4
      • 1.  Founders, Friends, and Family  16.5
      • 2.  “Angel” Investors  16.6
      • 3.  Venture Capital and Other Institutional Investors  16.7
    • D.  Structure of Venture Capital Financings  16.8
    • E.  Venture Capital Financing Term Sheet
      • 1.  Introduction  16.9
      • 2.  Form: Term Sheet for Preferred Stock Financing  16.10
    • A.  Introduction  16.11
    • B.  Types of Debt Financing  16.12
      • 1.  Working Capital Loans  16.13
      • 2.  Term Loans  16.14
      • 3.  SBA Loans  16.15
      • 4.  Lease Financings  16.16
      • 5.  Corporate Credit Cards  16.17
      • 6.  Convertible Debt  16.18
      • 7.  Customer Advances  16.19
    • C.  Qualifying for Loan  16.20
    • D.  Elements of Simple Loan Transaction
      • 1.  Overview  16.21
      • 2.  Usury Issues for Non-Bank Lenders  16.22
    • E.  Loan Agreement and Promissory Note  16.23
      • 1.  Form: Loan Agreement  16.24
      • 2.  Form: Promissory Note  16.25
    • F.  Security Interests in Intellectual Property Collateral
      • 1.  Generally  16.26
      • 2.  Security Interests in Copyrights  16.27
      • 3.  Security Interests in Patents  16.28
      • 4.  Security Interests in Trademarks  16.29
      • 5.  Security Interests in Domain Names  16.30
      • 6.  Security Interests in Trade Secrets  16.31
      • 7.  Form of Security Agreement (Intellectual Property)
        • a.  Introduction  16.32
        • b.  Form: Security Agreement (Intellectual Property)  16.33
    • G.  Convertible Promissory Notes
      • 1.  Generally  16.34
      • 2.  Form: Convertible Promissory Note  16.35


Advertising on the Internet

    • A.  Introduction  17.1
    • B.  Overview of Applicable Laws  17.2
      • 1.  Lanham Act  17.3
      • 2.  Federal Trade Commission Act  17.4
        • a.  FTC’s Dot Com Disclosure Guidelines  17.5
        • b.  Liability for Deceptive Advertising; FTC Enforcement Actions  17.6
        • c.  Examples of FTC Enforcement Actions  17.7
        • d.  Endorsements and Testimonials  17.7A
        • e.  Native Advertising  17.7B
      • 3.  Restore Online Shoppers’ Confidence Act  17.7C
      • 4.  State Laws  17.8
        • a.  Laws Prohibiting False or Misleading Advertising Generally  17.9
        • b.  Laws Regulating Telephone, Internet, and Catalog Sales  17.10
        • c.  Laws Regulating Online Advertising to Minors  17.10A
        • d.  Laws Regulating Use of Bots  17.10B
    • C.  Attorney Internet Advertising
      • 1.  Overview  17.10C
      • 2.  California Rules of Professional Conduct  17.10D
      • 3.  ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct  17.10E
      • 4.  ABA Best Practice Guidelines for Legal Information Providers  17.10F
    • D.  Unsolicited E-Mail (“Spam”)  17.11
      • 1.  Federal Legislation: CAN-SPAM Act
        • a.  Generally  17.12
        • b.  E-Mail Subject to CAN-SPAM Act  17.13
        • c.  CAN-SPAM Act: Basic Requirements for Commercial E-Mail Messages  17.14
          • (1)  Identification as Advertisement  17.15
          • (2)  Notice and Opt-Out Mechanism  17.16
          • (3)  Postal Address  17.17
          • (4)  Affirmative Consent  17.18
          • (5)  Forwarding Commercial E-Mails  17.18A
        • d.  Deceptive E-Mail Practices  17.19
        • e.  Sexually Oriented Materials  17.20
        • f.  Attribution Rules  17.21
        • g.  Enforcement of CAN-SPAM  17.22
        • h.  National “Do Not E-Mail” Registry  17.23
        • i.  Commercial E-Mails Sent to Wireless Devices  17.23A
        • j.  Criminal Liability Under CAN-SPAM  17.23B
      • 2.  State Anti-Spam Laws
        • a.  Generally  17.24
        • b.  California Anti-Spam Laws  17.25
        • c.  Scope of Preemption of California Law by CAN-SPAM Act  17.26
        • d.  Penal Code §502(c)  17.27
      • 3.  Anti-Spam Litigation  17.28
      • 4.  Practical Methods of Blocking Spam E-Mail  17.29
    • E.  Unsolicited Texts and Phone Calls  17.29A
    • F.  Search Engine Optimization
      • 1.  Overview  17.29B
      • 2.  Optimization Tools and Techniques  17.29C
    • G.  Behavioral Advertising  17.29D
    • A.  Overview  17.30
    • B.  Banner Advertising  17.31
    • C.  Form: Banner Advertising Agreement  17.32
    • D.  Internet Service Directories or Referral Sites  17.33
    • E.  Form: Internet Advertising Agreement  17.34
    • F.  Portal Agreements  17.35
    • G.  Form: Interactive Marketing Agreement  17.36



    • A.  Overview, Scope of Chapter  18.1
    • B.  Major Types of Threats  18.2
    • A.  Online Resources  18.3
    • B.  California Requirements
      • 1.  Obligation to Maintain Security (CC §1798.81.5)  18.4
      • 2.  California AG’s Data Breach Report  18.5
      • 3.  Internet of Things (CC §§1798.91.04–1798.91.06)  18.6
    • C.  General Cybersecurity Guidance for Companies
      • 1.  NIST Cybersecurity Framework  18.7
      • 2.  NIST Internet of Things  18.8
      • 3.  NYSE Guidance for Directors and Officers  18.9
      • 4.  Checklist for Cybersecurity Preparedness  18.10
    • A.  California Requirements  18.11
      • 1.  California “Shine the Light” Law (CC §§1798.80–1798.84)  18.12
      • 2.  California Consumer Privacy Act (CC §§1798.100–1798.199)  18.13
    • B.  Other Responses to a Cyberattack
      • 1.  General Considerations  18.14
      • 2.  Checklist for Response to Cyberattack  18.15
    • A.  Federal Legislation
      • 1.  Computer Fraud and Abuse Act
        • a.  Overview  18.17
        • b.  As Applied to Conduct Exceeding Terms of Use  18.18
          • (1)  Violations of Terms of Use  18.19
          • (2)  Sharing Passwords  18.20
          • (3)  Access After Cease and Desist Letter  18.21
        • c.  As Applied to Tracking Software  18.22
        • d.  As Applied to Improper Use of E-Mail  18.23
        • e.  As Applied to Spam  18.24
        • f.  As Applied to Wireless Networks  18.25
      • 2.  Electronic Communications Privacy Act
        • a.  Overview of Title I and Title II  18.26
        • b.  Title I, Wiretap Act  18.27
          • (1)  As Applied to Cookies  18.28
          • (2)  As Applied to Tracking Software  18.29
          • (3)  As Applied to Unauthorized Wireless Access  18.30
        • c.  Title II, Stored Communications Act  18.31
          • (1)  Authorized Versus Unauthorized Access  18.32
          • (2)  E-Mails and “Electronic Storage”  18.33
      • 3.  USA Patriot Act  18.34
      • 4.  Digital Millennium Copyright Act  18.35
      • 5.  Other Federal Statutes  18.36
    • B.  State Legislation
      • 1.  Penal Code §502: Computer Crimes  18.37
      • 2.  Ransomware  18.38
      • 3.  Wireless Devices  18.39
    • C.  Trespass to Chattels
      • 1.  Elements of Claim  18.40
      • 2.  Case Law Developments
        • a.  Interference With Computer System Operations: eBay, Inc. v Bidder’s Edge, Inc.  18.41
        • b.  No Interference With Computer System Operations
          • (1)  Intel Corp. v Hamidi  18.42
          • (2)  Ticketmaster Corp. v, Inc.  18.43
        • c.  Computer Hacking  18.44


Jurisdiction; Conflicts of Law

    • A.  Introduction  19.1
    • B.  Personal Jurisdiction  19.2
      • 1.  State Long-Arm Statutes  19.3
      • 2.  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure  19.4
      • 3.  Constitutional Limits on Personal Jurisdiction
        • a.  Due Process Clause  19.5
        • b.  Minimum Contacts Test  19.6
        • c.  Reasonableness  19.7
      • 4.  General and Specific Personal Jurisdiction
        • a.  General Personal Jurisdiction  19.8
        • b.  Specific Personal Jurisdiction  19.9
        • c.  Specific Jurisdiction in Cyberspace  19.10
    • C.  In Rem Jurisdiction; Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act  19.11
    • D.  Choice-of-Forum Clauses
      • 1.  Enforceability  19.12
      • 2.  Form: Choice-of-Forum Clause  19.13
    • A.  Conflicts of Law
      • 1.  Generally  19.14
      • 2.  Constitutional Analysis  19.15
      • 3.  Is There a Choice-of-Law Clause?  19.16
      • 4.  Governmental Interest Analysis  19.17
      • 5.  Conflicts of Law on Internet  19.18
    • B.  Choice-of-Law Clauses
      • 1.  Enforceability
        • a.  California Statutes  19.19
        • b.  Nedlloyd Lines, B.V. v Superior Court and Later Cases  19.20
      • 2.  Drafting Considerations  19.21
      • 3.  Form: Choice-of-Law Clause  19.22


Liability Related to Speech and the First Amendment

    • A.  Scope of Chapter  20.1
    • B.  Speech-Related Liability Covered in Other Chapters  20.2
    • C.  Internet Jurisdiction  20.3
    • A.  Introduction  20.4
    • B.  First Amendment
      • 1.  Scope of First Amendment  20.5
      • 2.  Prior Restraint  20.6
      • 3.  Commercial Speech  20.7
      • 4.  “Fighting Words” Doctrine  20.8
      • 5.  True Threats of Force; Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct  20.9
      • 6.  Obscenity  20.10
        • a.  Miller Test for Obscenity  20.11
        • b.  Reliance on Community Standards Problematic in Cyberspace  20.12
        • c.  Transportation via “Interactive Computer Service”  20.13
        • d.  Federal Criminal Laws Regulating Obscenity  20.14
        • e.  Child Pornography  20.15
        • f.  Children’s Internet Protection Act  20.16
      • 7.  Filtering Software and First Amendment  20.17
      • 8.  Free Speech Rights in Anonymous Communications  20.18
      • 9.  Spam  20.19
    • A.  Defamation
      • 1.  Overview  20.21
      • 2.  Libel and Slander Distinguished  20.22
      • 3.  Elements of Defamation  20.23
        • a.  Trade Libel Distinguished  20.24
        • b.  Pleading Requirement: Identifying Alleged Defamatory Statement  20.25
        • c.   “Publication” Requirement  20.26
        • d.  “Of And Concerning” Requirement; “Group Libel”  20.27
        • e.  “Falsity” Requirement  20.28
          • (1)  Fact Versus Opinion  20.29
          • (2)  Burden of Proof  20.30
      • 4.  Public Officials, Public Figures, Limited-Purpose Public Figures, Private Figures, and Matters of Public Concern  20.31
      • 5.  Substantial Truth Defense  20.32
      • 6.  Defamatory Meaning Requirement  20.33
      • 7.  “Mental State” Requirement  20.34
        • a.  Private Figures: Negligence  20.35
        • b.  Public Officials, Public Figures, Limited-Purpose Public Figures, Matters of Public Concern: Actual Malice  20.36
      • 8.  Damages  20.37
      • 9.  Privilege  20.38
    • B.  Invasion of Privacy Torts  20.39
      • 1.  False Light  20.40
      • 2.  Public Disclosure of Private Facts  20.41
      • 3.  Right of Publicity; Misappropriation of Name and Likeness
        • a.  Overview  20.42
        • b.  Right of Publicity Survives Death  20.43
        • c.  Misappropriation Elements  20.44
        • d.  Right of Publicity; Elements  20.45
        • e.  Defenses
          • (1)  Use in Certain News Accounts or Political Campaigns  20.46
          • (2)  Transformative Use  20.47
          • (3)  First Amendment and Public Interest  20.48
          • (4)  Federal Copyright Law Preemption  20.49
          • (5)  Use of Deceased Individual in Copyrighted Work  20.50
        • f.  Statutory Remedies  20.51
      • 4.  Intrusion Upon Seclusion  20.52
        • a.   Intrusion Element  20.53
        • b.   Offensiveness Element  20.54
    • C.  Fraud  20.55
      • 1.  Affirmative Misrepresentation  20.56
        • a.  Misrepresentation Element  20.57
        • b.   “Intent” Requirement  20.58
        • c.   “Reliance” Requirement  20.59
      • 2.  Fraudulent Concealment  20.60
      • 3.  Negligent Misrepresentation  20.61
    • D.  Conversion  20.62
  • IV.  PRIVILEGES  20.63
    • A.  Official Governmental Duty Privilege  20.64
    • B.  Litigation Privilege  20.65
    • C.  Common Interest Privilege  20.66
    • D.  Fair and True Report Privilege  20.67
    • A.  Generally  20.68
    • B.  Delayed Discovery Rule  20.69
    • C.  Single Publication Rule  20.70
    • D.  Specific Statutes of Limitation
      • 1.  Defamation  20.71
      • 2.  Invasion of Privacy (False Light, Public Disclosure of Private Facts, Misappropriation, Right of Publicity, and Intrusion Upon Seclusion)  20.72
      • 3.  Intentional Fraud (Affirmative Misrepresentation and Fraudulent Concealment)  20.73
      • 4.  Negligent Misrepresentation  20.74
    • A.  Overview  20.75
    • B.  Legislative Intent  20.76
    • C.  Procedural Considerations  20.77
    • D.  Two-Pronged Procedure  20.78
      • 1.  Prong One: Defendant’s Burden To Show Cause of Action Arises From Protected Activity
        • a.  Four Categories of Protected Activity  20.79
        • b.  Protected Activity Defined by Statute Only  20.80
        • c.  No Additional Requirements  20.81
        • d.  Causes of Action Subject to Anti-SLAPP Statute  20.82
        • e.  Merits Not Analyzed in Prong One  20.83
        • f.  Exception for Criminal Conduct  20.84
        • g.  “Arises From” Requirement  20.85
        • h.  Written or Oral Statements Made in Governmental Proceedings (CCP §425.16(e)(1))  20.86
        • i.  Written or Oral Statements Made in Connection With Governmental Proceedings (CCP §425.16(e)(2))  20.87
        • j.  Written or Oral Statements Made in Public Forums in Connection With Matters of Public Interest (CCP §425.16(e)(3)  20.88
        • k.  Any Conduct in Furtherance of Right to Petition or Free Speech in Connection With Matter of Public Concern or Public Interest (CCP §425.16(e)(4))  20.89
      • 2.  Prong Two: Plaintiff’s Burden to Show Probability of Prevailing  20.90
        • a.  Legal Standard in State Court  20.91
        • b.  Legal Standards in Federal Court  20.92
        • c.  Examples of Defendants Using Anti-SLAPP Motions in Libel Actions  20.93
    • E.  Exemptions to Anti-SLAPP Statute  20.94
      • 1.  Commercial Speech Exemption  20.95
      • 2.  Public Interest Exemption  20.96
    • F.  Exceptions to Exemptions  20.97
      • 1.  Media Defendants, Book Publishers, and Authors  20.98
      • 2.  Purveyors of Copyrighted Works  20.99
      • 3.  Nonprofit Organizations  20.100
    • G.  Attorney Fees
      • 1.  Prevailing Defendant’s Right to Attorney Fees  20.101
      • 2.  Plaintiff Entitled to Fees Only if Motion Was Frivolous  20.102
      • 3.  Amount of Fees  20.103
    • A.  Immunity for Internet Intermediaries  20.104
    • B.  Interactive Computer Service (ICS)  20.105
    • C.  Information Content Provider (ICP)  20.106
    • D.  Preemption; Relation to State Laws  20.107
    • E.  Nature of Immunity  20.108
    • F.  Exceptions to Liability  20.109
      • 1.  Criminal Activity and Obscene Material  20.110
      • 2.  Intellectual Property  20.111
      • 3.  Sex Trafficking  20.112
    • G.  No Publisher or Speaker Liability  20.113
      • 1.  Common Law Publisher–Distributor Distinction for Defamation Irrelevant  20.114
      • 2.  Traditional and Nontraditional Publisher Functions  20.115
      • 3.  Applies to “Providers” and “Users” of ICSs  20.116
      • 4.  Name of Claim Not Dispositive  20.117
      • 5.  Limits Injunctive Relief  20.118
      • 6.  Defendant “Directly Involved” in Soliciting Unlawful Speech Ineligible for Immunity  20.119
      • 7.  Nature and Structure of Website May Be Sufficient to Show Direct Involvement in Unlawful Speech  20.120
      • 8.  Merely Providing Tools to Create Web Content Insufficient to Strip Immunity  20.121
      • 9.  Use of Nonemployee Moderators  20.122
      • 10.  Advertising Content  20.123
      • 11.  “Fake News” Websites  20.124
      • 12.  Cases Upholding CDA Immunity  20.125
      • 13.  Cases Holding No CDA Immunity  20.126
    • H.  The “Good Samaritan” Exemption
      • 1.  Two-Part Exemption  20.127
      • 2.  Allegedly Improper Blocking  20.128
      • 3.  Alleged Interference With Third Party Downloadable Programs  20.129
      • 4.  Good Faith Finding Not Required When Classified as Editorial Function  20.130
    • A.  Overview  20.131
    • B.  Potential Causes of Action  20.132
      • 1.  Defamation  20.133
      • 2.  Trademark Infringement and Dilution  20.134
      • 3.  Cybersquatting: Federal and State Law
        • a.  UDRP  20.135
        • b.  Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act  20.136
        • c.  California’s Anticybersquatting Statute  20.137
    • C.  Practical Solutions  20.138
    • A.  Generally  20.139
    • B.  Child Pornography
      • 1.  Child Pornography Prevention Act  20.140
      • 2.  Child Online Protection Act  20.141
    • C.  California Penal Code  20.142


Discovery of Electronically Stored Information

Alexander H. Lubarsky

    • A.  Retention of ESI
      • 1.  Regulatory Obligations  20A.2
      • 2.  In Absence of Statute or Regulation  20A.3
    • B.  Document Retention Policies  20A.4
    • C.  Special Problems Concerning E-Mail  20A.5
    • D.  The CLOUD Act: Electronic Information Stored on Foreign Servers  20A.5A
    • A.  Rule 16: Scheduling Orders; Case Management  20A.7
    • B.  Rule 26: General Discovery Provisions; Duty of Disclosure
      • 1.  Initial Voluntary Disclosure  20A.8
      • 2.  “Clawback” of Privileged Material  20A.9
      • 3.  Meet-and-Confer Requirements  20A.10
      • 4.  Safe Harbor if ESI Not Reasonably Accessible  20A.11
    • C.  Rule 33: Interrogatory Responses  20A.12
    • D.  Rule 34: Production of Documents and Things
      • 1.  Rule 34(a): Inspection, Copying, Testing, and Sampling  20A.13
      • 2.  Rule 34(b): Specifying Format for Production  20A.14
    • E.  Rule 37: Duty to Comply With Court Order; Safe Harbor for Routine Deletion  20A.15
    • F.  Rule 45: Response to Subpoenas  20A.16
    • G.  Federal NIT Warrants  20A.16A
    • A.  Rules of Court  20A.17
    • B.  Electronic Discovery Act  20A.18
      • 1.  ESI From Sources Not Reasonably Accessible  20A.18A
      • 2.  Safe Harbor for Lost Information  20A.18B
      • 3.  Disclosure of Privileged Information  20A.18C
      • 4.  Form of Production  20A.18D
      • 5.  Court-Imposed Limits on Production  20A.18E
    • A.  ESI Survey and Retention Policy  20A.19
    • B.  Identifying Key Personnel  20A.20
    • A.  Notice of Litigation  20A.21
    • B.  Duty to Preserve Evidence  20A.22
    • C.  Legal Hold Letter to Client
      • 1.  Legal Holds  20A.23
      • 2.  Form: Legal Hold Letter to Client  20A.24
    • D.  Litigation Hold Letter to Opponent
      • 1.  Litigation Holds  20A.25
      • 2.  Form: Litigation Hold Letter to Opponent  20A.26
    • E.  Manner of Preservation  20A.27
    • F.  Sanctions for Failure to Preserve  20A.28
    • A.  Identifying Data for Discovery
      • 1.  Need to Understand ESI Infrastructure  20A.29
      • 2.  Drafting a Request for Production  20A.30
    • B.  Collecting Data
      • 1.  Defensible Collection Strategies  20A.31
      • 2.  Paper-Based Versus Electronic Production  20A.32
      • 3.  Forensic Data Professionals  20A.33
      • 4.  Electronic Data Discovery Software  20A.34
      • 5.  Risks in ESI Collection  20A.35
      • 6.  Metadata  20A.36
      • 7.  ESI Seized by Law Enforcement Through Search Warrants   20A.36A
      • 8.  Forensic or Mirror Images  20A.37
      • 9.  Right to On-Site Inspection  20A.38
    • C.  Form of Production  20A.39
      • 1.  Production in Native Format  20A.40
      • 2.  Production of Image Files  20A.41
        • a.  Copying Electronic Files  20A.42
        • b.  Handling Metadata  20A.43
    • D.  Privileged Information  20A.44
    • E.  Federal Rule of Evidence 502  20A.44A
    • F.  Data Processing, Storage, and Review
      • 1.  De-Duplication and Near De-Duplication  20A.45
      • 2.  Litigation Support Platforms  20A.46
      • 3.  Hosting  20A.47
      • 4.  Data Security  20A.48
    • G.  Costs of E-Discovery  20A.49


International Issues

    • A.  Introduction  21.1
    • B.  Hague Conference on Private International Law  21.2
    • C.  Applicable Law in International Disputes  21.3
    • D.  Jurisdiction of Foreign Courts  21.4
    • E.  Comity: Enforcing Foreign Judgments Against U.S. Companies  21.5
    • F.  Content Filtering by Foreign Governments  21.6
    • G.  How to Target or Avoid Certain Countries  21.7
    • H.  International Electronic Contracting  21.8
    • I.  International Intellectual Property Protection  21.9
    • J.  European Union Directives
      • 1.  Introduction  21.10
      • 2.  EU Data Protection Directive and Related Developments
        • a.  EU Data Protection Directive  21.11
        • b.  General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)  21.11A
        • c.  Right to Be Forgotten  21.11B
        • d.  EU-US Privacy Shield  21.11C
        • e.  Compliance With EU General Data Protection Regulation
          • (1)  Self-Certifying Under the Privacy Shield Framework  21.12
          • (2)  Consequences of Noncompliance  21.12A
          • (3)  Case-by-Case Compliance; Model Contract Clauses  21.13
      • 3.  Other EU Directives
        • a.  Distance Selling  21.14
        • b.  E-Commerce Directives  21.15
        • c.  VAT Directive  21.16
        • d.  Specific Industry Directives  21.17
        • e.  EU Data Retention Directive  21.18
        • f.  EU Cybersecurity Directive  21.18A
        • g.  EU Database Directive  21.18B
    • K.  Self-Regulation
      • 1.  Trustmarks  21.19
      • 2.  International ADR  21.20
    • A.  U.S. Export Controls  21.21
      • 1.  Export Administrative Regulations (EAR)  21.22
      • 2.  Scope of EAR; Commerce Control List (CCL)  21.23
      • 3.  Definition of “Export”  21.24
    • B.  Compliance Challenges  21.25
    • C.  Export Control Compliance Programs  21.26
    • D.  Violations   21.27
    • E.  Export Controls of Other Nations  21.28
    • F.  Import Controls  21.29
    • G.  Form: Export Control Compliance Clause  21.30


Acquisitions and Sales of Internet-Based Businesses

  • I.  INTRODUCTION  22.1
    • A.  Introduction  22.3
    • B.  Due Diligence Procedures
      • 1.  Confidentiality Agreement  22.4
      • 2.  Due Diligence Checklist  22.5
      • 3.  Seller’s Internal Response Team  22.6
      • 4.  Responding to Request  22.7
      • 5.  Advance Preparation by Seller  22.8
      • 6.  Buyer’s Due Diligence Report  22.9
      • 7.  Analyzing Information  22.10
      • 8.  Disposition of Information  22.11
    • C.  Sample Due Diligence Checklist
      • 1.  Introduction  22.12
      • 2.  Checklist: Due Diligence Information Request  22.13
    • D.  “Open Source” Software
      • 1.  Introduction  22.13A
      • 2.  Checklist: Acquiring Open Source Software  22.13B
    • E.  Sample Due Diligence Report
      • 1.  Introduction  22.14
      • 2.  Form: Due Diligence Report re Intellectual Property Matters  22.15
    • A.  Introduction  22.16
    • B.  Form: Representations and Warranties re Intellectual Property  22.17
    • A.  Introduction  22.18
    • B.  Form: Internet Domain Name Assignment Agreement  22.19


(1st Edition)

July 2019



File Name

Book Section



Chapter 1

Copyrights and the DMCA



Copyright Assignment



Checklist: Notice and Take-Down Checklist



Checklist: Company DMCA Compliance Policy


Chapter 2

Patents and Trade Secrets



Patent Assignment



Company Policy on Trade Secret Protection



Confidentiality Agreement


Chapter 3

Domain Names and Trademark Issues



Domain Name Purchase Agreement



UDRP Complaint



UDRP Response



Trademark Guidelines



Trademark License Agreement



Trademark Assignment



Sample Cease and Desist Letter


Chapter 4

Human Resources



Offer Letter to Prospective Employee



Confidentiality and Invention Assignment Agreement



Independent Contractor Consulting Agreement



Nondisclosure Agreement



Advisory Board Letter Agreement


Chapter 5

Website and App Development; Disability Accommodation Issues



Agreement for Transfer and Assignment of Intellectual Property



Website Development Agreement


Chapter 6

Hosting and Related Services; Cloud Computing



Hosting Services Agreement



Co-Location Agreement



Short Form Service Level Agreement



Website Hosting Service Level Agreement



Technical Support and Maintenance Agreement



Basic Technical Support Exhibit



Sample Cloud Services Agreement



Security Addendum


Chapter 8

Terms of Use; Online Agreements; Linking; Downloading; Social Networking



Website Terms of Use



Online End-User Software License Agreement



Online Beta User Evaluation Agreement



Open Source Software License Agreement



Evaluation License Agreement



Online Software Developer Toolkit License Agreement



Linking Agreement


Chapter 9

Privacy Law and Privacy Policies



Basic Website Privacy Policy



Commercial Website Privacy Policy


Chapter 10

E-Commerce Transactions; Tax and Insurance Issues



Sample Clauses re Payment of Subscription Fees


Chapter 11

Strategic Alliances



Form: Sample Letter of Intent re Strategic Alliance



Strategic Alliance Agreement



Co-Branding Agreement


Chapter 12

Software License Agreements



Software License Agreement



Exclusivity Clause


Chapter 13

Software Development Agreements



Form: Software Development Agreement



Software Test and Evaluation Agreement


Chapter 14

Content Clearances, Licensing, and Fair Use



Endorsement Agreement



Still Photograph License



Digital Reprint Rights License



Streaming Video License


Chapter 15

Source Code Escrows



Form: Source Code Escrow Agreement


Chapter 16

Financing an Online Business



Term Sheet for Preferred Stock Financing



Loan Agreement



Promissory Note



Security Agreement (Intellectual Property)



Convertible Promissory Note


Chapter 17

Advertising on the Internet



Banner Advertising Agreement



Internet Advertising Agreement



Interactive Marketing Agreement


Chapter 18




Checklist for Response to Cyberattack


Chapter 19

Jurisdiction; Conflicts of Law



Choice-of-Forum Clause



Choice-of-Law Clause


Chapter 20A

Discovery of Electronically Stored Information



Legal Hold Letter to Client



Litigation Hold Letter to Opponent


Chapter 21

International Issues



Export Control Compliance Clause


Chapter 22

Acquisitions and Sales of Internet-Based Businesses



Checklist: Due Diligence Information Request



Checklist: Acquiring Open Source Software



Due Diligence Report re Intellectual Property Matters



Representations and Warranties re Intellectual Property



Internet Domain Name Assignment Agreement


Selected Developments

July 2019 Update


Unlike facts and raw data, a compilation of facts may be protected in part, to the extent that it features an original selection or arrangement, displaying some minimal level of creativity beyond mere collection of the data. Feist Publications, Inc. v Rural Tel. Serv. Co. (1991) 499 US 340, 358, 111 S Ct 1282; Experian Info. Solutions v Nationwide Marketing Servs. Inc. (9th Cir 2018) 893 F3d 1176. Such creativity can be demonstrated when “the compiler makes choices independently to select information from numerous and sometimes conflicting sources.” Experian Info. Solutions, 893 F3d at 1185. See §1.2A

The term “phonorecord” is used in many places in the Copyright Act to refer to a medium for sound recordings. As the court in Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi Inc. (2d Cir 2018) 910 F3d 649, 657, explained, the Copyright Act defines “phonorecord” as a “material object[] in which sounds … are fixed by any method now known or later developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.” 17 USC §101. Thus, the term includes nontransitory digital music files, including the digital music file created on the original creator’s server or hard drive. “[W]hen the purchaser of a digital music file from iTunes possesses that file, embodied ‘for a period of more than transitory duration’ in a computer or other physical storage device, [citations omitted], that device—or at least the portion of it in which the digital music file is fixed (e.g., the location on the hard drive)—becomes a phonorecord.” 910 F3d at 657. See §1.3.

Before October 11, 2018, only sound recordings that were fixed before February 15, 1972, were entitled to federal copyright protection. Sound recordings fixed before that date were protected by state law. After the passage of the Music Modernization Act (Pub L 115–264, 132 Stat 3676), effective October 11, 2018, all sound recordings that are still entitled to copyright protection receive federal copyright protection and all state laws governing copyright in sound recordings are generally preempted. See 17 USC §301. See §1.3.

As of October 11, 2018, digital music downloads are subject to the compulsory blanket licensing regime inaugurated by the Music Modernization Act (Pub L 115–264, 132 Stat 3676). See 17 USC §115. See §1.11.

As of October 11, 2018, with the enactment of the Music Modernization Act (MMA) (Pub L 115–264, 132 Stat 3676), sound recordings fixed both before and after February 15, 1972, are afforded the same protections under the Copyright Act. See 17 USC §§102(7), 1401. The MMA preempts state copyright laws. See 17 USC §301(c). Previously, federal copyright protection only vested in sound recordings fixed after February 15, 1972. The rights to sound recordings fixed before that date were governed by state law. This topic is important because there has been much litigation on whether the laws of various states recognized a public performance right. Because the MMA only applies prospectively, the interpretation of these state laws is important to resolution of disputes over infringements occurring before October 11, 2018, the date of the MMA’s enactment. See §1.11B.

In general, a certificate of registration issued by the Copyright Office is a precondition to the filing of a copyright infringement suit. 17 USC §411(a); Fourth Estate Pub. Benefit Corp. v, LLC (2019) ___ US ___, 139 S Ct 881. In Fourth Estate, the U.S. Supreme Court resolved a circuit split on the issue of whether a plaintiff copyright owner has standing to sue in situations when the Copyright Office has received the application but has not yet issued a certificate of registration. Compare Apple Barrel Prods., Inc. v Beard (5th Cir 1984) 730 F2d 384, 386 (application approach), with La Resolana Architects PA v Clay Realtors Angel Fire (10th Cir 2005) 416 F3d 1195 (registration approach). The Supreme Court’s holding in Fourth Estate effectively overruled the Ninth Circuit’s rule, which was an application approach. See Cosmetic Ideas, Inc. v IAC/Interactivecorp. (9th Cir 2010) 606 F3d 612, 621, cert denied (2010) 562 US 1062. See §§1.15, 1.16.

A variation of the “striking similarity” test has emerged in the digital context: “striking compatibility.” Ticketmaster LLC v Prestige Entertainment W. (CD Cal 2018) 315 F Supp 3d 1147, 1162. In that case, Ticketmaster alleged that the defendants’ bots were highly capable of purchasing large quantities of tickets at inhuman speed and, to do so, required reproducing Ticketmaster’s website and mobile app—which contained multiple layers of protection and security measures. These allegations proved sufficient to demonstrate access in the form of “striking compatibility” on a motion to dismiss. See §1.22.

To establish direct infringement liability by a service provider for infringing postings and unauthorized uses by users, there must be a direct volitional act on the part of the service provider. VHT, Inc. v Zillow Group, Inc. (9th Cir 2019) 918 F3d 723 (volitional act prerequisite is of greater importance in cases involving automated systems, such as Zillow website); Perfect 10, Inc. v Giganews, Inc. (9th Cir 2017) 847 F3d 657, 666 (volition requires direct causal role in alleged infringement). In VHT, Inc. v Zillow Group, Inc., supra, the Ninth Circuit explained that, to demonstrate a website operator’s volitional conduct, the plaintiff must furnish some evidence showing that the operator exercised control over the works at issue (other than by general operation of its website); that it selected material for uploading, downloading, transmission, or storage; or that it initiated “copying, storage, or distribution” of the works. 918 F3d at 732. See §§1.24–1.25.

The remedy of statutory damages becomes trickier in the context of compilations. Registering works such as websites or a collection of photographs as a compilation may serve as an efficient and cost-effective means of securing copyright registration. However, statutory damages are available per work and the Copyright Act explicitly states that “all the parts of a compilation … constitute one work.” 17 USC §504(c). A compilation may be treated as a single work for purposes of statutory damages if its individual components are related and lack individual economic value. Adams v Agrusa (9th Cir 2017) 693 Fed Appx 563. See §1.35.

In Rimini St., Inc. v Oracle USA, Inc. (2019) ___ US ___, 139 S Ct 873, the Supreme Court held that the term “full costs” in 17 USC §505 refers to the costs specified in the general costs statutes, 28 USC §§1821, 1920. See §1.35.

The Ninth Circuit has clarified that, although the district court has great discretion in awarding attorney fees, there are limits. First, in determining the degree of a plaintiff’s success, courts should not confuse “actual success with the determination of a reasonable fee award.” Glacier Films (USA), Inc. v Turchin (9th Cir 2018) 896 F3d 1033, 1038. The focus must be on the degree of success and not the award. Second, there is no “presumptive entitlement” to fees for the prevailing party in which the “monetary stakes are small.” 896 F3d at 1039. Further, mere disapproval of BitTorrent cases in general is not a valid consideration for denying fees to a successful copyright plaintiff in a BitTorrent case. 896 F3d at 1042. See §1.35.

An issue arises when an owner of a legal copy of a copyrighted work, such as a photograph or a painting, creates a thumbnail of a copyrighted work in order to sell the legal copy on an e-commerce website, such as eBay or Amazon. Courts in both the Central District of California and the Southern District of New York have found such use to be transformative because the secondary use is “to provide information to legitimate purchasers under the first sale doctrine, not for the artistic purpose of the creator’s original images.” Stern v Lavender (SD NY 2018) 319 F Supp 3d 650, 681 (quoting Rosen v eBay, Inc. (CD Cal, Jan. 16, 2015, No. CV 13–6801 MWF (Ex)) 2015 US Dist Lexis 49999). See §1.45B.

The term “meme” does not lend itself well to definition. Usually, it refers to a copyrighted work, such as an image or series of images, that has been altered—usually with a caption added—and circulated online. The degree of alteration can vary drastically. Given that fair use is a context-sensitive inquiry, it is difficult to arrive at a per se rule regarding memes. However, the issue of whether a meme was transformative as a matter of law was addressed in Philpot v Alternet Media, Inc. (ND Cal, Nov. 30, 2018, No. 18–cv–04479–TSH) 2018 US Dist Lexis 203500. Alternet posted on Facebook an image of Willie Nelson, without permission of the copyright holder, with the quote: “Rednecks, hippies, misfits – we’re all the same. Gay or straight? So what? It doesn’t matter to me. We have to be concerned about other people, regardless. I don’t like seeing anybody treated unfairly. It sticks in my craw. I hold on to the values from my childhood.” Below the image was the comment, “We need more values like this.” The federal district court denied the motion to dismiss, because at the pleading stage, the court could not determine whether Alternet’s purpose in its use of the photo was to identify Willie Nelson’s connection to the quote or to transform the photo into a political poster. See §1.45C.

In VHT, Inc. v Zillow Group, Inc. (9th Cir 2019) 918 F3d 723, 740, the Ninth Circuit commented that “[S]earch engines have emerged as a significant technology that may qualify as a transformative fair use, making images and information that would otherwise be protected by copyright searchable on the web.” However, some courts, particularly courts in the Second Circuit, have begun to demarcate the outer boundaries of when a search engine constitutes transformative and fair use. Even the Ninth Circuit in VHT, Inc. v Zillow Group, Inc., cautioned that the label “search engine” is not a talisman for a finding of fair use. Search engines that are publicly accessible (i.e., free to the public) and provide limited access to the original work (which is medium-specific) are more likely to constitute transformative and fair use that serves the public interest. Conversely, search engines that require subscription fees and provide access to large portions or the heart of a work are less likely to be considered a transformative fair use. See Fox News Network, LLC v TVEyes, Inc. (2d Cir 2018) 883 F3d 169. See §1.47.

Fox News Network, LLC v TVEyes, Inc. (2d Cir 2018) 883 F3d 169 addressed a search engine that allowed paying subscribers to search by search term and view 10-minute video clips that were broadcast on television. The Second Circuit found the service to be slightly transformative only insofar as it increased the subscriber’s efficiency to view the clips instead of having to watch hours of content to find the specific coverage that the subscriber sought. However, the viewing function did not alter the content in any way and was commercial, which militated against a finding of transformative use. 883 F3d at 177. Ultimately, given other fair use factors that weighed against the search engine (namely, the amount and substantiality of the works used and the market harm), the Second Circuit did not find that the search engine constituted fair use. See §1.47.

In Capitol Records, LLC v ReDigi Inc. (2d Cir 2018) 910 F3d 649, 656, the court held that a digital music file did not qualify for the first sale doctrine because the file had been reproduced in a manner that violated the plaintiffs’ exclusive control over reproduction under 17 USC §106(1). See §1.56.

Discussion of the status of the California Resale Royalties Act (CRRA) (CC §986) is relevant to the resale of fine art over the Internet. The CRRA required sellers of fine art to withhold 5 percent of the sale price and pay it to the artist. CC §986(a). The Ninth Circuit held that the CRRA was preempted by the Copyright Act of 1976 (17 USC §301(a)) because it conflicted with the distribution right (codified in 17 USC §106(3)) and the first sale doctrine (codified in 17 USC §109(a)). See Close v Sotheby’s, Inc. (9th Cir 2018) 894 F3d 1061, 1069. However, the Ninth Circuit also held that the CRRA was not preempted by the Copyright Act of 1909. 894 F3d at 1072. Therefore, claims arising from January 1, 1977 (the effective date of the CRRA), to January 1, 1978 (the effective date of the Copyright Act of 1976), were not preempted. See §1.56.

Digital Millennium Copyright Act

The Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) protects the integrity of copyright management information (CMI), which includes the title of the work, the name of the author, copyright owner or performer, the terms and conditions for use of the work, and “identifying numbers or symbols referring to such information or links to such information.” 17 USC §1202(c). The first category of prohibited conduct is conduct involving false CMI. The prohibition has specific mental state requirements and a conduct requirement. It requires proof of (1) providing, distributing, or importing for distribution false CMI; (2) knowledge that the CMI is false; and (3) doing so with the intent to induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal copyright infringement. 17 USC §1202(a). The second category of prohibited conduct involves removal or alternation of CMI. The prohibition has multiple mental state and conduct requirements. The conduct requirements are either (1) intentional removal or alteration of CMI; (2) distributing or importing for distribution removed or altered CMI; or (3) distributing, importing for distribution, or publicly performing copies or sound recordings of copyrighted works with removed or altered CMI. The mental state requirements are that the prohibited conduct must be done with (1) knowledge that it was done without authorization of the copyright owner and (2) the intent to induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal infringement. The Ninth Circuit has interpreted the second mental state requirement as pertaining to a future act of infringement (i.e., the defendant’s intent to induce, enable, facilitate, or conceal a future act of infringement after the conduct is committed). See Stevens v Corelogic, Inc. (9th Cir 2018) 899 F3d 666. The future act need not be concrete—it is sufficient to prove that the defendant had a “pattern of conduct” or “modus operandi” such that “the defendant was aware or had reasonable grounds to be aware … [that] the probable future impact of its actions” would lead to infringement. 899 F3d at 674. See §1.60.

Whether a company needs an written internal policy depends on the size of the company. For small companies, in which the individuals who formulate the policies are the ones who execute them, a writing might not be required (but is advisable). For large companies, a written policy is necessary because those who formulate the policies are different from those who execute the policies. The details of the policy need not be written; rather, the website only need inform its subscribers of a policy of terminating repeat infringers in appropriate circumstances. Ventura Content, Ltd. v Motherless, Inc. (9th Cir 2018) 885 F3d 597, 615. See §§1.66–1.67.

The Ninth Circuit has articulated a number of factors to determine whether a service provider reasonably implemented a repeat infringer policy. See Ventura Content, Ltd. v Motherless, Inc. (9th Cir 2018) 885 F3d 597, 617. Factors that favor a service provider are (1) a DMCA logbook; (2) blocking a subscriber’s name and e-mail address for uploads; (3) putting e-mail addresses from terminated accounts on a banned list; and (4) prohibiting banned users from reopening a terminated account. In Ventura Content, the Ninth Circuit noted that, although the DMCA does not require that these factors be present, evidence demonstrating the existence of these factors generally shows that a repeat infringer policy was reasonably implemented. Conversely, the following factors cut against the service provider: (1) changing the e-mail address to which takedown notices are sent without providing notice of the change; (2) participating in copyright infringement; (3) allowing terminated users to rejoin the site; and (4) refusing to terminate known repeat infringers. See §1.68.

Protection is not stripped away because the service provider does police or monitor the website. In Ventura Content, Ltd. v Motherless, Inc. (9th Cir 2018) 885 F3d 597, 605, the owner of a pornographic website screened out child pornography, bestiality, and copyright infringement that he spotted on the website. The Ninth Circuit held that a service provider who does police or monitor a website does not lose protection under 17 USC §512(c). See §1.71.


Offers for sale, product announcements, product demonstrations at trade shows, disclosure of the invention in articles, magazines, or social media, and similar activities that take place before the statutory period may result in rejection of a patent application or invalidation of an issued patent. Even secret sales and “sales of an invention to a third party who is obligated to keep the invention confidential” can trigger the on-sale statutory time bar. Helsinn Healthcare S.A. v Teva Pharms. USA, Inc. (2019) 586 US ___, 139 S Ct 628. See §2.13.

A discussion of alternatives to patent litigation has been added in §2.16B.

A recent example of a business method patent is a patent held by Uber Technologies, Inc. for providing transportation services. U.S. Patent No. 10,163,139, issued December 25, 2018, is entitled “Selecting Vehicle Type for Providing Transport” and its abstract reads as follows:

A transport arrangement system operates to receive a transport request from a user, and to make a selection of a vehicle type for the user based at least in part on a set of criteria associated with the transport request or user information. For example, the determination of whether an autonomous vehicle is to be provided can be based at least in part on the destination specified with the transport request.

Uber currently utilizes an app that allows its customers to summon a driver at will by indicating on the app the customer’s desired destination. Uber appears to be taking its current transportation service to the next level by having this service performed by autonomous vehicles, i.e., self-driving vehicles. See §2.17. The USPTO has updated its instructions to its examiners concerning the first step of the Alice/Mayo test described in §2.17B. See The first step of the Alice/Mayo test asks whether the claimed subject matter is directed toward a judicially recognized exception to patentable subject matter, such as an abstract idea, law of nature, or natural phenomenon. The 2019 revised instructions break the first step of the Alice/Mayo test into two prongs. The first prong is to identify the judicial exception. The second prong is to determine whether the judicial exception has been implemented into a practical application (referred to below as the “judicial exception” test). See §§2.17B–2.17C.

In Visual Memory LLC v Nvidia Corp. (Fed Cir 2017) 876 F3d 1253, 1259, the Federal Circuit found the use of “programmable operational characteristics that are configurable based on the type of processor” to be patent-eligible subject matter because the claims were directed toward the improvement of computer memory systems. The court specifically distinguished previous cases in which computers were merely used to carry out claimed method steps, which were deemed patent-ineligible. 876 F3d at 1260. See §2.18.

A recurring theme in finding a subject matter patent-eligible appears to be the unconventional application of computer-implemented techniques. In Thales Visionix Inc. v U.S. (Fed Cir 2017) 850 F3d 1343, the Federal Circuit found that claims that “specify a particular configuration of inertial sensors and a particular method of using the raw data from the sensors in order to more accurately calculate the position and orientation of an object on a moving platform” were not directed toward an abstract idea because “the claims are directed to systems and methods that use inertial sensors in a non-conventional manner to reduce errors in measuring the relative position and orientation of a moving object on a moving reference frame.” 850 F3d at 1348. See §2.18.


Although general claims of trademark infringement are governed by the multi-factor test of AMF Inc. v Sleekcraft Boats (9th Cir 1979) 599 F2d 341, if the allegedly infringing use is in the title of an expressive work, the Ninth Circuit applies the test developed in Rogers v Grimaldi (2d Cir 1989) 875 F2d 994. This test takes into account the First Amendment’s right of free speech and balances it against the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion. Under the test in Rogers, the title of an expressive work does not violate the Lanham Act (1) “unless the title has no artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever” or (2) if the work has some artistic relevance, “unless the title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work.” Twentieth Century Fox Television v Empire Distribution, Inc. (9th Cir 2017) 875 F3d 1192, 1196 (quoting Rogers, 875 F2d at 999) (internal quotation marks omitted). See §3.60.

In Adidas Am., Inc. v Skechers USA, Inc. (9th Cir 2018) 890 F3d 747, the court reversed a preliminary injunction because there was no record evidence supporting the likelihood of irreparable harm to the plaintiff. See §3.63.

In Moldex-Metric, Inc. v McKeon Prods., Inc. (9th Cir 2018) 891 F3d 878, the Ninth Circuit reversed a grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant because the green color of an earplug may not be functional and thus protectable as trade dress. See §3.81.

Human Resources

Companies should also be aware of the California Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v Superior Court (2018) 4 C5th 903. In that case, for purposes of claims asserted under California’s wage orders, the court essentially scrapped the nearly 30-year-old common law right-to-control test, articulated by the court in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v Department of Indus. Relations (1989) 48 C3d 341, for determining whether a worker is an employee or an independent contractor. The Borello test applied multiple factors to determine whether a worker qualifies as an independent contractor (see §4.15). In its place, the court adopted the “ABC” test (see §4.16) used in various other jurisdictions around the country, including Massachusetts and New Jersey. The court interpreted California’s wage precedents and policy as placing the burden on the business to prove that a worker is an independent contractor rather than an employee; otherwise, the worker will be presumed to be an employee. See §4.13.

Dynamex applies only to claims based on wage orders, i.e., claims relating to minimum wage, meal and rest periods, overtime, reporting time pay, payments for required uniforms, and rules relating to meals and lodging. See Dynamex, 4 C5th at 948 (noting that worker may be considered an employee under one statute but not under another). Thus, Dynamex is limited in applicability to so-called nonexempt employees. The Borello right-to-control test remains applicable to exempt employees. See §§4.14–4.17 for further discussion. See §4.13.

A discussion of the distinction between exempt and nonexempt employees has been added to §4.14.

As noted in §§4.13–4.14, the California Supreme Court’s decision in Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v Superior Court (2018) 4 C5th 903 does not apply to workers who would be classified as exempt employees if they do not qualify as independent contractors. To determine the proper classification of these workers, the common law right-to-control test articulated by the court in S.G. Borello & Sons, Inc. v Department of Indus. Relations (1989) 48 C3d 341 still generally applies, although both the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) and the California Employment Development Department (EDD) have issued specific guidance on the issue, as discussed below. As stated by the Borello court, “[t]he principal test of an employment relationship is whether the person to whom service is rendered has the right to control the manner and means of accomplishing the result desired.” 48 C3d at 350 (citations omitted). See §4.15.

Under the ABC test, a worker is considered an independent contractor only if the hiring entity shows (4 C5th at 916)

(A) that the worker is free from the control and direction of the hirer in connection with the performance of the work, both under the contract for the performance of the work and in fact;

(B) that the worker performs work that is outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s business; and

(C) that the worker is customarily engaged in an independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same nature as the work performed for the hiring entity.

The burden of proof is on the hiring entity. The ABC test presumes that all workers are employees and permits workers to be classified as independent contractors only if the hiring entity demonstrates that the worker in question satisfies each of the above conditions. See §4.16.

On May 2, 2019, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals issued its opinion in the closely watched case of Vazquez v Jan-Pro Franchising Int’l, Inc. (9th Cir 2019) 23 F3d 575. The court held that, under California law, the California Supreme Court’s decision in Dynamex should be applied retroactively. In remanding the case, the court ruled that the district court should consider all three prongs of the ABC test and that the franchise context should not change the analysis. See §4.16.

As of May 3, 2019, a bill is pending in the California State Assembly (AB 5 (Gonzales)) that would codify the Dynamex decision and clarify its application. The bill would also provide exemptions for specified professions that are not subject to wage orders of the Industrial Welfare Commission or the ruling in the Dynamex case. See §4.17.

A recommended procedure for analysis of whether a worker should be classified as an employee or an independent contractor is set forth in §4.17.

Website Accessibility

Ninth Circuit cases have uniformly held that websites that are not connected to an actual physical place are not places of “public accommodation” and therefore are not subject to the ADA. See, e.g., Robles v Domino’s Pizza, LLC (9th Cir 2019) 913 F3d 898, 905; Weyer v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. (9th Cir 2000) 198 F3d 1104, 1114; Young v Facebook, Inc. (ND Cal 2011) 790 F Supp 2d 1110 (ADA inapplicable to Facebook because Facebook is website, not physical place). These cases reflect the Ninth Circuit’s consistent interpretation of the term “public accommodation” as requiring “some connection between the good or service complained of and an actual physical place.” Weyer v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., supra. However, if a business does have a physical location as well as a website and mobile app, the Ninth Circuit has squarely held that the ADA applies to the website and app. Robles v Domino’s Pizza, LLC (9th Cir 2019) 913 F3d 898, 904. See §5.28.

Cloud Computing

A sample form of data protection addendum has been added to the form of cloud computing agreement, which is intended to secure commitments from the cloud provider regarding data and infrastructure security, data breach response, and security audits. See §6.64.

Electronic Contracting

In Rushing v Viacom, Inc. (ND Cal, Oct. 15, 2018, No. 17–cv–04492–JD) 2018 US Dist Lexis 176988, relying on Nguyen v Barnes & Noble Inc. (9th Cir 2014) 763 F3d 1171, the court held that the arbitration provision in Viacom’s browsewrap agreement in a gaming app was unenforceable. Plaintiffs alleged that Viacom violated the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) (15 USC §§6501–6506) by tracking and selling children’s personally identifying information as they played the mobile game, Llama Spit Spit. (COPPA is discussed further in §§9.29–9.34A.) Viacom argued that the matter should be referred to arbitration under the terms of Viacom’s End User License Agreement. The court found that there was no evidence of actual or constructive notice of the arbitration provision because users had to click on a hyperlink titled “more” to see it and clicking on the hyperlink was not required to download the app. See §7.4.

The European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has significant implications on the structure of online agreements. A browsewrap agreement is not compliant with GDPR requirements to confirm the unambiguous consent of users as a clear affirmative action before collecting any personal information from them. Article 4(11) of the GDPR defines consent as “any freely given, specific, informed and unambiguous indication of the data subject’s wishes by which he or she, by a statement or clear affirmative action, signifies agreement to the processing of personal data relating to him or her.” Because the GDPR will apply to and be enforced against all businesses that collect data from EU residents, practitioners will need to take care to avoid the potentially large fines and penalties implicated by a violation of the GDPR. See §7.4.


In a 2017 enforcement action, the FTC alleged that a company named Vizio failed to provide adequate notice and obtain proper consent from consumers for the collection and sharing of their viewing data through the company’s “smart” televisions. Vizio and the FTC entered into a settlement in which Vizio agreed to pay $2.2 million and was required to delete previously collected consumer data, implement a comprehensive data privacy program, prominently disclose to consumers its data collection and sharing practices, and obtain affirmative consent for those practices. See FTC v Vizio, Inc. (Feb. 6, 2017) FTC File No. 162 3024, available at See §9.9.

The consent agreement in In re Uber Technols., Inc. (Oct. 25, 2018) FTC File No. 152 3054 resulted from a company’s failure to disclose a data breach. In that case, the FTC brought an action against Uber for a data breach in 2014, alleging that (a) employees were improperly accessing consumer data due to Uber’s insecure automated system and failure to monitor internal access of records and (b) an intruder was able to access personal information stored in plain text because Uber used only a single key to grant administrative access rather than multi-factor authentication. While negotiating a settlement for the 2014 breach, the FTC learned that Uber experienced a similar breach in 2016, which it had failed to disclose. In that situation, one of the company’s engineers posted an access code online, which an intruder used to access cloud storage where nonpublic information was stored in plain text. Rather than notify the FTC, Uber paid the intruder $100,000 to remain silent. When the FTC learned of this second breach, it withdrew its proposed consent agreement and issued a revised settlement prohibiting Uber from failing to disclose future incidents to the FTC or misrepresenting how it monitors internal access to consumers’ personal information, and mandating that the company implement a comprehensive information security program including biennial third party monitoring assessment. See §9.9A.

Some of the FTC’s powers to bring actions against companies for failure to maintain reasonable security measures have been curtailed by the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in LabMD v FTC (11th Cir 2018) 894 F3d 1221. In that case, the Eleventh Circuit held that an FTC cease and desist order was unenforceable because the FTC did not enjoin a specific act or practice, and instead mandated a complete overhaul of LabMD’s data security program without specifying how that was to be done. However, the decision is narrow because the Eleventh Circuit did not rule on the actual ability of the FTC to bring data security actions under §5 of the FTC Act. See §9.9B.

Internet of Things (IoT) companies should be aware of state and sectoral laws governing IoT devices. For example, California’s law on the security of connected devices (CC §§1798.91.04–1798.91.06) requires manufacturers of connected devices to equip devices with appropriate security. The Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA) (15 USC §§6501–6506) (see §§9.29–9.34A) also applies to IoT devices. See See §9.9D.

In May 2018, Congress passed the Economic Growth, Regulatory Relief, and Consumer Protection Act (Pub L 115–174, 132 Stat 1296), which amended the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The amendments increase the length of time a consumer reporting agency must include a fraud alert in a consumer’s file to one year and to require consumer reporting agencies to provide consumers with free credit freezes, notify consumers of their availability, establish provisions related to the placement and removal of fees, and create requirements related to the protection of credit records of minors. See 15 USC §1681c–1. See §9.15B.

The California Consumer Privacy Act of 2018 (CCPA) (CC §§1798.100–1798.199) takes effect January 1, 2020. It provides consumers with new rights regarding their personal information that is collected by businesses and creates disclosure obligations and potential penalties for businesses collecting, using, sharing, or selling that information. For these purposes, the Act defines a “consumer” as any natural person who is a California resident. CC §1798.140(g). The Act also includes a limited private right of action, discussed below. See CC §1798.150(a)(1). A business that violates the CCPA may be subject to an injunction and civil penalties of up to $2500 per violation or $7500 per intentional violation. CC §1798.155(b). The California Attorney General is responsible for enforcing the CCPA, although amendments made to it in September 2018 delay enforcement until July 1, 2020, or six months after the Attorney General publishes implementing regulations, whichever is earlier. CC §1798.185(c). Chapter 9 includes a lengthy summary of the CCPA. See §9.18A.

Under COPPA, a state attorney general may also bring civil enforcement actions against a website operator for any failure to comply with it or the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Rule (COPPA Rule) (16 CFR §§312.1–312.13). 15 USC §6504. See §9.33A.

Although less common, state actions have become an increasingly important enforcement mechanism. In 2018, for example, the largest-ever civil penalty under COPPA was levied by the New York Attorney General. There, Oath (formerly known as AOL) agreed to pay $4.95 million to settle allegations of improper tracking and targeting of children in violation of COPPA. See In another example, the State of New Mexico Office of the Attorney General filed a civil complaint against several tech companies, alleging that the companies extracted personal information from children as they played mobile apps and games. The New Mexico Attorney General alleged that the children’s information was then used to build profiles about the children and target advertising to them, in violation of COPPA. See See §9.33A.

Initial Coin Offerings

On April 3, 2019, the SEC issued formal guidance in its report, Division of Corporation Finance, Framework for “Investment Contract” Analysis of Digital Assets (Apr. 3, 2019), available at, to assist sponsors of ICOs in determining whether a digital asset proposed to be issued is a security. The SEC reiterated its reliance on Howey and subsequent cases and set forth the analytical steps for application of the Howey test to digital assets. Most notably, the SEC also set forth factors to be considered in determining whether and when a digital asset may no longer be a security, thus providing a preliminary roadmap for avoiding SEC regulation. At the same time, the SEC cautioned that the factors identified were not intended to be exhaustive and that no single factor is determinative. See §10.5C.

Taxation of Internet Transactions

In South Dakota v Wayfair, Inc. (2018) 585 US ___, 138 S Ct 2080, the U.S. Supreme Court acknowledged recent estimates that states were losing from $8 billion to $33 billion in revenues annually on account of their inability to collect sales taxes on sales made online by out-of-state retailers to in-state residents. Overruling prior Supreme Court precedent, the Court held that a retailer may have a substantial nexus with a state without having a physical presence in that state. At issue in Wayfair was South Dakota legislation that required retailers to collect sales and use tax if the retailer either (1) delivered more than $100,000 of goods or services into the state or (2) engaged in 200 or more separate transactions for the delivery of goods or services into the state. The Court ruled that the legislation afforded a reasonable degree of protection for small businesses and that the nexus was constitutionally sufficient. The Court also noted that the legislation was not retroactive. See §§10.17, 10.23.

Beginning April 1, 2019, retailers located outside California are required to register with the California Department of Tax and Fee Administration (CDTFA), collect the California use tax, and pay the tax to the CDTFA based on the amount of their sales into California, even if they do not have a physical presence in the state. The collection requirement applies to a retailer if, during the preceding or current calendar year, combined sales by the retailer and related parties of tangible personal property for delivery in California exceed $500,000, regardless of the number of separate transactions. Rev & T C §6203(c)(4), as amended by AB 147 (Stats 2019, ch 5). See §§10.24–10.25.

Advertising on the Internet

In In re 1-800 Contacts, Inc. (Nov. 7, 2018) FTC Docket No. 9372, the FTC determined that trademark settlement agreements prohibiting a settling competitor from using 1-800 Contacts’ trademark in its bids for online advertisements were anticompetitive. There existed less anticompetitive alternatives to prevent trademark infringement. The FTC ordered 1-800 Contacts to cease and desist from enforcing those provisions or entering into any similar agreements in the future. See §17.7.

Effective as of July 1, 2019, it is “unlawful for any person to use a bot to communicate or interact with another person in California online, with the intent to mislead the other person about its artificial identity for the purpose of knowingly deceiving the person about the content of the communication in order to incentivize a purchase or sale of goods or services in a commercial transaction.” Bus & P C §17940. If a business chooses to communicate using a bot, the disclosure about the nature of the bot “shall be clear, conspicuous, and reasonably designed to inform persons with whom the bot communicates or interacts that it is a bot.” Bus & P C §17941. A “bot” is an “automated online account where all or substantially all of the actions or posts of that account are not the result of a person.” Bus & P C §17940. This bot law applies to public-facing Internet websites, web applications, and digital applications that have had 10 million or more unique monthly United States visitors or users for a majority of the preceding 12 months. It does not apply to companies such as Internet service providers. Bus & P C §§17940, 17942. See §17.10B.

Many companies are using automated texts to drive engagement with their brands. These automated texts may be regulated by the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (TCPA), codified at 47 USC §227. See also Satterfield v Simon & Schuster, Inc. (9th Cir 2009) 569 F3d 946, 953 (explaining that TCPA also applies to texts). “As originally enacted, the TCPA placed restrictions on the use of automated telephone equipment, including automatic telephone dialing systems and telephone facsimile machines.” Marks v Crunch San Diego, LLC (9th Cir 2018) 904 F3d 1041, 1044. The Ninth Circuit has held that an automatic telephone dialing system (ATDS) “means equipment which has the capacity—(1) to store numbers to be called or (2) to produce numbers to be called, using a random or sequential number generator—and to dial such numbers automatically (even if the system must be turned on or triggered by a person).” 904 F3d at 1053. See §17.29A.


A checklist for cybersecurity preparedness has been added to §18.10.

Internet-Related Litigation

In Freestream Aircraft (Berm.) Ltd. v Aero Law Group (9th Cir 2018) 905 F3d 597, the court explained that it generally conducts a three-part inquiry into the defendant’s contacts with the plaintiff’s chosen forum to determine whether those contacts are sufficient to warrant the court’s exercise of jurisdiction. The test is as follows (905 F3d at 603):

  • The nonresident defendant must purposefully direct its activities or consummate some transaction with the forum or resident thereof, or perform some act by which it purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and protections of its laws;

  • The claim must be one that arises out of or relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and

  • The exercise of jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice, i.e., it must be reasonable.

See §19.6.

The Internet has leveraged exponentially the speech and speech-related activities of individuals and businesses. As a consequence, potential liability for speech-related activities has increased. Online speech can result in state tort liability (such as defamation, invasion of privacy, fraud, and unfair business practices) or federal tort liability (such as copyright and trademark infringement). At the same time, important protections have emerged, including protections under First Amendment jurisprudence, §230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA), and California’s anti-SLAPP statute (CCP §425.16). Chapter 20 has been substantially expanded to address liability related to the First Amendment and speech-related activities. See chap 20.

In U.S. v Ackell (1st Cir 2018) 907 F3d 67, the defendant, an adult male who had been convicted of violating the federal anti-stalking statute (18 USC §2261A), challenged the statute on First Amendment grounds. The defendant had been communicating with an adolescent female through an Internet chat room. The court highlighted the exceptions to protected speech for “true threats” (see Virginia v Black (2003) 538 US 343, 359, 123 S Ct 1536) and “speech integral to criminal conduct” (see U.S. v Alvarez (2012) 567 US 709, 717, 132 S Ct 2537). The exception for “‘true threats’ encompass[es] those statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” Ackell, 907 F3d at 75, citing Black, 538 US at 359. See §20.9.

The Ninth Circuit allows defendants to bring anti-SLAPP motions to strike state law claims in federal court. Planned Parenthood Fed’n v Center for Med. Progress (9th Cir 2018) 890 F3d 828, amended (9th Cir 2018) 897 F3d 1224. However, the Ninth Circuit has applied the anti-SLAPP statute differently in some key respects. See §20.92. Not all federal courts have allowed anti-SLAPP motions, on the grounds that they conflict with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Los Lobos Renewable Power, LLC v Americulture, Inc. (10th Cir 2018) 885 F3d 659, 672. See §20.77.

The “connection” element requires examining the specific nature of the statement and whether it concerns or is about the asserted public interest. Rand Resources, LLC v City of Carson (2019) 6 C5th 610. See §20.89.

In 2018, the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (47 USC §230) was amended to provide that §230 does not immunize Internet service providers and other providers of interactive computer services (see §20.104) against enforcement of federal and state criminal and civil laws prohibiting sexual exploitation of children, sex trafficking, or promotion or facilitation of prostitution (in jurisdictions where prostitution is illegal). 47 USC §230(e)(5). In Congress’s view, §230 was never intended to provide legal protection to websites that unlawfully promote and facilitate prostitution or websites that facilitate traffickers by advertising the sale of unlawful sex acts with sex trafficking victims. See Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017 (Pub L 115–164, 132 Stat 1253). See §20.112.

The role of a “publisher” is broader than merely providing a forum for the third party content to be posted. Under the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (47 USC §230), “lawsuits seeking to hold a service provider liable for its exercise of a publisher’s traditional editorial functions – such as deciding whether to publish, withdraw, postpone or alter content – are barred.” Hassell v Bird (2018) 5 C5th 522, 541. See §20.115.

A plaintiff cannot seek to enforce an injunction against a person or entity protected by the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (47 USC §230). Hassell v Bird (2018) 5 C5th 522, 540. In Hassell, the plaintiff sued his former client for defamation and related torts based on a review posted on Yelp!. The plaintiff deliberately omitted Yelp! from his complaint, knowing that it would otherwise be immune under §230. After obtaining a default judgment and injunctive relief against the defendant and her “agents,” plaintiff sought to enforce the injunction against Yelp!, which was granted by the trial court and upheld by the court of appeal. The California Supreme Court reversed, holding that the injunction sought to hold Yelp! liable for being the speaker and publisher of the post, which was barred by §230. See §20.118.


In Facebook, Inc. v Superior Court (2018) 4 C5th 1245, the California Supreme Court balanced the due process rights of criminal defendants with the privacy rights of witnesses. The defendant filed motions to subpoena public and private Facebook posts from an adverse witness. Facebook filed motions to quash the subpoenas on privacy grounds. The court held that the subpoenas were unenforceable with respect to communications addressed to specific persons and communications that were and have remained configured by the registered user to be restricted. However, under the lawful consent exception of 18 USC §2702(b)(3), social media providers must disclose communications that were configured by the registered user to be public and that remained so configured at the time the subpoenas were issued in accordance with state law. See §20A.5.

Courts have held that when a party fails to produce nonprivileged, nonprotected, and relevant electronic evidence based on the producing party’s good faith yet legally incorrect claims that the evidence is privileged, the producing party may be forced to produce the documents but would be, at most, subject to sanctions under Fed R Civ P 37(e)(1) for failure to produce without an intent to deprive the requesting party of its rightful discovery (i.e., mere negligence). The harsher Fed R Civ P 37(e)(2), which carries more severe penalties such as adverse inferences, adverse jury instructions, or outright dismissal of the action, would not be imposed if ill intent appears absent. See Schmalz v Village of N. Riverside (ND Ill, Mar. 23, 2018, No. 13 C 8012) 2018 US Dist Lexis 216011. Yet, in 2018, courts have imposed monetary sanctions with record disproportionality to the amount in controversy when bad faith rather than mere negligence is found. For example, in Klipsch Group, Inc. v ePRO E-Commerce Ltd. (2d Cir 2018) 880 F3d 620, the Second Circuit upheld a trial court discovery sanction of $2.7 million in a case in which the amount in dispute did not exceed $25,000. The defendant intentionally did not comply with its legal hold requirements and was also found to have willfully despoiled relevant and discoverable electronic evidence. Similarly, in 2018, a Nevada federal judge awarded nearly $820,000 in sanctions for serial discovery violations and evidence destruction in an ongoing wage-and-hour class action when the defendant failed to produce e-mail and text messages and other electronically stored information. See Small v University Med. Ctr. (D Nev, July 31, 2018, No. 2:13–cv–0298–APG–PAL) 2018 US Dist Lexis 127803. See §20A.8.

Recently, harsh sanctions have been upheld for intentional alteration of digital evidence. In 2018, a court issued terminating sanctions after finding that a party knowingly and intentionally fabricated e-mail messages to bolster its case in chief while knowingly deleting damaging ESI for that same reason. See ComLab, Corp. v Kal Tire & Kal Tire Mining Tire Group (SD NY, Sept. 11, 2018, No. 17–cv–1907 (KBF)) 2018 US Dist Lexis 154983. See §20A.19.

U.S. v Henderson (9th Cir 2018) 906 F3d 1109 involved a Network Investigative Technique (NIT) search warrant issued by a federal court magistrate in the Eastern District of Virginia to search a computer located at a residence in California that was tied to a suspect IP address communicating with a server in Virginia. The police were investigating child pornography file transfer activity between the two computers. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the federal district court’s denial of a motion to suppress, including the evidence seized in California. The Ninth Circuit held that the NIT warrant violated Fed R Crim P 41(b) by authorizing a search outside the issuing magistrate judge’s territorial authority, rejecting the government’s contention that the NIT mechanism was a “tracking device” for which out-of-district warrants are authorized by Fed R Crim P 41(b)(4), and that the Rule 41 violation was a fundamental, constitutional error. However, the panel concluded that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied to prevent suppression of the evidence obtained against the defendant through the NIT warrant. The court found that there was no evidence that the officers executing the NIT warrant acted in bad faith. See §20A.30.

International Issues

Although geo-filtering software is typically effective under most circumstances, in recent years a variety of methods to circumvent these measures have become easily accessible to the public, including virtual private networks (VPNs), Domain Name System (DNS) proxies, and browser plug-ins. See Edelman, The Thrill of Anticipation: Why the Circumvention of Geoblocks Should Be Illegal, 15 Va Sports & Ent LJ 110 (2015–16). In essence, each of these circumvention methods works by making the location of the user appear to be in the same country as the content provider. To combat these tactics, recent Regulation (EU) 2018/302 was passed in the EU to address unjustified geo-blocking and other forms of discrimination. See Although these services may seem nefarious from the perspective of intellectual property right owners, proponents of these services contend that they are vital to protecting anonymous free speech and privacy rights. See §21.7.

The recent popularization of cryptocurrency has also introduced the possibility of using so-called “smart contracts” in cross-border transactions when enforcement may otherwise be difficult. In general, a smart contract is a computer program designed to execute the terms of a contract on the occurrence of a pre-programmed triggering event. Smart contracts are discussed further in California Law of Contracts §4.67 (Cal CEB). Because smart contracts are self-executing, they tend to reduce the risk of breach and thus the possibility of having to adjudicate a claim in a foreign jurisdiction. Despite their promising potential, however, and depending on the structure of the smart contract, they may be vulnerable to hacks and other cybersecurity threats. Thus, the chance that smart contracts will become ubiquitous remains far from clear. See §21.8.

Despite harmonization efforts, variations in the scope of intellectual property protection available may differ significantly from country to country. Even when countries enter into an agreement, its provisions are not equally enforced by all parties. As a result, e-commerce businesses, among others, face substantial challenges in protecting their intellectual property, regardless of whether they conduct business in foreign markets or limit their sales to the United States. Although the issue is not new, the development of e-commerce infrastructure has brought certain kinds of infringement to unprecedented levels. One of the most pervasive examples of this phenomenon is the counterfeiting epidemic faced by online retailers. Popular products quickly become targets for counterfeiting and other forms of copying. When those counterfeit products are then shipped into the United States, manufacturers and retailers of the genuine goods not only lose profits based on those sales, but the typically inferior quality of the counterfeit goods harms the brand’s reputation, while also potentially posing health and safety hazards to consumers. See, e.g., According to a major report released by the International Trademark Association (INTA), the total value of international and domestic trade in counterfeit and pirated goods in 2013 was estimated at $710 billion to $917 billion, with projections of $1.9 trillion to $2.8 trillion by 2022. See Frontier Economics, The Economic Impacts of Counterfeiting and Piracy (BASCAP and INTA, 2017), available at See §21.9.

About the Authors

CLARA RUYAN MARTIN received her B.A. degree from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1985 and her J.D. degree from the University of Michigan Law School in 1989. She was a founding partner of the Los Angeles law firm Cadence Law Group LLP. She specializes in structuring, drafting, negotiation, and implementation of complex corporate and technology transactions. Her corporate work includes mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, corporate finance, and venture representation. Her technology practice is broad, ranging from software licensing and development to strategic alliances and e-commerce. Ms. Martin is an adjunct professor at the University of Southern California School of Law. She has served on the Cyberlaw Committee of the State Bar of California and is a frequent lecturer on topics such as software licensing agreements, Internet-related agreements, complex joint ventures, venture finance, and mergers and acquisitions.

DAVID B. OSHINSKY received his B.A. degree from Yale University in 1991 and his J.D. degree from Columbia Law School in 1996, where he was a member of the Columbia Law Review. He is a founding partner of the Los Angeles law firm Cadence Law Group LLP. Mr. Oshinsky works with many start-up and early-stage companies, for which he provides counsel regarding their early operational, financing, and intellectual property requirements. He regularly assists clients with venture capital financing; technology transactions; and mergers, acquisitions, and related corporate transactions. In particular, his practice involves the structuring, drafting, and negotiating of technology licenses, website policies and agreements, software development agreements, and strategic alliances. Mr. Oshinsky has written and lectured on a broad range of technology topics, including website development agreements, strategic alliances, intellectual property issues in mergers and acquisitions, and Internet law in California.

About the 2019 Update Authors

ROM BAR-NISSIM received his B.F.A. from Florida Atlantic University in 2002 and his J.D. from the University of Southern California Gould School of Law in 2013, where he received the Norma Zarky Memorial Award for excellence in entertainment law. Mr. Bar-Nissim’s practice focuses on the Internet, media, and entertainment industries, with an emphasis on copyright. He has coauthored several public comments and amicus briefs concerning copyright and digital issues. In 2014, he coauthored, with Professor Jack Lerner, a chapter on law enforcement practices for the American Bar Association publication Whistleblowers, Leaks and the Media: National Security and the First Amendment. Mr. Bar-Nissim is Co-Executive Editor of this update, a 2019 update co-author of chapters 1 and 14, and the 2019 update author of chapter 20.

TOMASZ R. BARCZYK is an associate at Kronenberger Rosenfeld, LLP, San Francisco, where he focuses much of his practice on litigating trademark, copyright, false advertising, privacy, and technology and Internet-related business disputes. Mr. Barczyk also counsels clients on trademark and copyright portfolio management through U.S. and international clearance, prosecution, maintenance, enforcement, and dispute resolution. In addition, he is active with the American Bar Association, where he serves as Chair of the Trademark Litigation Case Monitoring Subcommittee. Mr. Barczyk graduated from the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, where he earned a J.D. with a specialization certificate in law and technology, and obtained a B.A. in Political Science and Psychology from Northwestern University. He is a member of the California and Illinois State Bars. Mr. Barczyk is a 2019 update co-author of chapter 21.

LIANA W. CHEN is a senior associate at Kronenberger Rosenfeld, LLP, San Francisco. Ms. Chen’s practice focuses on Internet law, new media, and technology and includes online defamation, advertising, and data privacy and security matters. She zealously advocates for clients at all stages of litigation. She is a member of the State Bar of California, the District of Columbia Bar, and the Virginia State Bar (inactive/associate). She obtained her J.D., with high honors, from The George Washington University Law School, where she was the winner of the international Manfred Lachs Space Law Moot Court Competition in the Czech Republic, and her B.A., summa cum laude, in International Studies-Economics from the University of California, San Diego. Ms. Chen is a 2019 update co-author of chapter 21.

KIMBERLY CULP is a director at Carr McClellan P.C., Burlingame (in the Silicon Valley), where she works with digital media, video game, and consumer products companies to help them resolve their intellectual property and advertising issues. Ms. Culp has authored numerous articles on advertising issues, including New Media Affords New Ways to Deliver Advertising and Branded Content—and New Challenges, 31 CEB Cal Bus L Prac 92 (Summer 2016). She also regularly presents at industry conferences on these legal issues. Ms. Culp has been a “Super Lawyers Rising Star” every year since 2012. She received her undergraduate degree from U.C. Davis and her law degree from U.C. Hastings. Ms. Culp is the 2019 update author of chapter 17.

DANIEL M. GOLDBERG is counsel to Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz P.C., Los Angeles, where he represents top brands, agencies, and technology providers in complex negotiations involving the collection, use, and monetization of data. He helps clients develop privacy and data security programs and policies, conduct due diligence for fundraising and acquisitions, and respond to data incidents and inquiries. He has spent the past two years helping clients address GDPR compliance, and is now actively working with clients to prepare for the CCPA, effective January 1, 2020. Mr. Goldberg is a writer and frequent public speaker on privacy, ad tech, and emerging technology, and has spoken at programs sponsored by ABA, NAD, CARU, and ESRB, among others. He co-chairs the Los Angeles chapter of IAPP, and is certified CIPP/US. Mr. Goldberg is a 2019 update co-author of chapter 9.

LYRIC KAPLAN is an associate in the Privacy and Data Security Group at Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz P.C., Los Angeles. She advises clients in all industries on an array of privacy and data security matters involving the collection, use, storage, and monetization of data. She has authored several articles and recently co-authored Artificial Intelligence: Risks to Privacy and Democracy published in the Yale Journal of Law and Technology. Ms. Kaplan received her undergraduate degree from the University of Southern California School of Cinematic Arts, her law degree from Southwestern Law School, her master in business administration from Pepperdine University, and her Masters of Law in Privacy and Cybersecurity from Loyola Law School. Ms. Kaplan is a 2019 update co-author of chapter 9.

AMY LAWRENCE is an associate with Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz P.C., Los Angeles, where she advises clients across industries in privacy and data security matters. She represents multinational and emerging companies on all facets of data protection, processing, and monetization. Ms. Lawrence works with clients to develop privacy and data security programs and policies, respond to regulatory inquiries, and conduct privacy due diligence. She is certified as an Information Privacy Professional (CIPP/US). Ms. Lawrence received her undergraduate degree from the University of Pittsburgh, and her law degree from Fordham University School of Law. She is admitted to practice in both California and New York. Ms. Lawrence is a 2019 update co-author of chapter 9.

JACK LERNER is Clinical Professor of Law at the University of California, Irvine, School of Law, and Director of the UCI Intellectual Property, Arts, and Technology Clinic. Professor Lerner received his B.A., with distinction, in English from the University of Kansas and his J.D. from Harvard Law School. He clerked for Judge Fred I. Parker on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit and Judge G. Thomas Van Bebber in the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas. He practiced intellectual property law with the Palo Alto law firm Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C., and has taught at the University of California, Berkeley, School of Law and the University of Southern California Gould School of Law. In 2016, Professor Lerner was awarded the California Lawyer Attorney of the Year award for his work obtaining exemptions to the copyright laws that affect documentary filmmakers and authors nationwide. Professor Lerner is Co-Executive Editor of this update and a 2019 update co-author of chapters 1 and 14.

ALEXANDER H. LUBARSKY received his B.A. from Lewis and Clark College and his J.D. and L.L.M. from Golden Gate University School of Law. Mr. Lubarsky is a practicing litigator, electronic discovery consultant, and author. He has litigated hundreds of cases involving electronic discovery and has received numerous awards in the industry, including the TechnoLawyer @ Award. Mr. Lubarsky has been elected to the Executive Committee of the Law Practice Management and Technology Section of the State Bar of California and is on the editorial boards of several technology publications. He has consulted for numerous companies that provide electronic discovery support services, including Summation Legal Technologies, Inc.; Fios, Inc.; Guidance Software, Inc.; Daticon, LLC; and Zantaz, Inc. Mr. Lubarsky regularly consults with large law firms and Fortune 500 corporations in the area of ESI retention, e-discovery best practices, and litigation holds. Mr. Lubarsky is the author and 2019 update author of chapter 20A.

JAMES MARIANI is an associate in the Privacy and Data Security Group at Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz P.C., New York. He handles regulatory, operational, and transactional matters related to data privacy, security, and incident response. He advises on a wide variety of technology-based and digital media issues at the crossroads of business, law, and technology. Mr. Mariani received an LLM from Cornell Law School at Cornell Tech, a professional graduate certificate in cybersecurity from Harvard University, a JD from the University of Illinois College of Law, and Bachelors in both Science and Arts from the CUNY Macaulay Honors College. He is certified as an Information Privacy Professional in US specific laws (CIPP/US) as well as that of the European Union (CIPP/E), and is admitted to practice in New York. Mr. Mariani is a 2019 update co-author of chapter 9.

CLARA RUYAN MARTIN received her B.A. from the University of California, Berkeley, in 1985 and her J.D. from the University of Michigan Law School in 1989. She specializes in the structuring, drafting, negotiation, and implementation of complex corporate and technology transactions. Her corporate work includes mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, corporate finance, and venture representation. Her technology practice is broad, ranging from software licensing and development to strategic alliances and e-commerce. Ms. Martin is an adjunct professor at the University of Southern California Gould School of Law. She has served on the Cyberlaw Committee of the State Bar of California and is a frequent lecturer on topics such as software licensing agreements, Internet-related agreements, complex joint ventures, venture finance, and mergers and acquisitions. Ms. Martin is the author and 2019 update author of chapters 6–8.

C. WOOK PAK is a partner with Cislo & Thomas, LLP, Los Angeles, where he practices all aspects of intellectual property procurement and enforcement, including preparing and filing U.S. and international patent applications in a variety of technological fields, such as mechanical, pharmaceutical, energy, and business methods. He has publications in law and science, including a commentary published in the Berkeley Technology Law Journal, and has had a number of speaking engagements regarding patent law. Dr. Pak is a litigator and registered patent attorney. He received his B.S. in Biophysics and Biochemistry from Oregon State University, his Ph.D. in Neuroscience from the University of California, Riverside, and his law degree from Loyola Law School in Los Angeles. Dr. Pak is the 2019 update author of chapter 2.

JEFFREY G. SHELDON received his J.D., summa cum laude, from Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; his B.S. in chemical engineering from the Carnegie Institute of Technology; and his M.S. in biomedical engineering from the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow, Scotland. His studies in Scotland followed his receipt of a Marshall Scholarship. Mr. Sheldon is a partner in Cislo & Thomas LLP, Los Angeles, and was the founding partner of Sheldon Mak & Anderson PC, Pasadena. He is past president of the intellectual property section of the State Bar of California, past president of the Los Angeles Intellectual Property Law Association, and past committee chairman for the AIPLA and IP section of the ABA. Mr. Sheldon served as a consultant in 2019 for chapter 2.

KENNETH L. WILTON is a partner in the Intellectual Property Practice Group of Seyfarth Shaw LLP, Los Angeles, and chair of the firm’s national trademark practice. Mr. Wilton’s practice focuses primarily on false advertising, trademark, copyright, and patent litigation in the U.S. federal courts and on counseling and prosecution in the areas of trademark and copyright law. He has extensive experience litigating trademark disputes before the Trademark Trial and Appeals Board of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Mr. Wilton has taught trademark law in practice and Internet law at USC’s Gould School of Law. He is consistently listed in the World Trademark Review’s Top 1000 trademark practitioners worldwide, the International Who’s Who of Trademark Lawyers, and Managing Intellectual Property’s “IP Stars.” In 2019, Mr. Wilton was selected as one of 30 trademark attorneys recognized nationally in Expert Guides’ 2019 edition of Best of the Best USA. Mr. Wilton received his B.A. in history from the University of California, Los Angeles, and his J.D. from Hastings College of the Law, where he was editor-in-chief of the Hastings Journal of Communications and Entertainment Law. Mr. Wilton is the 2019 update author of chapter 18.

RAFFI V. ZEROUNIAN is a partner with Hanson Bridgett LLP, Los Angeles, where he has a 360-degree trademark and copyright practice, handling all facets of counseling, clearance, prosecution, enforcement, and litigation domestically and internationally. His practice also includes domain name disputes through the Uniform Domain Name Resolution Policy and lawsuits involving the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act. In addition, Raffi has broad experience with litigation involving counterfeit and gray market goods. He serves as a Senior Editor for the International Trademark Association’s Trademark Reporter® and is listed as a top trademark practitioner in the World Trademark Review’s WTR1000 rankings. Mr. Zerounian is the 2019 update author of chapter 3.

Products specifications
PRACTICE AREA Law Practice Skills
Products specifications
PRACTICE AREA Law Practice Skills